

The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations

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Introduction

IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS BOOK, the term "interpersonal relations" denotes relations between a few, usually between two, people. How one person thinks and feels about another person, how he perceives him and what he does to him, what he expects him to do or think, how he reacts to the actions of the other—these are some of the phenomena that will be treated. Our concern will be with "surface" matters, the events that occur in everyday life on a conscious level, rather than with the unconscious processes studied by psychoanalysis in "depth" psychology. These intuitively understood and "obvious" human relations can, as we shall see, be just as challenging and psychologically significant as the deeper and stranger phenomena.

The discussion will center on the person as the basic unit to be investigated. That is to say, the two-person group and its properties as a superindividual unit will not be the focus of attention. Of course, in dealing with the person as a member of a dyad, he cannot be described as a lone subject in an impersonal environment, but must be represented as standing in relation to and interacting with another person. Moreover, the fact that the interrelation is with another person and not an object means that the psychological world of the other person as seen by the subject must enter into the analysis. Generally, a person reacts to what he thinks the other person is perceiving, feeling, and thinking, in addition to what the other person may be doing. In other words, the presumed events inside the other person's skin usually enter as essential features of the relation.

The Lag of Scientific Psychology

Interpersonal relations have commanded man's attention from early times and he has recorded his beliefs about the ways of people in innumerable myths, folk tales, novels, poems, plays, and popular or philosophical essays. That man is curious about human relations, that he has an affinity for such matters and is able to assimilate them, is seen in the fact that his attention is often caught by even an ordinary view of two people talking together or of one person doing something to another. Writers and popularizers have made use of this quality of human nature; the human-interest angle of stories is played up and even atoms are described as if they were people.

Though the full significance of man's relations to man may not be directly evident, the complexity of feelings and actions that can be understood at a glance is surprisingly great. It is for this reason that psychology holds a unique position among the sciences. "Intuitive" knowledge may be remarkably penetrating and can go a long way toward the understanding of human behavior, whereas in the physical sciences such common-sense knowledge is relatively primitive. If we erased all knowledge of scientific physics from our world, not only would we not have cars and television sets and atom bombs, we might even find that the ordinary person was unable to cope with the fundamental mechanical problems of pulleys and levers. On the other hand, if we removed all knowledge of scientific psychology from our world, problems in interpersonal relations might easily be coped with and solved much as before. Man would still "know" how to avoid doing something asked of him, and how to get someone to agree with him; he would still "know" when someone was angry and when someone was pleased. He could even offer sensible explanations for the "whys" of much of his behavior and feelings. In other words, the ordinary person has a great and profound understanding of himself and of other people which, though unformulated or only vaguely conceived, enables him to interact with others in more or less adaptive ways. Köhler (1940), in referring to the lack of great discoveries in psychology as compared with physics, accounts for this by the fact that "man was acquainted with practically all territories of mental life a long time before the founding of scientific psychology" (p. 3).

Paradoxically, with all this natural, intuitive, common-sense capacity to grasp human relations, the science of human relations has been one of the last to develop. Different explanations of this paradox have been suggested. One is that science would destroy the vain and pleasing illusions man has about himself (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948,

p. 6); but one might ask why people have always loved to read the pessimistic, debunking writers from Ecclesiastes to Freud. It has also been proposed that just because we know so much about people intuitively, there has been less incentive for studying them scientifically; why should one develop a theory, carry out systematic observation, or make predictions about the obvious? In any case, the field of human relations with its vast literary documentation but meager scientific treatment is in great contrast to the field of physics in which there are relatively few nonscientific books.

The study of interpersonal relations has been treated only tangentially in the field of personality and social psychology. Personality investigators have been largely concerned with the isolation of personality traits and their patterning in personality structure. Though many personality traits, for example, introversion or extroversion, imply certain characteristic behavior toward other people, the interpersonal behavior itself has not often been a focus of study.

The scientific study of interpersonal relations may be thought of as belonging to social psychology. However, social psychologists have been mainly interested in the relations between people when larger groups play a role. In these cases problems arise that are more conspicuous and of more obvious importance than those that characterize the relations between two people. What determined John's attitude to Jim has not been investigated as thoroughly as John's attitude toward a group or the attitude of the group toward John; persuading another person has been neglected in favor of propaganda directed toward a wider public; and we hear little about conflicts between two people but much about industrial or international conflict. One might ask whether a study of the relations between two people might not throw new light on group problems.

To be sure, in recent times interpersonal relations in the two- or three-person group have more and more engaged the attention of workers in different fields. H. S. Sullivan and the Neo-Freudians in clinical psychology; Mayo, Roethlisberger and Homans in industrial psychology; Cartwright, Festinger, Lippitt, and Newcomb in social psychology; Moreno and Jennings in sociometry—all these and many others treat problems belonging to the psychology of interpersonal relations.

The Approach Used in the Present Study

This book is neither meant to provide an exhaustive survey of the literature and findings in the field of interpersonal relations, nor is it meant to be complete in the treatment of the problems selected. Its

main purpose is to present some considerations that may be helpful in building a conceptual framework suitable to some of the problems in this field.

We could go about this in the Baconian way, that is, by seeking further empirical and experimental facts. We side, however, with those who think that we shall not attain a conceptual framework by collecting more experimental results. Rather, conceptual clarification is a prerequisite for efficient experimentation. Northrop presents a concrete case for this point of view by illustrating what Galilei would have done and achieved had he followed the Baconian way:

... Galilei would have thrown and shot off all kinds of projectiles, carefully observing and describing what happened, gathering more and more detailed empirical information until this information added up to a generalization which was the answer. It is likely that had Galilei done this, he or his successors would still be observing, with the problem unsolved. . . . [Instead Galilei analyzed his problem by] noting the traditional assumptions which generated it. Once this was done, it became evident that his problem centered not in the projectile but in the Aristotelian definition of force, a definition which applied not merely to projectiles but to any motion whatever. (Northrop, 1947, p. 22.)

This discussion must not be construed to mean that experimentation could be dispensed with. Our point is rather that each definite advance in science requires a theoretical analysis and conceptual clarification of the problem. It is our belief that in the field of interpersonal relations we have a great deal of empirical knowledge already, and that we can arrive at systematic understanding and crucial experiments more rapidly by attempting to clarify the theory.

The task of conceptual clarification will be approached from two bases or starting points: We shall make use of the unformulated or half-formulated knowledge of interpersonal relations as it is expressed in our everyday language and experience—this source will be referred to as common-sense or naive psychology; we shall also draw upon the knowledge and insights of scientific investigation and theory in order to make possible a conceptual systematization of the phenomena under study. Such systematization is an important feature of any science and reveals relationships among highly diverse events. Lewin's field-theoretical approach known as topology (Lewin, 1936, 1938) has been in the background of much of the thinking in the present theory of interpersonal relations. Though not many of the specific concepts of topology have been taken over, they have helped in the construction of new ones with which we have tried to represent some of the basic facts of human relations.

Common-Sense Psychology

The study of common-sense psychology is of value for the scientific understanding of interpersonal relations in two ways. First, since common-sense psychology guides our behavior toward other people, it is an essential part of the phenomena in which we are interested. In everyday life we form ideas about other people and about social situations. We interpret other people's actions and we predict what they will do under certain circumstances. Though these ideas are usually not formulated, they often function adequately. They achieve in some measure what a science is supposed to achieve: an adequate description of the subject matter which makes prediction possible. In the same way one talks about a naive physics which consists of the unformulated ways we take account of simple mechanical laws in our adapted actions, one can talk about a "naive psychology" which gives us the principles we use to build up our picture of the social environment and which guides our reactions to it. An explanation of this behavior, therefore, must deal with common-sense psychology regardless of whether its assumptions and principles prove valid under scientific scrutiny. If a person believes that the lines in his palm foretell his future, this belief must be taken into account in explaining certain of his expectations and actions.

Second, the study of common-sense psychology may be of value because of the truths it contains, notwithstanding the fact that many psychologists have mistrusted and even looked down on such unschooled understanding of human behavior. For these psychologists, what one knows intuitively, what one understands through untrained reflection, offers little—at best a superficial and chaotic view of things, at worst a distortion of psychological events. They point, for example, to the many contradictions that are to be found in this body of material, such as antithetical proverbs or contradictions in a person's interpretation of even simple events. But can a scientist accept such contradictions as proof of the worthlessness of common-sense psychology? If we were to do so, then we would also have to reject the scientific approach, for its history is fraught with contradictions among theories, and even among experimental findings. We would have to concur with Skinner who actually draws this conclusion in regard to theory-making in the psychology of learning (Skinner, 1950).

This book defends the opposite point of view, namely, that scientific psychology has a good deal to learn from common-sense psychology. In interpersonal relations, perhaps more than in any other field of knowledge, fruitful concepts and hunches for hypotheses lie dormant

and unformulated in what we know intuitively. Homans (1950) in sociology and Ryle (1949) in philosophy have also given a central place in their disciplines to everyday practice and knowledge concerning human relations. Whitehead, writing as a philosopher, mathematician, and educator, has still further elevated the status of common-sense ideas by according to them an essential place in *all* sciences. He has stated

... science is rooted in what I have just called the whole apparatus of common sense thought. That is the *datum* from which it starts, and to which it must recur. . . . You may polish up common sense, you may contradict it in detail, you may surprise it. But ultimately your whole task is to satisfy it. (Whitehead, 1929, p. 110.)

Oppenheimer, the physicist, has also stated this view with equal firmness:

... all sciences arise as refinement, corrections, and adaptations of common sense. (Oppenheimer, 1956, p. 128.)
 ... we may well say that all ideas that occur in common sense are fair as starting points, not guaranteed to work but perfectly valid as the material of the analogies with which we start. (p. 134)

Actually, all psychologists use common-sense ideas in their scientific thinking; but they usually do so without analyzing them and making them explicit.

It is also our belief that the insights concerning interpersonal relations embodied in fables, novels, and other literary forms, provide a fertile source of understanding. This belief has been shared by many psychologists. Lewin has said,

The most complete and concrete descriptions of situations are those which writers such as Dostoevski have given us. These descriptions have attained what the statistical characterizations have most notably lacked, namely, a picture that shows in a definite way how the different facts in an individual's environment are related to each other and to the individual himself. . . . If psychology is to make predictions about behavior, it must try to accomplish this same task by *conceptual means*. (Lewin, 1936, p. 13.)

Allport (1937), too, thinks that a "still greater treasure for the psychologist lies in the world's store of *drama, biographies, poetry, and fiction*" (p. 60). Of course, it is clear that the job of the psychologist does not stop with the insights of the creative writer. Allport points out that

The psychologist . . . has an inescapable interest in the discovery of general principles, of laws of human behavior . . . the literary writer cares primarily for the individual case, leaving to the reader the task of generalizing the insight he gains. (Allport, 1937, p. 61.)

Though this is doubtless true for many writers, one might add that there are also a great number who are interested in revealing the laws of human nature through their characterizations. If we scan any collection of quotations we find a great many general statements concerning human behavior. Many writers would agree with Proust, who says

... it is the feeling for the general which in the future writer automatically selects what is general and can therefore enter into a work of art. For he has listened to the others only when, however mad or foolish they were, by repeating parrot-like what people of like character say, they had thereby become the prophet-birds, the spokesmen for a psychological law. (Proust, 1926, pp. 230-231.)

However, as Allport says, these generalizations are usually debatable. We cannot simply classify them and expect to get a psychology of interpersonal relations.

But if it is true that novelists are able to give descriptions of human behavior that are often more complete and concrete than those of a psychologist, we must assume that there are some valid features in these representations. Though the ultimate evidence on which we base our theories should be gained by scientific methods, we might use common-sense psychology to advantage in the development of hunches and concepts. The veil of obviousness that makes so many insights of intuitive psychology invisible to our scientific eye has to be pierced. The psychologist must first, however, translate the basic outlines of the nonscientific propositions into a language of more use to scientific investigations.

Language as a Conceptual Tool

The fact that we are able to describe ourselves and other people in everyday language means that it embodies much of what we have called naive psychology. This language serves us well, for it has an infinite flexibility and contains a great number of general concepts that symbolize experiences with the physical and social environment. After all, it is ordinary, nonscientific language that has served as the tool for writers in their representations of human behavior. However, this instrument lacks one important feature—a systematic representation—which is ultimately required by science. Ernst Cassirer, who was greatly concerned with the way in which reality is represented in myths, art, literature, and science, writes as follows about language:

In language we find the first efforts of classification, but these are still uncoordinated. They cannot lead to a true systematization. For the symbols of language themselves have no definite systematic order. Every single

linguistic term has a special "area of meaning." It is, as Gardiner says, "a beam of light, illumining first this portion and then that portion of the field within which the thing, or rather the complex concatenation of things signified by a sentence lies." But all these different beams of light do not have a common focus. They are dispersed and isolated. (Cassirer, 1944, p. 211.)

In other words, though nonscientific language in the hands of a master is unsurpassed for the description of even the most subtle relationships, it lacks the features of a real system. It is true that philology, whose purpose is to ascertain the elements and laws of language, has brought some order into the concepts that language expresses. Relations among words and phrases are indicated by etymological derivations, syntactical groupings and rules, and lists of antonyms and synonyms. But still the relations between terms are only crudely defined and understood. Though we know the meanings of words like "promise," "permit," or "pride" we do not know them in the same way we know the meaning of words like "two" and "four," or of words like "speed" and "acceleration." The words referring to interpersonal relations are like islands separated from each other by impassable channels. We do not know how to reach one from the other, we do not know whether they contain a certain number of basic principles of variation, or basic elements, different combinations of which produce the manifold of qualitative differences. These words have a tantalizing quality; they seem to present important concepts in their full meaning, and yet we cannot quite get hold of these concepts, because so much is hidden.

We can better appreciate this lack of systematic order if we confront representation by language with representation by numbers.

We cannot speak of single or isolated numbers. The essence of number is always relative, not absolute. A single number is only a single place in a general systematic order . . . Its meaning is defined by the position it occupies in the whole numerical system. . . . We conceive it as a new and powerful symbolism which, for all scientific purposes, is infinitely superior to the symbolism of speech. For what we find here are no longer detached words but terms that proceed according to one and the same fundamental plan and that, therefore, show us a clear and definite structural law. (Cassirer 1944, p. 212.)

Lewin, influenced by Cassirer in this respect, has emphasized again and again the importance of clarifying the systematic relations among the concepts used in scientific discourse. Operational definitions are not sufficient. In an operational definition, the concept is given meaning by the method used in arriving at it, as, for example, defining intelligence as that which is measured by an intelligence test. In

addition, Lewin proposes that a "method of construction" should be used,

which has been first developed in mathematics itself. To consider qualitatively different geometrical entities (such as, circle, ellipse, parabola) as the product of a certain combination of certain "elements of construction" (such as, points and movements) has since the time of the Greeks been the secret of this method . . . It is able, at the same time, to link and to separate; it does not minimize qualitative differences and still lays open their relation to general quantitative variables. Cassirer (1910) shows how the same method proved to be fruitful in empirical sciences where the "elements of construction" are mathematically described empirical entities (such as, forces, ions, atoms). (Lewin, 1944, pp. 5-6.)

Though the words of conventional language do not reveal their interrelations, this does not mean that there are none. It will be our task to make them manifest through a conceptual analysis. In doing so, we have to be aware of Skinner's warning:

The important objection to the vernacular in the description of behavior is that many of its terms imply conceptual schemes. I do not mean that a science of behavior is to dispense with a conceptual scheme but that it must not take over without careful consideration the schemes which underly popular speech. The vernacular is clumsy and obese; its terms overlap each other, draw unnecessary or unreal distinction, and are far from being the most convenient in dealing with the data. (Skinner, 1938, p. 7.)

One can agree with Skinner that an uncritical use of the concepts of the vernacular is not advantageous, and still be of the opinion that psychology can learn a great deal from a critical analysis of these concepts and the underlying conceptual schemes.

This, then, will be the purpose of this book: to offer suggestions for the construction of a language that will allow us to represent, if not all, at least a great number of interpersonal relations, discriminated by conventional language in such a way that their place in a general system will become clearer. This task will require identifying and defining some of the underlying concepts and their patterns of combination that characterize interpersonal relations.

We shall find that drawing upon the knowledge and concepts of psychological science will help sharpen and relate these common-sense concepts to each other. Carnap (1953) has referred to this task of redefining old concepts as the problem of *explication*; he points out that making more exact a concept that is used "in a more or less vague way either in every-day language or in an earlier stage of scientific language" is often important in the development of science and mathematics (p. 438).

We do not pretend that the scientific language that we gained in this way is as systematic as the language of physics and mathematics or, in psychology, as the language of topology or of some of the stimulus-response theorists. But we do believe that it is broader and more flexible than these other psychological languages, and at the same time, in spite of its crudeness, sufficiently exact to permit analysis of a wide variety of commonly experienced human interactions, an analysis which will at the same time "link and separate" them.

On the following pages we shall give two examples of this explication of common-sense concepts, one concerning the meaning of words, and one concerning the meaning of situations.

Word Analysis

For reasons already discussed, our search for concepts crucial to the understanding of interpersonal relations will begin with common-sense psychology as expressed by everyday language. The words of the vernacular, to say nothing of combinations of words in sentences and longer units, present such an endless variety of concepts that it is hopeless to study the nature of interpersonal relations by simply classifying them. By careful analysis of language expressions, however, we can attempt to arrive at concepts that will enable us to clarify the implicit relations among words referring to psychological phenomena.

Let us illustrate this thesis by an example of word explication. Consider the following words: *give*, *take*, *receive*, and *keep*. Grammar has prescribed one relationship—they are all transitive verbs, words that refer to some action. A thesaurus of antonyms may note that *take*, *receive*, and *keep* are all opposites of *give*. The dictionary, calling upon such disciplines as etymology and semantics, records their qualitative meaning. But in spite of all this information, their relationships to each other remain quite obscure. Examine the simplest definitions of these terms:

Give—to hand over to another

Take—to gain possession of by putting forth exertion

Receive—to get as a result of delivery

Keep—to retain in one's possession

These words have something to do with the transaction of property. But explicitly what are their interlocking relationships? Just how is it, for example, that *take*, *receive*, and *keep* are all antonyms of *give* without being equivalent to each other? The following chart records the essential underlying concepts that bring these common-sense concepts into an ordered, systematic relationship. These basic concepts

Patterning of Concepts Underlying Give, Take, Receive, Keep

Common Sense Concept	Causal Source of Action	Direction of Action (Movement of x)
p gives x to o	p	$p \rightarrow o$
p takes x from o	p	$p \leftarrow o$
p receives x from o	o	$p \leftarrow o$
p keeps x from o	p	no movement

p = reference person; o = other person; x = a thing

are: (1) Reference person, i.e., the person who is the subject of the verb considered. He is designated as p , and the other person as o . (2) Source of action. (3) Direction of the movement of a thing from one region of ownership to another.

The following systematic statements emerge from an examination of the chart: (1) We notice immediately that the four terms are distinguishable by the different combinations of the basic concepts. No two patterns are alike. (2) *Take* is the opposite of *give* in regard to the direction of movement of x . With *take* the direction is from o to p , and with *give* it is from p to o . (3) The same statements hold for the connections between *receive* and *give*. In addition, the source of action in *receive* and *give* differ: In the former, o is the source. In the latter, p is the source. (4) *Keep* is an opposite of *give* because with *give* there is a movement of x away from p and with *keep* no movement occurs.

The system also allows us to construct other combinations that are missing from the chart. For instance, we might think of a case in which x is kept by p through o 's efforts. Again, as with " p keeps x from o ," there is no movement of x , and p owns x ; but the source, in this case, lies in o , not in p .

This analytical procedure encompasses a variety of interpersonal relations in yet another way. There are some kinds of human interaction that may fit the system as far as it goes, but require the addition of other basic concepts for their precise delimitation. For example, the pattern of *to take from* may also be seen to apply to the concept *to steal from*. In order to distinguish these two everyday concepts, it becomes necessary to introduce a fourth underlying concept, that of *ought*. To steal expresses an ethical violation, whereas to take from need not. Now the horizons extend still further and we can begin to search for everyday ideas that fit the patterns of four underlying concepts in combination. Such transactional concepts as *lend*, *borrow*, *barter*, *lose*, *beg*, *relinquish*,

and find, can be placed within the framework. By dropping out one or another of the underlying concepts and by adding others as the analysis proceeds, it gradually becomes possible to incorporate a wide variety of human relations within the system of underlying concepts.

Note the steps that were involved in this type of analysis: We began with four words that had a vague relationship to each other. They were antonyms and had to do with the transaction of property. We then searched for basic underlying concepts that could represent these interpersonal relations. The patterning of these constitutive elements suggested other interpersonal relations that could be systematically represented by them. In turn, some of these new interpersonal relations required additional underlying concepts for their adequate representation. And so the basic underlying concepts may be gradually uncovered and a host of interpersonal relations conveyed by their combinations.

Ryle's book *The concept of mind* (1949) contains many similar analyses of the concepts of naive psychology and we will be able to refer to it in more than one place. However, his discussion, though it contains many stimulating ideas of great value, is not always immediately applicable to the work of the psychologist. In contrast to the present approach, he is mainly concerned with the actual meaning of words in ordinary usage with all their ambiguities, whereas our main purpose is to make explicit the system of concepts that underlies interpersonal behavior, and the analysis of words and situations is considered only a means to this end. We want to find a reality that lies beyond this rough sketch language gives us, and are not so much concerned with the sketch as such.

Situation Analysis

In addition to word explication as a method of discovering underlying concepts, one may use conceptual analysis of descriptions of social situations narrated in stories, plays, and novels. Let us begin with the fable of the fox and the crow:

A fox once saw a crow fly off with a piece of cheese in its beak and settle on a branch of a tree. "That's for me, as I am a Fox," said Master Renard, and he walked up to the foot of the tree. "Good-day, Mistress Crow," he cried. "How well you are looking today; how glossy your feathers; how bright your eye. I feel sure your voice must surpass that of other birds, just as your figure does; let me hear but one song from you that I may greet you as the Queen of Birds." The Crow lifted up her head and began to caw her best, but the moment she opened her mouth the piece of cheese fell to the ground, only to be snapped up by Master Fox. "That will do," said he. "That was all I wanted. In exchange for your

cheese I will give you a piece of advice for the future—Do not trust flatterers."

Let us analyze the significant parts of this fable one by one:

A fox once saw a crow fly off with a piece of cheese in its beak and settle on the branch of a tree. "That's for me," said Master Renard, and he walked up to the foot of the tree.

The important underlying concepts are:

Perceiving—this refers to the fact that events in the outside world have entered the awareness of the fox.

Belong to—the cheese is seen as belonging to the crow.

Want—the fox wants the cheese.

Cause—this refers to the source of a change. Here the fox cannot cause or bring about climbing the tree.

Can—the fox cannot get the cheese directly.

In terms of our abstracted concepts, the story thus far means: The fox sees something that belongs to someone else, and that he wants, but that he cannot have because he cannot execute the necessary locomotions.

"Good-day, Mistress Crow," he cried. "How well you are looking today; how glossy your feathers; how bright your eye . . . let me hear but one song from you that I may greet you as the Queen of Birds."

In the following statements, the concepts that have already appeared are italicized. The fox believes that flattery, which he *can cause*, will *cause* the bird to trust him and to *want* to show off, which in turn will *cause* the bird to *want* to sing. This will *cause* the crow to open his beak, which will *cause* the cheese to belong no longer to the crow. The fox *can* then *cause* the cheese to *belong* to him. A new concept which enters is that of:

Sentiment—that the fox likes and admires the crow is the substance of the belief he wishes, through flattery, to impart to the crow.

Here we shall not take time to analyze such concepts as flattery, trust, and showing off into their constitutive elements, but merely wish to point out that the kind of flattery the fox uses in this case is quite different from the more usual kind designed to incur favor from another. The fox did not believe that the crow would wish to bestow a favor upon him, but he did expect the crow to be flattered into displaying her wonderful self. The meaning of opening the beak, therefore was very different for the two. To the crow, opening the beak was required by the physical mechanisms of vocalization, and releasing the

cheese was not even in her awareness. To the fox, on the other hand, the song was completely incidental to the release of the cheese.

The Crow lifted up her head and began to caw her best, but the moment she opened her mouth the piece of cheese fell to the ground, only to be snapped up by Master Fox.

The events ensue as planned.

"That will do," said he. "That was all I wanted. In exchange for your cheese I will give you a piece of advice for the future—Do not trust flatterers."

This is retribution: you gave me something good and so I'll give you something good.

In this analysis of the old story of the fox and the crow, we have not specified all the concepts important to its meaning. Our purpose, as with the preceding word analysis, was to show how the concepts of naive psychology may be fashioned into a language of underlying concepts that coordinates a great number of ordinary human relations in a systematic way. Many varied kinds of human interactions can then be pinned down. Because their conceptual definitions have become more explicit, questions that are more precise, and we believe more sensible, can be raised for experimental investigation.

This book does not claim to present a complete program for describing interpersonal relations in terms of underlying concepts. But it should serve as the beginning of such a task and will include an attempt to clarify some of the basic concepts that are most frequently encountered in an analysis of naive descriptions of behavior.

It would be an impossible task to describe in detail how these concepts were arrived at. Long years of analyses of word meanings of short stories or daily experiences contributed to the belief in the fruitfulness of working with them. The attitude that underlay these analyses was a feeling that there is a system hidden in our thinking about interpersonal relations, and that this system can be uncovered.

When Lewin developed topological psychology, I had at first great hopes that it would furnish the tools for the representation and analysis of interpersonal phenomena. However, though the concepts of topology were of great help in disentangling the underlying means-end structures in the actions of a person, they were rather cumbersome and in many cases inadequate in dealing with two-person situations. It is difficult or impossible to describe in topological terms how one person's life space is represented in another person's life space—how, for instance, the sentiment of *A* can be a goal for *B*, or how *A* reacts to what *B* does to him. I once discussed with Lewin attempts to analyze social

situations and pointed out some examples that were difficult to represent in topological terms. He recognized the difficulties, and it is illuminating that the last sentence of his treatise on forces reads as follows:

An adequate treatment of social problems, especially social conflicts, however, makes certain distinctions necessary, particularly that between "own" and "foreign" forces, which we have merely mentioned. (Lewin, 1938, p. 210.)

In groping for a language that would allow the representation of a great variety of social interactions there was developed this list of basic concepts which seemed to occur again and again in the analyses and which could not be reduced further to expressions of still greater generality.

A sort of shorthand description of social situations was arrived at in which these concepts played the role of a word list of basic English. This symbolic representation uses some of the features of symbolic logic without pretending to be as exact and systematic. It was employed a great deal in the actual analyses and was of great help because it forces one to think in general terms. A brief description of it is given in the Appendix. It did not seem wise to burden the text of the book with these expressions, which are rather difficult to read for one who is not used to them.

In the following section we shall describe the basic concepts briefly. Further specification, through whatever knowledge can be brought to bear on them from naive and scientific psychology, will be given in the succeeding chapters.

The Underlying Concepts

Subjective environment or life space. According to naive psychology, both ourselves and other people have an awareness of the environment and the events in it. This awareness is what is referred to as the subjective environment of a person, or life space. In a general way, the expression "he thinks thus and so" is used to state the conscious contents of the life space, which consists of different kinds of relations characterizing people, objects, and events. Examples of contents of life space are: spatial relations, as when the person believes that the gas station is on the northeast corner of Main Street; functional relations, as when the person recognizes that a gas station is for servicing cars; and evaluations, as when the person thinks that the attendant is dishonest.

Perceiving. Perceiving is experienced as a direct contact with the environment; it is a means whereby objective facts enter the life space.

That is why we react in a special way when we notice someone observing our behavior. He has obtained certain information through perceiving and may now act on it. A fact can also enter a life space by way of language transmission, as when we read something or when somebody tells us something. Then there is the process of inference through which we arrive at conclusions on the basis of the existing contents of the life space.

Suffering, experiencing, or being affected by. Man, as we know, is affected by events in his environment. He is the recipient of acts of others and of impersonal presses. This is expressed to some extent by the passive form of verbs as in "I am hit," "He is pushed." The most important characteristics of events that affect us are, first whether or not they are positive, pleasant, and satisfying, and second their causal sources.

Causing. Of great importance for our picture of the social environment is the attribution of events to causal sources. It makes a real difference, for example, whether a person discovers that *the stick that struck him fell from a rotting tree or was hurled by an enemy*. Attribution in terms of impersonal and personal causes, and with the latter, in terms of intent, are everyday occurrences that determine much of our understanding of and reaction to our surroundings. An additional fact of importance is that personal causation not only effects changes in the physical environment, as when a man winds his watch; it also has social implications. Thus, "benefiting" means that a person has caused a change that is agreeable or positive to another person. Also, one person can cause another person to cause a change by asking him to do something, or commanding him, etc.

Can. A fundamental concept that is linked with causation, and that refers in some way to the possibility of the change or action being performed by a specific person, may be expressed in the most general way by the auxiliary verb "can." Whether a person can do something or not is a very important consideration which affects our attitude toward him and our predictions of his future behavior. The concepts of power and ability are related to this concept.

Trying. A second fundamental concept related to causation is that of trying to cause a change. When we notice someone trying very hard but not succeeding it implies several things: First, that the person does not really cause the change; second, that the person is doing something more than just wishing to cause the change; and finally, that the situation represents something different from being able to cause the change but not trying.

Wanting. Want is also connected with causation in the sense that

when one wants something, one wants to bring about a certain state of affairs. **Motivational factors** in ourselves and others are often spontaneously recognized. For example, by observing the behavior of another person or by listening to what he says and how he says it, we discover that he wants to do something but cannot do it, or does not dare to do it. Or we discover that the change he produced in the environment is exactly what he wanted to bring about; he intended it.

Sentiments. The positive or negative valuation attached to persons and objects, namely *our sentiments toward them, enormously influence our behavior*. When we observe or sense that person *A* likes or dislikes person *B*, we also sense that *B* plays a certain role in *A*'s life space; the representation of *B* in *A*'s life space has a certain functional significance. Of special importance is the awareness we have of the positive or negative character of the representation of ourselves in another person's life space.

Belonging. Another concept that also plays an important role in the so-called perception of forms or movement is the concept of belonging. This concept is applied when separate entities are seen to *form a unit*. Things can "belong" to people either as property or in some other sense, as, for instance, when one talks of one's alma mater. Two people can belong together because they are related, or because they are similar in some respect, for instance, in their likes or dislikes.

Ought and may. Finally, that a person ought or ought not to do something can also be a very vivid and direct experience. The relations of "ought" to "can" and "want" will be treated later. The meaning of "he may do it" is really based on the negation of the "ought" concept and is equivalent to: "it is not true, that he ought not do it."

To sum up: According to naive psychology people have an awareness of their surroundings and the events in it (the *life space*), they attain this awareness through *perception* and other processes, they are *affected* by their personal and impersonal environment, they *cause* changes in the environment, they are able to (*can*) and *try* to cause these changes, they have wishes (*want*) and *sentiments*, they stand in unit relations to other entities (*belonging*), and they are accountable according to certain standards (*ought*). All these characteristics determine what role the other person plays in our own life space and how we react to him.

Some of these concepts might rate as "dimensions." Just as color, form, space, or motion are basic components of a more peripherally oriented perception, these concepts are the basic components, or some of the basic components, of our direct experiences of the social environment.

This cursory survey is meant only to present a preliminary approach to an analysis of basic components of our naive ideas about other people and social situations. These fundamental concepts give rise to intriguing problems as one tries to understand the conditions and effects of the psychological phenomena they represent. They will be discussed in the following order:

Concept	Chapter
Life space	2
Perceiving	2, 3
Causing	4, 9, 10
Can	4
Trying	4
Wanting	5
Suffering	6, 11
Sentiments	7
Belonging	7
Ought	8

It may be useful to describe briefly the contents of the chapters that follow.

Chapter 2. This chapter deals with the problem of how p , the person whose psychological processes form the topic of the discussion, perceives o , the other person; how p experiences this perceptual contact with o , and how it is made possible by the mediation between person and environment, i.e., the processes that furnish the cues for perception.

Chapter 3. In this chapter the discussion of "naive" psychology begins with a study of the implicit theory of perception. The common-sense ideas about the conditions and effects of perception are analyzed. It is necessary to understand these ideas if we are to understand how we perceive that o perceives something, or how we go about making o perceive something.

Chapter 4. This chapter deals with the naive psychology of action, with the effects of action and with its conditions in the person and in the environment. The factors of ability, exertion, and environmental difficulty are described. They play an important role in our assessment of o 's actions and in our attempts to influence them.

Chapter 5. This chapter contains an exploration of the naive psychology of motivation and affect. Our ideas about the connection between desire, pleasure, and success are considered, and the question of the source of positive and negative experiences is studied. The purpose of these considerations is to find clues to the relevant variables

that determine under what circumstances we perceive, or believe we perceive, that o wants or enjoys something, and that decide what means we choose when we try to produce or prevent o 's wishes and pleasures.

Chapter 6. The subject under discussion is what happens to the person undergoing or suffering the effect of environmental changes, and in what way these events are interpreted by the person.

Chapter 7. This chapter deals with how one person feels about another person—how o is represented in the life space of p —and especially the positive or negative character of this representation, that is, p 's liking or disliking o ; it also considers the problem of how this liking or disliking is influenced by things or other persons to which o is related in some way, or which in some way belong to him.

Chapter 8. Questions of the role of values and norms in interpersonal relations are approached—how we come to feel that another person ought to do something, and what effects this feeling has.

Chapters 9 and 10. Specific actions that are of great importance for interpersonal relations are considered. Systematically, they belong with Chapter 4; however, it was decided to put them here since it is helpful in dealing with these problems if we first become familiar with the concepts discussed in Chapters 5 through 8. In Chapter 9 the actions of inducing o to do something and the ways in which o reacts to such impositions are studied. In Chapter 10 the actions by which p causes o to undergo positive or negative experiences are examined; the relations of benefiting or harming another person to ability, sentiments, ought, etc., are touched upon. Also, the problem of retribution is dealt with as one of the reactions to being benefited or harmed by another person.

Chapter 11. The reactions to the positive or negative experiences of another person, like sympathy or envy, are studied in their relation to other factors.

Chapter 12. A short review of the contents of the book.

Perceiving the other person

THROUGH PERCEPTION we come to cognize the world around us, a world made up of things and people and events. Obviously, the existence of the other person, *o*, as an object with not only physical and spatial particulars, but also with complex psychological properties, must be mediated in some way to the subject, that is perceived by *p*, if *o* is to feature in *p*'s thinking, feelings, and actions. Likewise, if *p* is to influence *o*, he must create changes that in some way can be perceived by *o*, barring, of course, internal reactions such as those instigated by drugs that affect *o*. The nature of this perception, in particular the principles that underly the coordination between the stimulus conditions outside the person and his experience or phenomenal representation of them, is the topic to which we shall address ourselves here.

Bruner and Tagiuri, to whom we can refer for a discerning integration of representative studies concerning the perception of people, have grouped the studies into three categories: the recognition of emotions in others, the accuracy of appraisals of other personalities, and the process by which personality impressions are formed. They conclude that the current trend in research

... appears to be in the direction of investigating what kinds of organized impressions are formed under varying conditions of cue, role, set, and prior information. There appears to be a deemphasis of interest in the nature of judgmental accuracy, and a renewed emphasis in the judging process. . . . (Bruner and Tagiuri, 1954, p. 648.)

Our orientation is directed toward explicating some of the naive, implicit principles that underlie perception, principles that connect the stimulus configurations presented to the person with his apprehension of them. During the course of this explication, we shall leave the realm of naive psychology and make use of knowledge gained from the scientific, causal analysis of the perceptual process. Moreover, because many of the principles underlying social perception have parallels in the field of nonsocial or thing perception, and because in many instances their significance has first been recognized in this field, we shall frequently have recourse to knowledge about the perception of things. We shall speak of "thing perception" or "nonsocial perception" when we mean the perception of inanimate objects, and of "person perception" or "social perception" when we mean the perception of another person. The term "object perception" which has been traditionally used in discussions of the perception of things is avoided in this chapter, since the word "object" is also used in its more general sense—"the object of perception" or "the distal object"—which includes persons as well as things. Brunswik's (1934) conclusion, that the objects of social and nonsocial perception are similar in regard to their formal characteristics as well as in regard to the processes by which they are perceived, is in general a valid framework for discussion (p. 211).

This is not to say, of course, that there are no differences between the perception of things and people. It is a commonplace that inanimate objects differ from persons in important ways. In discussing thing perception, we assume that there are real, solid objects with properties of shape and color, things placed in particular positions in real space, having functional properties making them fit or interfere with our purposes, and in general defining their place in the space of meaningful relations. There is a chair on which one can sit; there is an object with which one can cut paper, tie a package, or write a note.

In discussing person perception, we also assume that these "objects" have color and occupy certain positions in the environment. They are, however, rarely mere manipulanda; rather they are usually perceived as action centers and as such can do something to us. They can benefit or harm us intentionally, and we can benefit or harm them. Persons have abilities, wishes and sentiments; they can act purposefully, and can perceive or watch us. They are systems having an awareness of their surroundings and their conduct refers to this environment, an environment that sometimes includes ourselves. And yet, just as the contents of the nonsocial environment are interrelated by certain lawful connections, causal or otherwise, which define what can or will happen, we assume that there are connections of a similar character between the contents of the social environment.

At the outset we should like to distinguish two roles of perception in interpersonal relations. In the first, the concern of this chapter, the emphasis is on the conditions that lead *p* to perceive his environment and the people in it as he does. In the second, the topic of the following chapter, *p*'s attention is directed toward *o* as a perceiver; there the main problems concern the conditions that lead *p* to realize that *o* is perceiving something, the effects of *o*'s perceptions on himself as understood by *p*, and how all this affects *p*'s feelings and behavior. One might say the first role deals with perceiving the other person, whereas the second deals with the other person as perceiver.

Phenomenal and Causal Description in Perception

By phenomenal description is meant the nature of the contact between the person and his environment as directly experienced by the person. By causal description is meant the analysis of the underlying conditions that give rise to perceptual experience. There is no *a priori* reason why the causal description should be the same as the phenomenal description, though, of course, the former should adequately account for the latter. We shall see, however, that though there are differences between the two, the parallels are marked.

It has often been stressed, especially by phenomenologists, that the person feels that he is in direct contact with things and persons in his environment. He sees objects directly, just by focusing his eyes upon them. He acts on objects directly by touching them and lifting them. The same is true of person perception. He not only perceives people as having certain spatial and physical properties, but also can grasp even such intangibles as their wishes, needs, and emotions by some form of immediate apprehension. Asch has made the point that the

... attitude, which has been aptly described as naive realism, ... sees no problem in the fact of perception or knowledge of the surroundings. Things are what they appear to be; they have just the qualities that they reveal to sight and touch. The surroundings open themselves to us directly and almost without deviation, as if we were face to face with objective reality. (Asch, 1952, p. 46.)

Dunker, who describes the direct presence of the objects of perception as "participation," has urged that the phenomenal "self-givenness" of the object must be recognized as an important characteristic of perception:

Seeing has the phenomenal characteristics of "being open to," more generally, of "participating in." "I see the tree" is equivalent to: "I participate (in a definite manner) in the tree"; or, "The tree is given to me in a

definite manner." ... We must not fail to mention the phenomenal self-givenness of the object in which I participate by seeing. The tree appears "in person," not by any chance "as image." (Dunker, 1947, 506-507.)

For Scheler (1913, trans. 1954, Part III) the immediate awareness of other people's minds is of central importance. Asch presents a vivid description of the experience of direct contact with other people's thoughts, wishes, and emotions:

To naive experience the fact of being "in touch with" other persons is most direct and unmediated by intervening events. We experience direct communication with others: emotion clashing with emotion, desire meeting desire, thought speaking to thought. Often there is virtually no lag between the psychological event in one person and its grasp in the other. We may even anticipate the thought and feelings of those we know, and it would appear that we are as directly connected with others as with our own psychological processes. It seems sufficient for the actions and purposes of others to be there to make them visible and comprehensible; the process appears entirely translucent. (Asch, 1952, p. 142.)

In contrast to phenomenal description is the causal analysis which, instead of revealing the person as being in direct contact with the objects of perception, distinguishes a number of steps. A somewhat technical vocabulary has been built up to describe these steps. According to causal analysis, the perceptual process may be conceived of as a perceptual arc (Brunswik, 1952) encompassing two end points—the object, i.e., the part of the environment toward which perception is directed; and the percept, i.e., the way the object appears to us. The former has been referred to by Brunswik (1952) as the *initial focus* inasmuch as it is the starting point of the perceptual arc. It has also been referred to as the *distal stimulus* since it pertains to something "outside the person's skin," at a distance from the person. It is the chair "out there" that is seen or the melody coming from the violin that is heard. Whatever its designation, it refers to the environmental reality, an objective stimulus defined by properties perceivable by everyone.

The *distal stimulus*, however, does not directly affect the person. Rather it is mediated, for example, by light or sound-wave patterns that excite his sensory organs. This stimulus pattern, impinging as it does directly upon the sense organs, has been designated the *proximal stimulus*; it is the stimulus that is physically in direct proximity to the person. With touch or taste the object must come in direct contact with the sensory receptors, and the starting point of the perceptual process is the proximal rather than the distal stimulus; nonetheless the distinction between the two is still meaningful inasmuch as the sensory

quality is attributed to the distal object—the object as separate from the person. Should the sensory quality be “looked at” for itself, stripped of its object reference, as when the taste of cool water is savored, or when one basks in the warmth of sunlight, or feels the texture of silkiness, then the proximal stimuli appear in the life space as sensation.

The perceptual process thus far involves **distal stimuli**, and **mediation** ending in the **proximal stimuli**. Within the organism there is, then, **the constructive process of perception** which leads to some event corresponding to the awareness of the object, the reality as perceived. The terms, **representation** or **image** of the object have been used to describe this awareness. It has also been referred to as the percept, the phenomena, and the terminal focus, the latter pointing to the fact that it is the end point of the perceptual arc, completing its function of providing an awareness of the “environmental reality.” The constructive part of the perceptual process within the person is sometimes spoken of as involving central or higher phenomena, processes, or layers, whereas the proximal stimuli entering the organism, the so-called raw material, involve more peripheral or lower layers. The proximal stimuli, being unorganized and uninterpreted are also described as being more superficial.

With person perception, causal analysis also divides the phenomenally given immediate presence of the other person into steps. The other person, with his psychological processes such as needs and intentions, functions as the distal stimulus. He is the “object” toward which *p*’s perception is directed. The mediation consists of the manifestations of the personality of the other, as they determine the proximal stimulus pattern. Often the manifestations of *o*’s inner psychological processes are behavioral though they may be data gained from other sources, such as verbal communication from a third person. Finally, there is the perceptual construction within the person that leads from this raw material to the awareness of the other.

However, the process does not proceed in a one-way fashion from peripheral to central excitation. There is an interaction between the central processes in the brain and the more peripheral data, the “raw material” from the outside, so that the former determine, in some cases more, in some cases less, how the raw material is organized. What is of primary importance is that the central processes provide the “terms” in which the lower layers are interpreted, making it possible, for instance, for a movement to be perceived as a personal action. Often only the contents of the higher levels are directly present, and the

lower levels—the raw material of peripheral data—are either not given at all, or are already in terms of the higher levels.

Other features of the phenomenal and causal description of perception will be discussed later. But here we wish to stress that the two descriptions should not be confused. The different analytic parts of the perceptual process are not always apparent in direct experience. We usually do not perceive any of the mediating processes, for instance, nor do we see images. Rather, the distal objects are given to us directly. We see them through the mediation, as it were. In spite of these differences, however, further considerations make us realize that the disparity between the phenomenal and causal descriptions is not as complete as it seems at first.

For one thing, the mediation does not always completely disappear phenomenally in the service of presenting the object. When we see the object through the mediation, not only what we see may be given, but also the cues upon which our perception rests. For comparative purposes, let us first note instances in which the mediation is clearly not a phenomenal fact. Though the pattern of visual stimuli informs us about the shape, color, location, and size of an object, phenomenally we do not know what the raw material is on the basis of which we learn of these important properties. We just see them, and to identify the raw material is often a problem for science. When, however, our concern is with the function or causal possibilities of objects, then we often do become aware of the perceptual cues which mediate this information.

Many visual properties, for example, imply certain causal possibilities. The location tells me how to move in order to put my hand on the object. The shape tells me something about the way the object would interact mechanically with other solid bodies. A spherical object can be rolled around; if I put it on the table it might roll off. I will be able to put that object into this box because of their size relations, etc. The visual pattern can also give me an idea about the pliability of the object because of the common-sense fact that the shape of an object is determined by its support according to its flexibility. That we see certain objects as pliable cannot always be explained by the fact that we have experienced them as such in the past; the point of Dalí’s well-known picture of watches is that objects we know from experience to be solid present a visual pattern of pliability. Another example in which the mediation is clearly accessible to the person’s awareness is that of reading. The terminal focus or the meaning of what is read rarely appears without our being able to say on what raw materials

it is based. We see the words and sentences, and we can even pay attention to the figural properties of the letters. The same is true when we "see" the direction of the wind from the movement of a flag, or when we see an object by way of its shadow.

In social perception, too, there are some instances in which the mediating factors are very obscure, and others in which we are or can become quite cognizant of the cues for the perception of *o*. For instance, we may see that a person is displeased, without being able to say just what about his appearance or behavior gave us that impression. This very often is true when the cues involve the interpretation of physiognomies, gestures, the tone of voice, and similar expressive features. They often mediate personality traits, wishes, or attitudes of persons without our being able to say what the material is upon which we base our perceptions. On the other hand, there are many occasions when we can quite precisely elucidate the mediating conditions for our perceptions of other people. Often the raw material consists of actions and reactions of the person that can be perceived in their own right and can be separated from the terminal focus. We can say, "I believe he is displeased because he said so and so or did thus and thus." Throughout this book, our attention will be drawn to just this problem, namely the conditions that permit us to become aware of such distal objects as the perceptions, intentions, desires, pleasures, abilities, and sentiments of another person.

Perhaps in cases in which the raw material and the percept are so clearly separated, the more inconclusive term "cognition" might be preferred to "perception." The problem of defining perception, especially as it differs from cognition, has bothered psychologists over the years. Floyd Allport has presented a trenchant statement of the issues involved:

As a first approximation, let us say that it [perception] has something to do with our awareness of the objects or conditions about us. It is dependent to a large extent upon the impressions these objects make upon our senses. It is the way things look to us, or the way they sound, feel, taste, or smell. But perception also involves, to some degree, an understanding awareness, a "meaning" or a "recognition" of these objects. . . . Thus we can include all the senses and can interpret perception as covering the awareness of complex environmental situations as well as of single objects. Though some psychologists tend to assign this last consideration to cognition rather than to perception the two processes are so closely intertwined that it would scarcely be feasible, especially from the standpoint of theory, to consider one of them in isolation from the other. (F. H. Allport, 1955, p. 14.)

In line with Allport's position, it seems that the distinction between perception and cognition is currently being drawn less and less sharply,

doubtless because there are so many gradual transitions between the extreme cases of the most direct and immediate forms of perception on the one hand and the most indirect interpretations on the other. That the extremes and the degrees within them can all be handled in terms of the same concepts is perhaps even more important in the obliteration of the distinction. In ordinary discourse one is likely to speak of inference or diagnosis rather than of perception when the construction of the percept on the basis of the raw material is itself given to awareness; yet upon analysis, a data pattern may be found in both rational inference and direct perception which is used in the construction of the apparent reality.

The similarities between perception and inference are stressed, for instance, by Brunswik, Nuttin, and Helmholtz, though to be sure, these men are also aware of the differences. Brunswik describes his view of perception as a "ratiomorphic" model, at the same time cautioning that ratiomorphism is

not to be confused with rationalism or with intellectualism . . . it even helps us to nail down more concretely the rather important secondary differences between "perception" and "thinking." (Brunswik, 1956, p. 141.)

Nuttin (1955) reminds us that the fact that consciousness is an exposure of the self to the outside world "does not contradict the theory of perception as a selective and constructive process" (p. 351). In short, for purposes of understanding the perceptual process, we agree at least partly with Brunswik (1934) that it does not very much matter "whether a part of the mediation goes on in awareness or whether the whole process is in the preconsciousness" (p. 211). For our purposes, then, we shall designate by the term perception all the different ways we have of getting to know the environment, from direct perception to explicit inference.

Summarizing, we can say that in many cases of both thing and person perception the raw material remains phenomenally unidentifiable, the only fact that appears ready-made in our life space being the percept, the end product of the organizing process. In other cases the raw material is phenomenally given, or at least can become so as we concentrate on the "visual field" instead of the "visual world," to use Gibson's (1950) expression. It is then that the whole process of perception seems more visible, more spread out for our inspection. It is probably fair to say that the less one depends on direct visual properties such as size and shape, and the more on events or behavior, the more the mediation becomes accessible to awareness.

Coordination Between Distal Object and Percept

Constancy phenomena. In perception, the percepts (or impressions or representations) of the environment largely furnish an adequate picture of the surroundings. That is to say, there is a high degree of coordination between the percept and the distal object. According to a phenomenal description of naive psychology this is to be expected, for if the person is in direct contact with his environment, a true correspondence is naturally expected.

But the causal analyst quickly realizes that the object as perceived is not equal to the stimuli that are actually in direct contact with the person, namely the proximal stimuli mediated, for example, by light waves. Thus, even though the light waves from the surface of a table form varying patterns on my retina depending on my position with respect to the table—sometimes a trapezoid, sometimes a parallelogram, sometimes a large retinal image, sometimes a tiny one—I still perceive the table as rectangular and do quite well at approximating its size. Or, even though the stimuli on the retina are affected by illumination, the color of an object appears surprisingly little influenced. In other words, perception of the object remains fairly constant in spite of the enormous variation in the proximal stimuli which mediate it through the excitation of sensory organs. This phenomenon is referred to as the problem of perceptual constancy. It should be noted, however, that constancy does not hold completely.

The term constancy phenomenon is usually applied to the perception of color, brightness, size, and shape, but it is also applicable in the social perception of such crucial distal stimuli as wishes, needs, beliefs, abilities, affects, and personality traits. If we assert that a "wish constancy" is possible just as there is a size, shape, or color constancy, that means we recognize a wish as being the same in spite of its being mediated by different cues. The same wish may be conveyed, for example, by an innumerable variety of word combinations, ranging from "I want that" to the lengthy and complicated reflections transmitted to the therapist in a psychoanalytic session. Or, the same wish may be conveyed by a colorful array of actions, as when a child, wanting a red wagon above all else, goes up and takes it, pushes a competing child from it, and even angrily kicks it in a fit of frustration. Brunswik's generalization of constancy phenomena to person perception holds:

Indeed we can, exactly as in thing perception, talk of a "constancy" of the apparent personality in the variety of its actions. This is the case, for instance, if we, in spite of changing conditions—the instigations from the

environment—, always perceive the same personality in another person, in spite of the fact that he produces in each case different behavior, which corresponds to the reaction laws of his personality, and which stands merely in the same relation to the conditions. (Brunswik, 1934, p. 217.)

It is just because manifestations (the mediation) of personal characteristics are vicarious that, as pointed out by Hammond, it is often difficult for the clinician to indicate with confidence exactly what the evidence is on which his judgment is based:

Observers of the state of anger may agree that such a state exists (i.e., high reliability may be achieved), but they may not be able to communicate the basis for their decision. . . . (Hammond, 1955, p. 257.) The clinician is attempting to discover the patient's motive. The patient substitutes one form of behavior for another as he attempts to achieve his goal (equifinality). The clinician perceives these behaviors, as they substitute for one another, as cues which also substitute for one another (equipotentiality). Because of vicarious functioning, then, the clinician is hard-pressed to point at, to communicate, the basis for a decision. . . . *Vicarious functioning, then, lies at the heart of the private, quasi-rational nature of the clinical decision.* (Hammond, 1955, p. 258.)

Thus, again we see that the interaction between the person and his environment, in this case between a person and someone he is observing, can best be described as going on between two foci separated by the mediation which can, to some extent, be neglected in the description. Later we shall examine the conditions that impede veridical perception, but in a first approach we will assume that the significant features of the other person (distal objects) are more or less invariantly connected with the perception of them, while neither object nor phenomenon show invariant relations to the mediation.

Probably the constancy in social perception, however, is less perfect than the constancy in thing perception. It is not easy to decide this matter since we do not have simple methods to define psychological processes objectively. We are able to measure the actual size of an object and correlate the perceived size with it much more easily than we can measure the actual strength of a wish and its perceived strength. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the correlation between the distal stimulus in social perception and the impression of it is much greater than the correlation between either of these foci and the mediation. Therefore, we can say of the phenomenal and causal descriptions of perception, that both recognize the correlation between the foci, but the latter is also cognizant of the relatively chaotic mediation.

Coordination with dispositional properties. A further point, closely related to the constancy phenomenon, also concerns the comparison between the way we experience the environment and the way

a causal analysis presents it: The parts or characteristics of the environment that are directly given phenomenally and towards which perception (or action) is directed, are those parts that either themselves show an invariance (i.e., do not change very much in their properties), or which, when they change, change mostly in ways that follow macroscopically visible laws. Such properties have been referred to as *dispositional properties* and are discussed more fully in Chapter 4, which deals with the naive analysis of action. Here we should like to emphasize that the object as we perceive it is not coupled with just any arbitrarily selected part of the environment; rather it is coupled with such properties as shape, color, and size, properties that are relatively invariant features of the object and show consistent relations with other events. The shape of a solid object, for instance, is relatively enduring. It is something one can rely upon finding again. It is connected with important and lasting possibilities of the object. It allows us to predict to a certain degree how the object will behave when we handle it; for instance, if I see an object is spherical, I predict it can be rolled. This prediction is possible because shape is connected in an invariant way with a possible event, namely all spherical solid objects can be rolled. It is because these intrinsically invariant properties belong so often to distant objects, that is, objects separated in space from the person, that distal perception plays such an important role in interaction with the environment.

It is interesting that in social perception, also, the direct impressions we form of another person, even if they are not correct, refer to dispositional characteristics. At least, relative to the events that mediate these impressions, the characteristics show a high degree of intrinsic invariance. For instance, the impression that a person is friendly, which may be conveyed in any number of ways, points to a relatively enduring characteristic of the person. In fact, any personality trait refers to something that characterizes the person, that is, holds over time in spite of irregularities of circumstance and behavior. As a dispositional property, a personality characteristic enables one to grasp an unlimited variety of behavioral manifestations by a single concept, e.g., friendliness. A description of a manifold of interpersonal relations becomes far more systematically simple by reference to such enduring characteristics. Furthermore, insofar as personal dispositions are connected in lawful ways with other features, predictions about behavior of the other person become possible. Just as one can predict the rolling behavior of the ball because its spherical shape is a persisting property, so one can predict (albeit with less confidence) that o will help p because of his friendly nature, an enduring personality trait.

Two kinds of invariant relations that characterize the coordination between the distal object and the percept may now be distinguished. As we have just seen, the percept is coordinated to dispositional properties of environmental contents, properties that show invariant relations with possible events and are in themselves relatively enduring. Then there are the constancies, the more or less invariant relations between the percept and the distal object in spite of variability of the mediation. Boring has called attention to these two kinds of invariant relations. Using size as an example, he refers to the first as the invariance of physical size, and to the second as the invariance of perceptual size:

Objects do not shrink or expand as you move them around, and neither do our perceptions of them when you have those conditions . . . under which size-constancy occurs. We have under these circumstances, the correlation of two similar invariances, the invariance for physical size and for perceptual size. . . . (Boring, 1952, p. 145.)

Psychological dispositional properties in social perception. The dispositional properties that are the important distal stimuli in social perception frequently refer to psychological or mental entities, to concepts that are not defined in a physical sense. The preceding example of friendliness is a case in point. Without the aid of such psychological, dispositional properties, the behavior of persons mediated by the proximal stimuli would remain largely unintelligible.

Experimentally, this has been demonstrated by the use of a film in which, physically speaking, only an enclosure with a moveable part in the upper right-hand corner plus the movements of three geometrical figures are seen (Heider and Simmel, 1944). A still of this film is presented in Fig. 1. As long as the pattern of events shown in the film is perceived in terms of movements as such, it presents a chaos of juxtaposed items. When, however, the geometrical figures assume




Figure 1. Geometrical figures in apparent behavior (Heider and Simmel, 1944, p. 244).

personal characteristics so that their movements are perceived in terms of motives and sentiments, a unified structure appears:

... the movements are organized in terms of acts of persons. It is obvious that this organization has many advantages from the point of view of ... the adaptation of the organism to the environment. The changes, when identified with a constant figural unit, no longer follow each other in an arbitrary and unconnected way. They are connected with invariable characteristics of the environment, they are meaningfully embedded in our picture of reality ... the interpretation of movements is intimately connected with the interpretation of invariances. ...

A description of movements in terms of motives again taps environmental layers of greater invariability. Just as the successive perspective views of a landscape seen through the window of a moving train can only be "resolved," or made to yield a meaningful unit, by reference to distant objects laid out in space, so acts of persons have to be viewed in terms of motives in order that the succession of changes becomes a connected sequence. (Heider and Simmel, 1944, pp. 256-258.)

But motives and sentiments are psychological entities. They cannot be measured by a ruler, weighed by a scale, nor examined by a light meter. They are "mentalistic concepts," so-called intervening variables that bring order into the array of behavior mediating them.

Another example is given by Hebb's highly relevant analysis of the unrewarding efforts of scientists to be "objective" by attending only to the physical or space-time descriptions of animal behavior:

A thoroughgoing attempt to avoid anthropomorphic description in the study of temperament was made over a two-year period at the Yerkes Laboratories. ... All that resulted was an almost endless series of specific acts in which no order or meaning could be found. On the other hand, by the use of frankly anthropomorphic concepts of emotion and attitude one could quickly and easily describe the peculiarities of the individual animals, and with this information a newcomer to the staff could handle the animals as he could not safely otherwise. Whatever the anthropomorphic terminology may seem to imply about conscious states in the chimpanzee, it provides an *intelligible and practical guide to behavior*. The objective categorization therefore missed something in the behavior of the chimpanzee that the ill-defined categories of emotion and the like did not—some order, or relationship between isolated acts that is essential to comprehension of the behavior. (Hebb, 1946, p. 88.)

For social perception on the human level, the uses of "mental" dispositional concepts in the understanding and even description of interactions between persons are legion. Let us suppose that person *A* likes person *B* and that he wants to do him a favor. He takes into account *B*'s wishes, and also what *B* can do: perhaps there is something *B* desires very much but cannot get by himself. *A* also has to consider

the possibility that the benefit might embarrass *B*, or that *B* might feel that it implies a lack of respect. Finally, *A*, deciding on a particular action, goes through with it. *B* is overjoyed. He concludes that *A*, about whose attitudes he had been in doubt, really likes him; he appreciates especially the tactful way in which *A* handled the matter.

Descriptions of this kind seem to capture the essential features of an interpersonal event. One might go even further and try to discover the reasons why *A* likes *B*, or why *B* was questioning *A*'s sentiments; or one might try to assess the personality characteristics that played a role in this event. Though the description as it stands does not go far back into the history of the relation between *A* and *B*, nor into deep psychological motivations, within its limits it is a meaningful episode.

If we examine the concepts that are used in making this episode intelligible, we find sentiments, wishes, abilities, and emotions. The particular behavioral data on which the judgments or perceptions of the other person's wishes, abilities, or traits are based are not mentioned. One may even feel that the description of the essential interpersonal process would not gain very much in exactitude if they were specified. Neither would a more detailed report of *A*'s particular actions change very much our understanding of the main features of the event. The particular action by which *A* benefited *B* is of importance only insofar as it is judged by *B* and is related by him to his self-evaluation. To be sure, we might describe the event by concentrating on the surface, on the overt behavior, on what can be seen from the outside. But even then the reader would certainly translate the overt syndromes into concepts very much like the ones used in the description given above. These concepts provide the nodal points in terms of which the event can be described most economically, which allow for extrapolation to other possible events and which allow for prediction.

Social perception in general can best be described as a process between the center of one person and the center of another person, from life space to life space. When *A* observes *B*'s behavior, he "reads" it in terms of psychological entities (and his reactions, being guided by his own sentiments, expectations, and wishes, can again be understood only in terms of psychological concepts). *A*, through psychological processes in himself, perceives psychological processes in *B*. Asch has clearly expounded this view in the following:

The paramount fact about human interactions is that they are happenings that are *psychologically represented in each of the participants*. In our relation to an object, perceiving, thinking, and feeling take place on one side, whereas in relations between persons these processes take place on

both sides and in dependence upon one another. . . . We interact with each other not as the paramedium does by altering the surrounding medium chemically, nor as the ants do by smell, but via emotions and thoughts that are capable of taking into account the emotions and thoughts of others. (Asch, 1952, p. 142.)

One might say psychological processes such as motives, intentions, sentiments, etc., are the core processes which manifest themselves in overt behavior and expression in many variable ways. The manifestations are then directly grasped by *p*, the observer, in terms of these psychological core processes; they would otherwise remain undecipherable. By looking through the mediation, *p* perceives the distal object, the psychological entities that bring consistency and meaning to the behavior; *p*'s reaction is then to this meaning, not to the overt behavior directly, and this reaction is then carried back by the mediation to *o*, etc.

Of course, such an analysis of the separate processes involved in perceiving the other person has ignored the usual interplay between *p* and *o* in which *p*'s perception of *o* are constantly modified by what he believes are *o*'s perceptions of *p* and of other matters. This interdependent give and take in interpersonal relations is nicely described by Merleau-Ponty. The topic, the nature of conversation, is a *propos* since it implies the cognition on the part of *p* of *o*'s thoughts, wishes, intentions, etc:

In the experience of a conversation, a common ground constitutes itself between the other one and myself, my thought and his make up a single tissue, my words and his are called out by the phase of the discussion, they insert themselves in a common operation of which neither one of us is the sole creator. A double being comes about, and neither is the other one for me a simple behavior in my transcendental field, nor am I that for him, we are, one for the other, collaborators in a perfect reciprocity, our perspectives glide one into the other, we coexist within the same world. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 407.)

As a beginning, however, a simplified analysis in which the interpersonal relation is divided into steps, such as the behavior of *o*, the reaction of *p* to *o*, then the reaction of *o* to the reaction of *p*, etc., allows the detection of important perceptual processes, though we must bear in mind that these processes arise within one encompassing situation. Thus far, our stepwise analysis has brought out that the perceptual process in person perception goes on essentially between two core regions, the persons *p* and *o*, and that they are separated by a mediation that causally has a function different from that of the core regions. Generally *p*'s perceptions of *o* are coordinated to psycho-

logical dispositional properties of *o*, and not to the cues mediating those properties. True enough, the perception of *o* in these terms must have been mediated by some characteristics of overt behavior or by some features of the situation, but it seems that the interpretation of behavior in terms of "mentalistic" or psychological concepts often enhances understanding and prediction.

However, though the main process of social perception goes on between person and person spanning the mediation, and though often a first over-all description can catch the essentials without considering the mediation, we also want to know how the mediation carries the process. After all, the perceiving person gets information about the environment only through the proximal stimuli. This, then, poses the important problem of relating the proximal stimuli to two end points (the foci of the perceptual arc), namely the contents of the environment on the one hand and the phenomena, the way these contents appear to us, on the other. Only then will we also be able to explain cases in which one person misunderstands another, or in which an action (a primary medium for the transmission of psychological characteristics) does not correspond to the intention of the agent.

In later chapters we shall attempt to analyze the mediating processes of such psychological referents as intention, ability, and desire, by making explicit the raw material upon which the perceptual construction takes place. Here we should like to explore further certain general principles that aid the person in utilizing the ambiguous mediation in the service of veridical perception.

The Mediation

It has already been pointed out that the contents of the environment toward which perception is directed, be they things or persons, are mediated to the person by vicarious manifestations. Other terms such as "manifold of offshoots" or "event patterns" can also be used to refer to this mediation. Though the mediation is vicarious, in order to give information about the environmental contents (the distal stimuli of perception) it must to some degree be coordinated to them. Our job now is to define certain of the principles of this coordination.

Its grammatical structure. The simplest model for the coordination of mediation to distal stimuli would be one in which a specific offshoot is coordinated to each content or property. The organism would then only have to learn the specific connections between offshoots and contents. He would, so to speak, have to memorize a vocabulary of mediation consisting only of nouns. If the organism perceived one of the offshoots, he would react to it as if he were

individual perceptual styles could also be elaborated by reference to such concepts as "levellers" versus "sharpeners" (Klein, 1951), "authoritarians" versus "nonauthoritarians" (Titus and Hollander, 1957), the optimist who sees a rosy glow to everything versus the pessimist who extracts the negative values. All these are perceptual attitudes, general ways of "being in the world" which lead to the arousal of different percepts in spite of the fact that the stimulus configurations presented are the same.

Summary

The phenomenal description of perception attests to the value of naive psychology, the pretheoretical and implicit system which underlies interpersonal relations, by showing that direct experience centers on points that are also central causally, namely the environmental contents with which we are concerned, and that direct experience more or less adequately assesses the role of mediation. Causal analysis, in splitting up the "direct presence of the objects" into object, mediation, and percept, to some extent does violence to the phenomenal description of perception.

The following statement connecting the object of our perception and the resulting percept (the two foci) points up the theoretical problem: Invariance is in general connected with the foci, variance with the mediation. To a limited degree, one can find coordinations between ordinal patterns of stimulation, i.e., patterns defined spatially or temporally, and the resulting perceptual experience. It also seems to be approximately true that the smaller the part of the pattern taken into account, the more ambiguous it is. But in many cases, no simple coordinations between ordinal stimuli and phenomena can be found. Therefore, in order to understand the relation between stimulus patterns and phenomena theoretically, to make general statements about it, intervening variables must be assumed. These intervening variables consist of a hierarchy of meanings and evaluations which can be compared to a system of interlocking concepts or schemata. That percept will arise that best fits the stimulus conditions and at the same time this system of schemata.

The study of social perception deals with the perception of such important dispositional and psychological properties of another person as his actions, motives, affects, beliefs, etc. A great part of this book will be devoted to such topics, and in studying them we shall attempt to achieve a somewhat more differentiated picture of the matrix of schemata in terms of which the social environment is seen.

The other person as perceiver

IT IS NOTEWORTHY that the usual treatment of perception in psychology does not include the area of problems in which *p*'s attention and behavior are directed toward *o* as a perceiver. The following questions are pertinent in this respect: How do we perceive (know) that another person perceives something in the environment? What are our reactions to being an object of *o*'s perceptions? How do we bring about or prevent his perceiving? When do we look forward to his perceptions and when are we afraid of them? When do we believe that *o* wants to see something or that he can or ought to see it? Certainly, the naive psychology of perception is not merely a figment of the imagination. In its way it provides an admirable analysis of perception for practical purposes.

In order to reach a better understanding of these processes, it will be helpful to study the ideas one ordinarily has about the conditions and effects of another person's perceptions. These ideas are the basis of our actions and cognitions in regard to the perception of other people, though they are seldom made explicit.

The idea that our cognitions, expectations, and actions are based on a mastery of the causal network of the environment, is, of course, the main tenet of a cognitive psychology, and it will be applied throughout this essay. For instance, in the perception of a "wish" of another person, the perceiver will rely on what he believes are the effects of a wish as cues for the cognition of it, though certainly not

always in a conscious way. If he tries to produce a wish in another person he will do so by producing its conditions. If he knows that another person harbors a wish he will expect the usual consequences of this phenomenon "wish," and he will try to produce it as a means if he wants to bring about one of its consequences.

Therefore, in order to study the cognitions and actions directed toward the perceptions of another person, we have to explore our beliefs regarding the conditions and effects of perception.

Conditions of Perception

The common-sense assumptions about the conditions that make it possible for one person to recognize what another is perceiving are for the most part implicit. If people were asked about these conditions they probably would not be able to make a complete list of them. Nevertheless, these assumptions are a necessary part of interpersonal relations; if we probe the events of everyday behavior, they can be brought to the surface and formulated in more precise terms.

To give a simple example: If you want another person not to look at something, you may ask him to close his eyes; that is, by annulling the condition, perception is prevented. Or you may have a conviction that someone has not seen *x* because he had his eyes closed; that is, the absence of perception is inferred from the absence of the condition. Or you may attribute the fact that someone has not seen *x* to the fact that he has his eyes closed; that is, the absence of perception is attributed to the absence of the condition. All this means that "open eyes" are recognized as one of the conditions for visual perception.

Thus, by analyzing the data through which our beliefs are revealed, particularly the conditions we set up to produce or prevent perception or from which we infer and attribute perceptual states, we shall try to obtain insight into the common-sense assumptions about the conditions of perception.

The object as a condition of perception. When we see a person who, after intently watching a traffic signal, starts crossing the street the moment the sign changes from red to green, then we are quite certain that he has perceived the change. However, a behavioral reaction is not always necessary for the recognition that another person is perceiving. Even when we see only that the glance of the other person is directed toward an object, we get the impression that he perceives it.

This presupposes first of all that the other person is experienced by us as living in the same world as ourselves and as perceiving approx-

imately the same things that we would from his position. Asch says:

We start with the bare observation that a number of persons will in a given situation perceive objects and happenings within it in a similar way and that their modes of action in the situation will also have a basic similarity. The tree that I see others see too; what I hear they hear. (Asch, 1952, p. 128.)

Asch uses the term "mutually shared environment" to refer to this fact. (Cf. Schuetz, 1945, p. 534.)

It is also obvious that the object itself is a condition for the inference that *o* has seen it. A consequence of this is that, by and large, we trust eye witnesses. If someone tells us that he has seen something, we usually assume that what he has seen was actually there, that we ourselves would have seen it if we had been there. Furthermore, recognition that the object itself plays a role in the perceptual process guides *p*'s behavior when he wishes to prevent or encourage perception of it. He may destroy the object or remove it from view, or he may direct *o*'s attention to it.

Duncker's (1947) description of how we experience our own perception of objects, namely, that "seeing a tree" means to be open to the tree, or participating in the tree (p. 506) can also be applied to how we feel other people experience objects. The meaning of "I see a tree" and "He sees a tree" both involve this phenomenal participation in the object on the part of the perceiver, the object being outside of and independent from the observer.

PERCEPTIBILITY AS AN OBJECT PROPERTY. Some objects in our mutually shared environment can be more easily perceived than others. For example, an object can be easily visible, or visible only with difficulty, or even invisible; it can be conspicuous and striking, or inconspicuous and indistinct. Sometimes the perceptibility of an object is contingent upon the mediating conditions between observer and object: something may be visible from one location but not from another; it may be momentarily concealed by another object or obliterated because of the lack of illumination. But in other cases, the perceptibility refers definitely to a property of the object itself without regard to the mediation. When we say that the writing is invisible, we mean that it cannot be seen even if one looks closely at it under good light. The invisibility is a property of the object. The science of camouflaging makes use of object properties in altering visibility.

Perceptibility, as a dispositional property of the object, is crucial in regard to matters one wishes to keep private. Such matters may be

considered as "objects" more or less liable to the scrutiny of other people.

Different criteria can be used to distinguish between what is private and what is public. One is perceptibility—the concept of privacy can be restricted to what only the person himself can observe, what is cognitively accessible only to him. This criterion is used, for instance, by Lapiere and Farnsworth who say:

The whole complex of covert behaviors of an individual may be conceived of as his private self, that which he knows, however vaguely, but which others can know if at all only by influence from his overt behavior (his "social self," as it is sometimes termed). (Lapiere and Farnsworth, 1949, p. 160.)

Similarly, Ichheiser writes:

The counterpart of the collectively perceivable world is the world of our individual (private) experiences. The desk on which I am writing is an object which can be perceived by myself, by you, and by anyone else, as something which is "located" in the interpersonal, collective world. By contrast, my feeling of being happy, or my conviction of being right, is perceived and can be directly perceived, as this particular feeling or conviction, only by me. (Ichheiser, 1949, p. 12.)

However, this is not the usual sense in which we apply the words "private" and "privacy" in interpersonal relations. If it were, one could hardly ever talk about an "intrusion into privacy." Many people feel that their privacy has been invaded when strangers read letters addressed to them. The letter certainly can be perceived and read by other persons; from the point of view of cognitive accessibility it belongs to the interpersonal world. Nevertheless, it belongs in a special sense to the own person. It is felt to be a peculiarly "personal" matter not meant for the eyes of *o*; *p* wishes that its perceptibility were restricted to himself or at least within his control. Another example is visible injury. White, Wright, and Dembo point out that

An injury, as a characteristic and inseparable part of the body, may be felt to be a personal matter which the man would like to keep private. However, the fact of its visibility makes it known to anyone whom the injured man meets, including the stranger. A visible injury differs from most other personal matters in that anyone can deal with it regardless of the wish of the injured person; anyone can stare at the injury or ask questions about it, and in both cases communicate to and impose upon the injured person his feelings and evaluations. His action is then felt as an intrusion into privacy. (White, Wright, and Dembo, 1948, p. 16.)

Nuttin (1950) also stresses the fact that some personal contents are accessible to others; he says: "The private interiority of psychological

life, combined with this inherent possibility of its exposure, constitute what we may call the *functional conditions* for the origin of shame" (p. 345). Thus the region of privacy does not coincide with the region that is perceptible or accessible only to the own person.

Besides these two criteria, namely, perceptibility and belonging in an intimate way to the person, there are other distinctions that are relevant for the content of the somewhat general and vague concept of "privacy." One can differentiate between those contents that one wants others to perceive, that one does not mind having them perceive, and that one wants to keep under cover. Furthermore, there is the question of power over accessibility, of whether one can prevent others from seeing something or not.

These differences can be related to more abstract concepts. Thus, the criterion of perceptibility in the sense of accessibility is formally analogous to that of the space of free movement and is based on the fundamental concept of *can* (cf. Chapter 4). The space of free movement includes all the goals the person *can* reach. The space of what is accessible to perception includes all the things the person *can* notice. The inclusiveness of this space depends on the conditions taken into account in determining *can*. Something can be inaccessible to direct perception which is accessible through symbolic means; for instance, though *p*'s dreams are not directly detectable by *o*, *p* can tell *o* about them. The case in which *p* controls the perceptibility of *x* can also be defined by the concept, *can*; *p* can cause others not to perceive *x*, that is, he can prevent others from seeing it.

In regard to the "personal" meaning of privacy, conceptualization can be furthered if we assume that the concept of privacy is based on a special kind of intimate relation between *p* and the particular *x*. In this way, what is personal as a criterion for privacy can be connected with the concept of unit formation (see p. 176).

The underlying concept, *want*, also appears in the analysis of privacy, for *p* does not *want* the particular matter to be perceived by others.

As a summary example, a visible injury may be described in the following way: it is perceptible to others, it is personal, *p* does not have the power to prevent others from seeing it, *p* wishes (wants that) others would not see it. Thus we have seen that perceptibility as an object property is significant in the analysis of privacy. Its significance was conceptualized in terms of the concept "*can*." Privacy, in addition, was related to such other fundamental concepts as "unit formation" and "*want*."

APPEARANCE VS. REALITY AS AN OBJECT PROPERTY. Connected in some ways with perceptibility as a property of an object is the distinction

we generally apply our knowledge with another person rather than ourselves as the target. Even the school age child understands well how to create embarrassment in another in spite of the fact that he would be hard-pressed to define his techniques in terms of necessary conditions.

Not only is it true that perception leads to evaluation; evaluation can also lead to perception. People like to look at persons with high prestige, and being "noticed" or "regarded" has both cognitive and evaluative meanings. The vain man will think that everybody looks at him and listens to him because of his positive value; the guilty man will think they do so because of his negative value.

Motivation of further action. We have already seen that perception influences *o*'s action possibilities, what he can and cannot do, and thus influences his control over the environment. Perception also influences action by arousing motivational states in the person. This is not only true in the stock examples of "incentive" as when a child sees appetizing candy, but holds also for more complex situations. Such examples as the following are common:

When we see that something is possible, we may try to do it.

When we see that *o* benefits or harms us or our friends, we may be motivated to reciprocate.

Evaluation on the basis of perception may lead to sentiment-derived actions: praising, damning, rewarding, punishing.

Perceiving a sign of *o*'s sentiments toward *p* may arouse *p*'s sentiment toward *o* and lead to sentiment-derived actions.

Seeing a situation fraught with danger may lead to avoiding and correcting actions: I see that the tire is about to blow out; I smell a leak in the gas pipe; I see a child playing in traffic; I notice termites in the foundation of my house.

In common-sense psychology, we have many beliefs on the order of "if *o* were to see *x*, he would do *y*." Therefore, we know that in order to produce or prevent action, the most efficacious *modus operandi* may be to produce or prevent perception.

Ability to report on the perceived. One of the significant action possibilities with which *p* is concerned is that of communication. He knows that when *o* has perceived something, he can tell about it. He also may infer, when *p* tells about something, that *p* has seen it. Moreover, *o*'s descriptions as a firsthand witness to the situation become particularly potent. Therefore, *p* may prevent *o* from coming into perceptual contact with *x* in order to prevent him from becoming such a messenger. Or, just because he wishes *o* to become a link in

the transmission of information, he may tell him about *x*, or show him *x*, or send him out as a scout to observe *x*.

Perception and communion between persons. Perception can also serve to establish a union between persons. Simmel says:

Of the special sense organs, the eye has a uniquely sociological function. The union and interaction of individuals is based upon mutual glances. This is perhaps the most direct and purest reciprocity which exists anywhere. This highest psychic reaction, however, in which the glances of eye to eye unite men, crystallizes into no objective structure; the unity which momentarily arises between two persons is present in the occasion and is dissolved in the function. So tenacious and subtle is this union that it can only be maintained by the shortest and straightest line between the eyes, and the smallest deviation from it, the slightest glance aside, completely destroys the unique character of this union. . . . This mutual glance between persons, in distinction from the simple sight or observation of the other, signifies a wholly new and unique union between them. . . . By the glance which reveals the other, one discloses himself. By the same act in which the observer seeks to know the observed, he surrenders himself to be understood by the observer. The eye cannot take unless at the same time it gives. . . . What occurs in this direct mutual glance represents the most perfect reciprocity in the entire field of human relationships. (Simmel, 1921, p. 358.)

Of course, one may object that the fact that two people look at each other is no guarantee that they really understand each other, or that a real union arises. Both may have unrevealed thoughts, or they may even fight with their glances, in which case there is a struggle and one wants to outstare the other. Nevertheless, there is a peculiar functional closeness and interaction in a mutual glance. One could assume that *o* holds a special position within *p*'s life space since the representation of *o* includes the fact that in *o*'s life space the representation of *p* is also potent at the moment. Each is aware that he sees the other. It is also noteworthy that in the conversational union, in what Malinowski (1928) called the "phatic communion" (p. 478) the mouth gives and the ear receives, whereas in the optic communion the same organ gives and receives.

Communion through the eyes creates such an intense interpersonal experience that usually only when a deep intimacy is sought is the mutual perception maintained. More typically, one of them breaks the connection by gazing away.

Summary

In this presentation of the effects of *o*'s perceptions on *o*, as understood by *p*, we have again seen that *p* in turn is affected in important ways:

1. His actions are influenced: If the effects are desirable he will try to produce perception; if not he will try to prevent it.
2. His expectations are affected: If he knows that *o* has perceived something, he will expect the consequences of this perception to occur also.
3. His attributions are determined: If he knows that a consequence has occurred, he will infer that perception, as the necessary condition of this consequence, has also occurred.

Among the experienced effects of perception, the following were singled out for special emphasis:

1. Control over the environment as an effect of perception: When he can observe it, *o* has more control over the environment than when he cannot. Knowing this, *p* may try to influence *o*'s perception in order to influence *o*'s action possibilities. For instance, he may hide himself or his thoughts in order to escape *o*'s control.
2. Evaluation as an effect of perception: What is perceived is often judged favorably or unfavorably. Also, *p* may influence *o*'s perception in order to influence *o*'s evaluation of *x*, especially of *p* himself; or *p* reveals himself and what belongs to him in order to produce a positive reaction; he brags and shows off. Or, he hides himself in order to prevent a negative evaluation. Furthermore, *o* as an evaluating perceiver creates a heightened self-consciousness in *p* which may take the form of shyness and embarrassment, and *p* attempts to ward off this discomfiting state by avoiding the conditions that give rise to it. He may, by design, establish the conditions for embarrassment in another.
3. Motivation of further action as an effect of perception: *p* may influence *o*'s perception in order to motivate *o* towards an action, or prevent such motivation. For example, *p* may hide what he has done if he thinks that *o* would get angry and harm him if he were informed of it.
4. Ability to report as an effect of perception: *p* may influence *o*'s perception because if *o* were to see *x* he would be able to report about *x* to other people. Therefore, *p* hides what he has done in order to prevent *o*'s telling about it, or he reveals something just to initiate gossip.
5. Communion as an effect of mutual perception: There is a peculiar functional closeness in the mutual glance; *p* allows this communion when he seeks intimacy and avoids it by deflecting his gaze.

The naive analysis of action

IN THIS CHAPTER we shall be concerned with the actions of another person, in particular with the basic constituents of an action sequence which lead us to know that another person is trying to do something, intends to do something, has the ability to do something, etc. The concepts also apply to one's own actions, but our main emphasis will be on actions in interpersonal relations. We shall also explore the consequences of such cognition—how we utilize knowledge of the basic constituents of action in interpreting action and in predicting and controlling it. The concepts involved in the naive analysis of action stand, as we shall see, in systematic relations to each other just as do the terms of a good scientific system of concepts. Our task will be to formulate this system more explicitly.

This task requires a description of the causal nexus of an environment which contains not only the directly observable facts about the behavior of another person, but also their connection with the more stable structures and processes underlying that behavior. It is an important principle of common-sense psychology, as it is of scientific theory in general, that man grasps reality, and can predict and control it, by referring transient and variable behavior and events to relatively unchanging underlying conditions, the so-called dispositional properties of his world. This principle, already discussed in this book, will become increasingly familiar as we continue the investigation of common-sense psychology. It is time that we examined it more fully.

Dispositional Properties

The nature of and search for dispositional properties. The term dispositional properties is applied to those properties that "dispose" objects and events to manifest themselves in certain ways under certain conditions. Dispositional properties are the invariances that make possible a more or less stable, predictable, and controllable world. They refer to the relatively unchanging structures and processes that characterize or underlie phenomena. (Cf., for instance, Ryle, 1949, Chapter 5.)

Instances of relatively unchanging structures are such object properties as color and size, such person properties as character and ability. We feel, for example, that John's good grades make sense when we refer his achievement, a relatively momentary event, to his high intelligence, a more or less permanent property, and we then believe we are safe in predicting a successful college career. But static structures are not the only ones that can serve as reference points for understanding. Processes may also provide a basis for understanding as long as they show relatively constant coordination to changes in underlying structures or to other processes. For example, "practice makes perfect" is satisfying as an explanatory principle insofar as the process of repetition is felt to be highly coordinated to skill.

The causal structure of the environment, both as the scientist describes it and as the naive person apprehends it, is such that we are usually in contact only with what may be called the offshoots or manifestations of underlying core-processes or core-structures. For example, if I find sand on my desk, I shall want to find out the underlying reason for this circumstance. I make this inquiry not because of idle curiosity, but because only if I refer this relatively insignificant offshoot event to an underlying core event will I attain a stable environment and have the possibility of controlling it. Should I find that the sand comes from a crack in the ceiling and that this crack appeared because of the weakness in one of the walls, then I have reached the layer of underlying conditions which is of vital importance for me. The sand on my desk is merely a symptom, a manifestation that remains ambiguous until it becomes anchored to dispositional properties—cracks and stresses in this case.

The depth dimension of the invariances. The search for relatively enduring aspects of our world, the dispositional properties in nature, may carry us quite far from the immediate facts or they may end hardly a step from them. That is, there exists a hierarchy of cognitive awarenesses which begin with the more stimulus-bound recognition of

"facts," and gradually go deeper into the underlying causes of these facts. What is called "fact" here is similar to what Ichheiser (1949) calls the "raw material" of social perception: "Let us call those data which are interpreted and misinterpreted by mechanisms of social perception the 'raw material' of social perception" (p. 12). The raw material is the stuff, so to speak, of which the organism forms a conclusion. Thus, in the hierarchy of cognitive awareness, each previous layer stands to the succeeding one in the relation of raw material to interpretation.

For a concrete illustration, let us assume that a person, *p*, is confronted with an agreeable, happy experience, *x*. This is the raw material at a level close to the peripheral stimulus. The next step of interpretation may be: What is the immediate source of *x*? Is it chance? Am I the cause of it? Or is another person, *o*, the cause? If *o* is accepted as cause, the question of motive or intention may well arise. Did he do it in order to please me, or was the event only an accidental by-product of a different goal? Perhaps he was ordered to help me, perhaps he did it to put me under an obligation to him, or to relieve his conscience, or to please someone else. But if *p* perceives *o* as really wanting to please him, there are still deeper layers of interpretation possible. The need "*o* wants to please *p*" may be caused by temporary goodwill in *o*; it may be "displaced love"; or it may come from a more permanent sentiment that *o* feels toward *p*. Finally, the underlying attitude itself may be traced to further sources. For example, *p* may feel that *o*'s attitude toward him is a function of *o*'s personality, that *o* is a kind person. Or, *p* may feel that the sentiment stems from the compatibility in their natures, etc.

Underscoring the main points of this illustration, we note first, that man is usually not content simply to register the observables that surround him; he needs to refer them as far as possible to the invariances of his environment. Second, the underlying causes of events, especially the motives of other persons, are the invariances of the environment that are relevant to him; they give meaning to what he experiences and it is these meanings that are recorded in his life space, and are precipitated as the reality of the environment to which he then reacts.

As applied to the actions of another person, the depth dimension of relevant invariances is often of the following order: There is first the raw material which provides the information that change *x* occurs or has occurred and that *o* causes or has caused *x* (though this can already be a further level of interpretation). Then, further meaning is given to these facts when, relating them to certain dispositional properties of the person and of the environment, we conclude that

o can do *x*, *o* wants to do *x*, *o* is trying to do *x*, *o* likes to do *x*, etc. These conclusions become the recorded reality for us, so much so that most typically they are not experienced as interpretations at all. We shall now investigate certain features surrounding the actions of another person which lead us to penetrate the depth dimension of the invariances and precipitate into reality the meaning of actions.

Effective Forces of the Person and Environment in the Action Outcome

In common-sense psychology (as in scientific psychology) the result of an action is felt to depend on two sets of conditions, namely factors within the person and factors within the environment. Naive psychology also has different terms to express the contributions of these factors. Consider the example of a person rowing a boat across a lake. The following is but a sample of expressions used to refer to factors that are significant to the action outcome. We say, "He is *trying* to row the boat across the lake," "He has the *ability* to row the boat across the lake," "He *can* row the boat across the lake," "He *wants* to row the boat across the lake," "It is *difficult* to row the boat across the lake," "Today there is a good *opportunity* for him to row the boat across the lake," "It is sheer *luck* that he succeeded in rowing the boat across the lake." These varying descriptive statements have reference to personal factors on the one hand and to environmental factors on the other. One may speak of the effective force (*ff*) of the person or of the environment when one means the totality of forces emanating from one or the other source.


The action outcome, *x*, may then be said to be dependent upon a combination of effective personal force and effective environmental force, thus:

$$x = f \text{ (ff person, ff environment)}$$

One is tempted to formulate the underlying relation between the two independent variables as an additive one, for if the effective environmental force is zero (which would mean that the combination of environmental factors neither hinders nor furthers the result *x*), then *x* will depend only on the effective personal force. One would also have to assume that *x* would occur without any personal intervention if the effective environmental force were greater than zero (that is if those environmental factors favorable to *x* were greater than those unfavorable to *x*). This would be the case if the wind carried the boat safely to shore while the rower was asleep.

The effective personal force is also analyzed into two contributing factors: a power factor and a motivational factor. We shall have more to say about these components in the course of our discussion, but here let it suffice to point out that the power factor is often represented by ability; there are other characteristics of a person that affect his power, temperament for example, but ability is commonly felt to head the list. The motivational factor refers to what a person is trying to do (his intention) and how hard he is trying to do it (exertion). The contribution of the rower to the outcome *x*, therefore, depends on his ability to maneuver the boat and on how hard he tries to accomplish the goal.

Thus, the schema that is used is the following:



Or,


$$x = f \text{ (trying, power, environment)}$$

The personal constituents, namely power and trying, are related as a multiplicative combination, since the effective personal force is zero if either of them is zero. For instance, if a person has the ability but does not try at all he will make no progress toward the goal.

The personal and environmental contributions to action do not have the same status. The effective personal force shows the traits of personal causality (see later, pp. 100 ff.); it is truly directed toward the goal in the sense that this direction is an invariant characteristic of the force, invariant to the changing circumstances. When we talk of direction toward or away from the goal in regard to impersonal environmental forces, we are using the term in a different sense. Notice that in the above schema, "trying" was not given as a constituent of the effective environmental force. The wind has the direction of furthering or hindering the progress of the boat only accidentally. It is not "trying" or "exerting itself" to produce a certain state of affairs. Only when we think of the wind in an anthropomorphic way would we say: "It could hold up the boat if it only tried hard enough."

Whether a person tries to do something and whether he has the requisite abilities to accomplish it are so significantly different in the affairs of everyday life that naive psychology has demarcated those factors still further by regrouping the constituents of action in such a way that the power factor and the effective environmental force are combined into the concept "can," leaving the motivational factor clearly

separate and distinct. The conceptual groupings may be indicated as follows:



Our plan is first to examine the concept of can, to discuss the properties and conditions underlying its power and environmental components and end with an analysis of the concept of "try" in action.

The Concept of Can

Dispositional character of can. Can generally, though not exclusively, is a dispositional concept, which means that it refers to a relatively stable relationship between the person and the environment. As a dispositional concept it allows the person to ask and answer such questions as, "Will I be able to do the task again?" "Will other people be able to do it as well?" Temporary factors that affect an action outcome are generally ascribed to luck or to transitory personal states such as fatigue rather than to the "can." Thus, if I accidentally hit the bull's eye, I will not feel that I can hit it in the sense of being able to hit it again should I try. I was just lucky.

Sometimes, however, can is used to represent temporary relations between person and environment. We say, "I can't do it now because I am too tired." Or we say, "He can swim the channel when the weather conditions are just right." Notice, however, that the temporary factors, fatigue in the first case and opportunity in the second, are explicitly indicated as disrupting the usual state of affairs obtaining between the powers of the person and the environmental situation.

Can and may. The distinction between can and may as understood by naive psychology is offered by the Webster dictionary under "may":

... can expresses ability, whether physical or mental; may implies permission or sanction; as he will do it if he possibly can; I shall call tomorrow, if I may.

In topological psychology, this difference is found in the source to which the limits of the space of free movement are ascribed. The totality of activities a person can perform has been designated by

Lewin (1936) as the "space of free movement." Or, the space of free movement consists of those regions (areas, particularly activities, within the person's life space) accessible to the person. The limits of the space of free movement are mainly set by (1) quasi-physical barriers—what is beyond a person's abilities and (2) quasi-social barriers—what is forbidden to a person.

Expressing the difference between can and may in terms of our basic concepts, we have:

Can: absence of imposed restraining environmental forces, or imposed restraining forces smaller than own power.

Cannot: imposed environmental restraining forces greater than own power.

May: another person who has power over me, or the objective order (moral laws, etc.) does not wish me not to do x , if that is true then I may do x .

May not: another person who has power over me, or the objective order wishes me not to do x . If I do it anyway (and that is possible in case I can do it but may not) then my action was counter to the wish forces of o , or of the objective order. If o is powerful enough he will "punish" me.

As a succinct statement of the difference between can and may we note:

Can: if he tries he will succeed.

May: if he tries he will not be punished.

Both may and can are sometimes used in the sense of possibility. When we say "He may do x " we may mean "It is possible that he will do it." To say "It can happen" is equivalent to saying "It is possible that it will happen." But it is not equivalent to "It is possible that he will do it." On occasion it makes good sense to say "He could do it but I am perfectly sure he never will."

The may and may not of permission is sometimes transformed into the can and cannot of possibility. If a person marks things with his name, he has symbolically indicated that "other people may not use these things"; if he puts them into a safe, he has transformed the may into "other people cannot use these things." The honor system of examinations relies on the may not; separating the examinees on the cannot. Markers are sufficient to indicate may and may not but it is the height of the fences that is the determining factor in the can and cannot.

The significant relations can be shown graphically:

	<i>o</i> can	<i>o</i> cannot
<i>o</i> likes <i>p</i>	++	+
<i>o</i> dislikes <i>p</i>	--	-

The square presents a field in which the vertical dimension means degrees of liking ranging from "*o* likes *p*" (the other person likes *p*) to "*o* dislikes *p*"; the horizontal dimension at the same time indicates the degrees of the power of *o* to cause benefit or harm ranging from "*o* can" to "*o* cannot." The positive and negative signs within the square refer to the degree to which the situation conforms to *p*'s wishes.

The whole square thus contains all the possible pictures *p* can have of *o* in regard to the dimensions of can and want (as indicated by like). For instance the situation represented in the upper left hand corner of the square is one in which *o* can help or harm *p* and in which *o* likes *p*. In such a case there is no question but that *o* will help *p*; the situation is the most favorable one possible and on our diagram is marked by a double plus. In the lower left hand corner, on the other hand, the situation is represented in which, though *o* again can do something positive or negative for *p*, he dislikes *p*. In this case it can be assumed that *o* will do harm to *p*; this situation is the most negative one possible and is marked by a double minus. It is the situation characteristic of Horney's neurotic.

Unless the situation is the most positive one, forces in the direction of something more positive, or at least less negative, will be aroused. In the case in which *o* likes *p* but at the same time has relatively little power (upper right hand corner) *p* will wish that *o* had greater power, and may try to augment it. If it is given that *o* has great power but that his attitude toward *p* is less positive than it might be (lower left hand corner), then the force will be in the direction away from *o* dislikes *p* toward *o* likes *p*, i.e., *p* will wish that *o* liked him better and may "move toward" *o* to accomplish this. If it is obvious that *o* dislikes *p*, then the force will be towards *o* cannot harm or toward a lessening of *o*'s power (lower right hand corner); *p* may attempt this by "moving against" *o*. Though this situation may still be far from positive, in the sense that it is not agreeable to be disliked even by a

person who has no power over our fortunes, it is much better than having *o* dislike *p* coupled with *o* can harm *p*, the situation in which we are at the mercy of someone who dislikes us.

In brief, when *p* becomes convinced that *o* cannot harm him, then he doesn't have to be so concerned about whether *o* wants to harm him or not; *p* can even arouse *o*'s hostility with impunity. By the same logic, when *p* becomes convinced that *o* will never want to harm him, then he doesn't have to worry about whether or not *o* can harm him; *p* may even put himself in the power of *o*. The principle guiding *p*'s efforts clearly focuses around the can and want: If other people cannot harm me because they are in my power, or do not want to harm me because they like me, then they will not harm me.

Summary

We have attempted to show the complexities, the wisdom, and the failings of the naive psychology of action by making explicit what is not always phenomenally explicit. In the analysis, "can" and "trying" were shown to be the two necessary and sufficient conditions of purposive action. Each is analyzable into constituent elements: can into personal power and environmental factors; trying into intention and exertion. The nature of dispositional properties as well as the meaning of personal causality were singled out as being of special significance in the understanding of these concepts. Factors that influence the conditions of action and their constituents were also discussed.

The naive factor analysis of action permits man to give meaning to action, to influence the actions of others as well as of himself, and to predict future actions. The framework of the many examples in the chapter rests on the fact implicit in naive psychology that can and try are the conditions of action. Thus, our reactions will be different according to whether we think a person failed primarily because he lacked adequate ability or primarily because he did not want to carry out the action. In the first case, we will expect him to succeed as soon as the condition "can" is fulfilled. Moreover, we may bring this condition about by making the task easier, by removing obstacles, by teaching the person requisite skills, and so on. In the second case, however, we will not expect the person to perform the action even when such changes are realized.

Only by affecting the want is there a possibility of establishing the necessary condition, try. Consequently, the direction of our efforts will be quite different. We may attempt to convince the person that this is something he wants to do, we may highlight the positive features of the goal, or appeal to ethical considerations. In this case, the condi-

tions of motivation become the focus. In addition to differences of expectation and control in the two cases, our value judgments may be quite different also. The person may be held far more responsible for the action outcome in the one case than in the other.

The above example seems obvious. But after all, our intention was to show the connections given by naive psychology that permit action and the interpretation of behavior in everyday interpersonal relations. At the same time, in delineating the "logic" of the naive analysis of action, we do not imply that the conclusions based thereon always fit objective reality. Sometimes, as we have seen, erroneous inferences are made when the conditions of action are only partially given or when egocentric influences distort cognition.

It is quite remarkable that the naive psychology of action works as well as it does and applies to such a wide range of cases involving action. It permits statements about the attribution of action, the cognition of its components, and the prediction and control of behavior. Similar functions were seen to emerge from the naive analysis of perception and in this area as well as that of action, man's meaningful association with his environment and control over it is thereby widened.

Desire and pleasure

INsofar as the discussion of trying was restricted to intention, i.e., what a person is trying to do, and to exertion, i.e., how hard he is trying to do it, we were dealing with motivation at a relatively superficial level; we did not consider the question of why he is doing it. Intention and exertion were conceptualized as the constituents or aspects of trying, not as the conditions of trying. But, as we have pointed out more than once, man has a strong urge to push toward deeper levels of understanding, those levels that reveal the conditions behind the events with which he is confronted. In this chapter we shall trace a few outlines of the way one of the conditions of trying—desire, and its counterpart, pleasure or enjoyment—is managed in interpersonal behavior.

Scientific psychology, in spite of considerable thinking and research in the area of motivation, has not yet succeeded in establishing a generally accepted vocabulary. It is not surprising, therefore, that the vocabulary of naive psychology, which bases its concepts on a much wider range of phenomena, is not altogether clear either. The experience of pleasure has hardly been touched by systematic psychology. As Henle has observed,

Contemporary motivation theories are theories of striving to reach goals; their interest stops once the goal has been achieved. Even hedonism seems to deal only with the pursuit of happiness and to have little place for happiness itself. (Henle, 1956, p. 299.)

Examples of supporting "facts" are: the acting was excellent, the plot was masterfully designed, the costuming was perfect, etc. In addition to such cognitive "facts," special needs of the person may also serve to maintain the original position. The person may not wish to lose face by shifting his judgment, for instance. If, then, other people find the film dull, the person may ascribe their negative reaction to their ignorance. The ones who do not enjoy x simply do not realize its good points. The connection of " x is positive" to other cognitions or needs may be so strong, that even if p knows that everyone else is displeased with x and he alone enjoys it, he can have the feeling that he is right and others are wrong. In short, he continues to attribute the enjoyment of x to its intrinsic excellence and not to his own personality.

Phenomenally, enjoyment is directed toward an object. But the object may not be responsible for the enjoyment. We may not have insight into the true reasons for our pleasure or that of others. As in cases of perceptual attribution, a hedonic experience of either p or o may be attributed to a condition in such a way that it fits our own view of the world, the state of affairs as we wish them or as we think they should be.

Effects of Enjoyment

Enjoyment is not only an effect of certain conditions, but it also has effects of its own. A survey of these effects points up the diverse and basic significance of enjoyment in man's relation to the world of objects and people. The first two of these effects have already been discussed:

1. Enjoyment has behavioral manifestations from which enjoyment in another is cognized (cf. pp. 135-137).
2. Enjoyment is attributed to different sources, notably the person and the object; the consequences of such attributive judgments are legion (cf. pp. 146-160).

A third point may be mentioned:

3. The effects of enjoyment are the goals we attempt to reach when we use enjoyment as a means.

With respect to the last point, we again have a wealth of illustrative material from everyday life upon which to draw:

Knowing that enjoyment leads to liking, p may try to have o enjoy x so that o may be positive toward it or desire it in the future.

Realizing that the sentiment toward the source (cause) of x is often largely determined by the attractiveness of x (cf. Chapter 7 on senti-

ment), p may try to get o to enjoy x if he wishes o to be positive toward the people who made x possible.

Realizing that the pleasure or displeasure of one person also affects others perceiving these reactions, p may attempt to have o enjoy something just because he wishes to please a friend of o , or annoy o 's enemy.

Being aware that enjoyment is attached to an object and very often is attributed solely to the object, p may show o how much q is enjoying x in the hope that o 's attraction for x will be enhanced accordingly.

Believing that enjoyment leads to a feeling of well-being in general, p may give o something desirable in the hope that it will take his mind off disturbing thoughts and help him overcome depressed feelings.

Believing that enjoyment leads to a feeling of expansiveness and generosity, p may wish to make o happy so that o will be more ready to do him or someone else a favor.

These examples by no means exhaust the ways enjoyment is used to bring about desired ends. Yet as a sample, they serve to show how the naive psychology of enjoyment consists of a system of concepts that not only refers to the conditions of enjoyment, but also to the effects of enjoyment.

Summary

The path connecting desire and pleasures in the naive psychology of motivation led us to explore some of the more compelling signposts along the way. The major ones read:

Desires or personal wishes are to be distinguished from induced motives, though the distinction is not always clear.

Desires are not invariably coordinated to actions.

The fulfillment of a desire is thought to be invariably coordinated to pleasure, though not vice versa.

When necessary, re-evaluation of conditions and effects occurs in accordance with the desire-pleasure postulate.

Desires and pleasure may conflict with other requirements perceived by the organism. Harmony may be restored through re-evaluation.

Conceptually, there are two relations between the person and the object to which the desire and pleasure are directed, namely, value and distance.

The value relation is designated by the sentiment, p likes x . It is uncoordinated to conditions of distance between p and x .

The distance relation between p and x pertains to the distance as perceived by p . It is a psychological distance conceptualized as a spatial relation between p and x .




Figure 1. *Desire and pleasure in the naive psychology of motivation.*

The conditions of distance between p and x differentiate the affective reactions of p . Desire, pleasure, hope, the frustration of a near success, the relief of a near miss are examples.

Control of pleasure in another person may be accomplished by manipulating the distance between o and x — o may be correctly or incorrectly informed of wish-fulfillment or wish denial; he may be teased by manipulations leading to near successes.

The attribution of desire and pleasure to the underlying subject and object poles has far-reaching consequences. It is essential for understanding. Through attribution an experience leads to further beliefs important for prediction and control.

Adequate attribution requires an adequate data pattern of condition-effect changes.

Attribution to the object or to the person can depend on whether experiences of the self or those of another are being considered.

Attribution of enjoyment to the object provides the basis for one kind of egocentric attribution.

Personal wishes and propriety may also lead to egocentrically determined incorrect attribution.

Enjoyment has certain aftereffects. These may be the ends sought by p in bringing about pleasure.

Figure 1 represents some of the above features, a basic skeleton as it were, which provides the outline for the rich detail and vast scope encompassed by the naive psychology of desire and pleasure. Beginning at the left, we find the person and the object as possible reasons for the positive relation between p and x . This positive relation, a

dynamic p - x relation designated as liking, together with the distance relation, determines the experience. When p is in contact with x , pleasure will result, when p is separated from x , desire. A somewhat different view of the same underlying dynamics is given by the connection, desire plus contact produces pleasure. Beliefs in the future possibilities of the distance variable will further influence the outcome: if with contact the belief in the possibility of losing x is given, fear will arise. With separation, the belief that x will be secured leads to desire with hope. The belief that p can cause x will lead to exertion and action. But exertion can also be caused by other sources: p can exert himself to produce x not only because it is intrinsically attractive to him, but because of extrinsic motivation derived from a means-end relation, from sentiment, command, or ought forces.

Angyal refers to such events as heteronomous events in contrast to autonomous happenings which have their source in the person himself.

The autonomy of the organism is not an absolute one. Self-determination is restricted by outside influences which, with respect to the organism, are heteronomous. The organism lives in a world in which processes go on independently of it. . . .

Autonomy and heteronomy refer here only to the source out of which a process is governed. In this study, by autonomy is meant "self-government" and by heteronomy "government from outside." Thus, for example, when two animals A and B are engaged in a fight, what animal A does to animal B is heteronomous for B, in spite of the fact that it originates from an organism. (Angyal, 1941, pp. 37-39.)

Heteronomy as Treated by Lewin and Murray

It should be mentioned that in the topological psychology of Kurt Lewin (1936) heteronomous events are of less central importance than events that have their source in the person. The typical process handled topologically is that of a person proceeding through means-actions toward a goal. He is the agent of his actions, and only in a limited sense the recipient of environmental effects.

Topological psychology represents heteronomous events in the life space, albeit restrictedly, by the use of barriers, by the concept of alien facts, and by the concept of behavior induced by the power field of ϕ . It is significant that since action is the main thought model in topology, heteronomy appears mainly in the shape of external obstructions to action. Barriers express the fact that external factors can stop an event that has its source in the person. The concept of alien facts refers to heteronomous events that are not represented in the life space, not even in unconsciousness. If we experience an unforeseen event, a sudden change in our life space occurs that could not have been derived from the previous state of the life space. Insofar it is an intruding, alien fact. But, of course, heteronomous events cannot be equated with alien facts, for the simple reason that the former are often clearly present in the life space. One can anticipate a good or a bad fate, one can hope for it or be afraid of it; one can feel the pressure that is being exerted on oneself and can resist or yield to it; and the fact that we have been pushed into fortune or misfortune is represented in our life space. Whether a past change, a past locomotion has been caused by us or by an external, heteronomous force is of the greatest importance for the reaction. We can internalize heteronomous forces and make them part of our life space. The concept of induced force, representing that the behavior of p may be induced by the power field of ϕ , is also relevant to, but not the same as, the concept of heteronomy. It is not the same because induction, referring to social induction,

Environmental effects

EVENTS CAN HAVE THEIR SOURCE in the environment, and the many ways such events affect the individual have already been discussed. We examined at some length how the other person as perceiver is able to evaluate and control his environment, which can have major consequences for p . Environmental conditions bearing upon the attribution of success, such as task difficulty, luck, and opportunity were discussed. That environmental circumstance may alter the distance between p and his goal, and thereby affect his desires and pleasures, was shown to be of theoretical and practical interest. In later chapters, especially Chapter 10, "Benefit and Harm," the significance of environmental effects will be examined further. In the present chapter we wish to present a few considerations relevant in a general way to all such environmental effects on the person. The problem can be seen as one in which personal action is contrasted with what happens to us: pushing versus being pushed, being the hammer versus being the anvil, in general, activity versus passivity.

In discussing environmental effects we shall not be concerned with the more general influences of the social or physical milieu which may shape personality but rather with concrete events which are caused by the environment and with which the person has to cope, such as what another person does to him, the strokes of fortune or misfortune, etc. It should be clear that events originating outside the person include those instigated by another person as well as those stemming from the inanimate environment.

excludes inanimate environmental events as a source of change, and refers to the environmental source of *p*'s actions, not to the source of, for instance, *p*'s affects or emotions. Thus, that the child complies on command is an example of induced behavior; that his emotions may be drastically influenced by the dictates of fortune is not.

Murray's system, on the other hand, provides a central position for heteronomous events, particularly in his concept of "press." His view of environmental effects, actually, is very similar to our own in which benefits and harms in their broad sense are major psychological concepts. Murray suggests that

... it is convenient to classify the SS [stimulus situation] according to the kind of effect—facilitating or obstructing—it is exerting or could exert upon the organism. Such a tendency or "potency" in the environment may be called a *press*. For example, a press may be nourishing, ... or restraining, or amusing or belittling to the organism. It can be said that a press is a temporal gestalt of stimuli which usually appears in the guise of a *threat of harm or promise of benefit* to the organism. (Murray, 1938, p. 40.)

Thus, an object or a situation is represented according

... to its effect (or potential effect) upon the subject. ... By "effect" here we do not mean the response that is aroused in the subject ... we mean what is done to the subject before he responds (ex: belittlement by an insult) or what might be done to him if he did not respond (ex: a physical injury from a falling stone), or what might be done to him if he did not respond by coming into contact with the object (ex: nourishment from food). ... [It is therefore advisable to] classify an environment in terms of the kind of benefits (facilitations, satisfactions) and the kind of harms (obstructions, injuries, dissatisfactions) which it provides. (pp. 117–118.)

Murray (1938) coins the term "pressive perception" for "the process in the subject which recognizes what is being done to him at the moment (that says 'this is good' or 'this is bad')..." (p. 119).

In the following quotation, Murray specifies some of the important presses with which individuals are confronted:

What we want to know is how people in general, or how people of a given type or category, respond to situations such as these: frustration, postponement of gratification, social rejection, injustice, despotic coercion, moral condemnation, erotic advances, flattery, appeals for help, and so forth. (Murray, 1951, p. 459.)

The kinds of press important in interpersonal relations are uncovered by probing certain areas:

In formulating an interpersonal proceeding, for example, the task would be that of defining the need-aim of the object [the other person] (just as one would define the need-aim of the subject). The question is, what

is the object doing to the subject, or intending to do, or capable of doing under certain circumstances? Is the subject being rejected or accepted, attacked or assisted? Are his tastes being criticized or praised? (p. 459.)

These are the presses to which the person is subjected, and they can be classified as benefits, harms, lacks, and barriers. Also important for interpersonal relations is the concept of "potential press."

Many situations are not definable as press (which have already been exerted), but rather as signs of *potential press*—promises of benefits or threats of harm. In such cases, the subject will predict to himself or expect that the alter will respond with an agreeable or beneficial press if he is properly treated, or that he will exert a disagreeable or harmful press if the subject comes within reach of him or acts in a provocative manner. (p. 459.)

Heteronomy and Causal Attribution

The concepts of heteronomy and autonomy, in referring to the origin and governing source of an event, designate its causal attribution. The diversity of conditions leading to a judgment concerning the cause of an event has already been indicated in the analysis of different types of interpersonal relations. We can refer, for instance, to the discussions of personal and impersonal causality (p. 100), problems concerning the attribution of can (p. 87) and of trying (p. 114), the source of a perceptual experience (Chapter 3), etc.

Of particular importance, is that the origin or cause of heteronomous events may be referred to different sources depending upon whether one is concerned with the facts immediately presented in a concrete instance or with the dispositions underlying a whole group of events. For example, a particular action may be ascribed to *o*, or upon deeper analysis to *o*'s sentiments toward *p*, the mainsprings of *o*'s action. Thus, a phenotypically single event may bespeak a hierarchy of heteronomous events depending on its causal attribution. The distinction between the more proximal and the more distal was discussed earlier in connection with perceptual phenomena (cf. pp. 23–35). What is more immediately given as raw material is referred to more distal contents so that the situation may be grasped more fully. This point also has bearing on the scope of the situation that is taken into account, the so-called local and total relevance in causal attribution; its relation to proximal and distal phenomena are elaborated in Chapter 10, "Benefit and Harm."

The question of the reality of an event—whether in fact it has been caused or not—which arose in connection with the control of pleasure in interpersonal relations, also has general application to all heteronomous events. There it was pointed out that the event that brings about

Sentiment

SENTIMENTS ARE SUCH an integral part of interpersonal relations that one hardly need explain why they are to be discussed in such a book as this. Many of the actions that occur between people can be understood only if one has an appreciation of the feelings that guide them.

A sentiment refers to the way a person p feels about or evaluates something. The "something" may be another person, o , or an impersonal entity x . Sentiments may be roughly classified as positive and negative. We shall speak of positive sentiments in a relation of liking between p and another entity, and of negative sentiments in a relation of disliking. Finer distinctions among sentiments such as those between like and love or between dislike and hate will be disregarded for our present purposes.

Naive Psychology and Scientific Psychology in the Study of Sentiments

Naive psychology is fairly certain about the meaning of the sentence " p likes o ." There can be doubt whether a particular person likes a certain other person, but there is hardly any doubt as to the meaning of the words "to like." This is the more remarkable as it is rather difficult to state explicitly what the conceptual properties of this naive construct are.

For one thing, sentiment is not coordinated to a single kind of

emotion nor to a single action. The variety of behavior and emotions connected with a sentiment is pointedly illustrated by Shand in regard to love:

... the situation of presence contrasts with that of absence, and prosperity with adversity, and love responds to the one with joy, and with sorrow and longing to the other. The anticipation of the future changes; and, in correspondence with it, love is sometimes full of hope and sometimes sunk in despondency. The remembrance of the past changes; and, responding to it, love is sometimes filled with thankfulness, and sometimes with remorse. The situation of danger contrasts with the situation of security; and, responding to the first, love feels anxiety, and to the second, confidence. The plots of enemies contrast with the help of friends; and love responds in the one case with suspicion and anger, and in the other with trust and gratitude. The situation in which love is placed may be any one of those referred to; and, in the course of its history, it may pass successively through all of them. Love, therefore, cannot be reduced to a single compound feeling; it must organize a number of different emotional dispositions capable of evoking in different situations the appropriate behavior. (Shand, 1920, pp. 55-56.)

The point is clear. Different situations give rise to different actions and feelings that in some way are appropriate to the sentiment. Shand puts it this way:

Every sentiment tends to include in its system all the emotions, thoughts, volitional processes and qualities of character which are of advantage to it for the attainment of its ends, and to reject all such constituents as are either superfluous or antagonistic. (p. 106)

That is, the sentiment is the connecting link between the variety of situations on the one hand and the events that transpire on the other.

How, then, does one go about bringing order into the infinite diversity of possible situations and the manifold of events? Aside from the urge of the scientist to reduce the complex to the simple, naive psychology itself tells us that there is order and coherence in the way sentiments function. We have no trouble understanding a parent's pleasure over the success of his son and sorrow over his defeat. The totally different reactions of pleasure and sorrow do not leave us with a feeling of chaos or of unfathomable complexity regarding the vagaries of human nature. The factor that brings order into heterogeneity is the perceived sentiment, namely the fondness of a parent for his son. The sentiment is the more or less underlying invariance, the disposition which gives a stability within fluctuating circumstances and behavior.

Naive psychology does more than tell us that there is order in the way sentiments function. In providing a superabundance of psychological events, it points to the way in which we must look for that

things which are congenial to the flame, for then its outcome would be an "entropic death." Instead it needs environmental support for these representations. "The organism is not a closed system; it is part of a larger functional context..." (Köhler, 1938, p. 323; cf. also Bertalanffy, 1950).

Thus, the intensity of the part-flame depends on the state of the external object to which the representation refers. The more the real person flourishes, the more will that part of the flame corresponding to the representation of *o* flourish, and thus the flame *p*. Through representation in *p*'s life space, the functioning of *p* depends on the functioning of *o*. This is where unit relations enter. The flame within the flame *p* can be nourished not only by promoting *o*, but also by combining it with other fitting structures, or also by a more intense interaction between *p* and *o*. On the other hand, interaction might lead to the building up of such a part-process within *p*. In awareness, the fitting of the part-process into the larger flame *p* is experienced as a positive sentiment. Sentiments and unit relations are thus interdependent and in their tendency toward balance serve the organism in its striving for greater perfection.

The general starting point of Spinoza's theory, namely, that the life processes in man have a direction which reaches out toward ever higher states of perfection, has much in common with certain modern viewpoints. We are reminded of Goldstein's (1947) ideas on self-actualization, the main supposition being that "...the organism has definite potentialities, and because it has them it has the need to actualize or realize them" (p. 146). In this way the urge to perfection is derived for "...an organism is governed by the tendency to actualize its individual capacities as fully as possible" (p. 141). To the extent that the balance hypothesis was shown to be consistent with Spinoza's views, it is also consistent with Goldstein's. Balance between sentiments and unit relations may be said to be in accord with the process of self-actualization, for

... various actions occur in accordance with the various capacities which belong to the nature of the organism, and in accordance with those instrumental processes which are the necessary prerequisites of the self-actualization of the organism. (Goldstein, 1947, p. 142.)

Angyal is another personality theorist who believes that the life processes of an organism have a general dynamic trend. For Angyal the trend is towards greater self-expansion and self-determination.

Life processes do not merely tend to preserve life but transcend the momentary status quo of the organism, expanding itself continuously and

imposing its autonomous determination upon an ever increasing realm of events. (Angyal, 1941, p. 48.)

This is the "system principle" against which situations, objects, other persons, are evaluated by the subject. If they fit the system principle, then they will be experienced as positive.

To this list of personality theories which offer unifying principles of personality functioning could be added Lecky's (1945) views on self-consistency of personality organization, Stagner's (1951) use of the concept of homeostasis, and others. Our intention, however, is not to review such personality theories, but rather to show the place of the balance theory of sentiments within broader, holistic theories of personality. Whatever the merits of such an integration, it must be remembered that the balance theory, because of its specifications, can still be tested in the laboratory as well as in everyday life.

Summary

In this chapter a hypothesis concerning the relations between unit formation and sentiments was proposed. Stated briefly, it assumes that a state of harmony or balance exists if entities which belong together are all positive, or if they are all negative. If two closely related entities are of different sign, a state of disharmony or tension results, which can be resolved in different ways. A number of unit-forming factors relevant for interpersonal relations, and the way the surrounding influences unit formation were discussed.

A main section of the chapter was devoted to the different specific instances of this interrelation between unit formation and sentiments, that is, the way in which different relations between entities interact with liking or disliking them. Thus, the relations of similarity, interaction, proximity, familiarity, and ownership were explored from this point of view.

A theoretical analysis of the hypothesis was attempted and the different possibilities of resolution of states of disharmony were considered. At the end we tried to place the hypothesis in a broader frame of organismic psychology.

which the experience of should is produced. He points out that all of them

... contain a gap or disjunction; the person was in need of help, or action was called for in a given case. The situation was in some sense incomplete; our apprehension of the facts and their relations, or of the need of the situation, laid a claim upon us to improve or to remedy it, to act in a manner fitting to it. Action that fits the requirements we judge to be appropriate or right; to fail to act appropriately we experience as violating a demand, or being unjust. (Asch, 1952, p. 357.)

Requiredness, according to this view, is rooted in the gap or incompleteness of the situation. Acting in accordance with this implicit injunction, acting in a manner that brings about the necessary closure, then becomes identified with the right.

Yet, it is not strictly correct to equate gap-induced requiredness with ought requiredness, for clearly there may be many occasions in which the person may experience the tension of an incompleteness in the situation, without at the same time experiencing the tension of an ought. For instance, the person may realize that he wants *x*, the situation being incomplete in the sense that his desire is unfulfilled, and yet that he ought not have it. Or, in interpersonal relations, the person may recognize that someone else wants *x*, but unlike the case in which *o* needs help, filling in the gap by satisfying his wants does not necessarily coincide with what ought to be done.

As a first approach, the content of "I (or *o*) ought to do *x*" may be said to be fashioned after the idea "somebody wants or commands that I (or *o*) do *x*." In the case of ought, however, it is not a particular somebody that is felt to want or command people to do *x*, but some suprapersonal objective order. It may also be experienced as a supernatural being who personifies this objective order. In any case, when *p* has the conviction that he ought to do *x* he recognizes a vector in the environment, a vector which is like a wish or a demand or a requirement on the part of some suprapersonal order and which has the validity of objective existence. True enough, when *p* has the conviction that *o* wants him to do *x*, he also recognizes a vector in the environment; the desire of *o* is also felt by *p* as being objectively existent. But the desire has its source, or is located, in only a part of the environment, that is, that part which consists of person *o*.

First of all, oughts are impersonal. They refer to standards of what ought to be done or experienced, standards independent of the individual's wishes. This is not to say that personal wishes do not influence the perception of ought forces; it is rather that they "should not," that in principle the ought is established by objective requirements. What

Ought and value

WE OFTEN HAVE THE FEELING that someone ought to get a reward or a punishment, that we or other people should do something, that someone does not deserve his bad or good luck, or that he has a right to act in a certain way. These oughts or obligations play a major role not only in the evaluation and determination of behavior and its consequences, but also in the fashioning of the content and the emotional quality of experience. Instances of this have been given before in regard to the psychological phenomena we have already reviewed. We saw, for example, how the attribution of pleasure and of pain may be influenced by ought requirements. In a subsequent chapter we shall also see how an act of harm or of benefit may be instigated by considerations of justice and how the recipient may accept the harm if he feels that it is warranted, or accept the benefit without any feelings of gratitude if he believes it was "coming to him," and even reject a benefit purporting to express a relationship of liking if he interprets the benefit as being offered from a sense of duty.

We shall now try to discuss some of the basic properties of the concepts of ought and value.

Properties of Ought

Wertheimer (1935) and Köhler (1938) use the concept of requiredness to describe a situation in which we feel that something "ought to happen." To exemplify this, Asch presents a number of situations in

that he is happy. Philosophers have again and again felt the need to counter the spontaneous association of these attributes by emphasizing that great power or riches do not assure happiness.

The coexistence of the three properties happiness, power, and value, brings into harmony heteronomous forces, autonomous tendencies, and ought forces. (1) Heteronomous forces. With the happy and fortunate person, the environmental forces or changes are in the direction of his wishes. (2) Autonomous tendencies. With the powerful person, the structure of the environment is such that the person is the source of events within a causal network. (3) Ought forces. The good person acts in conformity with the superindividual objective requirements. Power, as a value, is then seen to be in harmony with other values, to fit in with autonomous and homonomous strivings of the individual, to make possible the achievement of the good and worthwhile.

Summary

As a framework for discussion, oughts and values were conceptualized as impersonal objective requirements which are also dispositional in character and intersubjective in validity. They were distinguished by the concept of force field, the ought representing an actual process, a field of forces, and value belonging to the dimension of potentiality so that it evokes behavior only under proper conditions. The concept of force field also helps clarify the fact that rationally an ought has application only where the person is able to fulfill the requirements of the objective order. The effect of personal wishes on the perceived application of oughts and on the creation of barriers to action (i.e. establishing the cannot) was also pointed out. That oughts and values increase the possibilities of action in the social world was shown to stem from its conceptual properties.

The importance of communication among people in the establishment of the cognitive objectivity of values and oughts was examined in terms of the fact that objectivity requires intersubjective consensus. The absence of consensus may in fact direct the person to take a new look at his beliefs concerning oughts and values, the re-evaluation leading to the possibility that distorting personal considerations may be discarded. Where consensus is not achieved, the person tends to discredit the disagreeing member, thereby preserving the significance of the requirement of intersubjective validity.

Because behavior stemming from the wish to satisfy the objective order may not "look" any different from behavior arising from other motives, determining the ought as a motivating factor is not always simple. The significance of the disagreeableness of the task and of the

power of the person were discussed in this connection, the one eliminating personal wishes as a possible motive, and the other eliminating fear of punishment from the outside world.

Harmony between the impersonal requirements of the objective order and other areas in the person's life space, was discussed at some length. The cases of balance were considered under the following headings: personal wishes and objective requirements; justice, happiness, and goodness; ought and reality; liking and admiring. Some of these cases could be seen as a logical consequence of the person's attempt to establish himself in a meaningful and stable world. Others may not primarily represent a process of rational determination, but all have major consequences for the content of oughts and values and how they affect other sentiments, perceptions, and actions.

Finally, a specific value, power or strength, was discussed in an attempt to explore how values are connected with man's over-all efforts to adjust to the many events about him when these events do not all conform to his personal wishes and welfare.

Request and command

ONE PERSON CAN INDUCE ANOTHER TO do something by producing conditions of action in the other person. The schema used in the interpretation of action and its motivation (Chapters 4 and 5) is used not only in assessing the sources of behavior in *o*, but also for the purpose of bringing about actions of *o*.

Cases of induction of action

That the action schema can be used as a means-end relation was discussed at the end of Chapter 4. In the example analyzed there, *p* wanted to prevent an action of *o*, namely, the harming of *p*. But, of course, the use of the action schema as a means-end relation is not restricted to the prevention of action; the conditions of action can serve as means by which an action of *o* is brought about as the desired end.

Thus, *p* knows that trying and can are the two conditions of action. If *p* knows further that *o* wants to do *x* but cannot, he will try to affect *o*'s "can," by putting him in a position of being able to do it, or by influencing any of the conditions of can which were mentioned in Chapter 4. If, on the other hand, *p* knows that *o* can do *x* but has no wish to exert himself in the direction toward *x*, he will try to bring about *o*'s action by influencing one of the conditions of trying, which were discussed in Chapter 5.

We are not considering here cases in which *p* is the unintentional

source of the behavior of *o*, for instance, in prestige suggestion, when *o* sees *p*, his admired superior, choose something which then becomes positive for *o*; or, when *p* wants something for himself and thereby arouses the competitive envy of *o*. We are concerned only with what Lippitt *et al.* (1952) call a direct influence attempt, which they define as "A social interaction in which one child consciously and deliberately tries to get another child to do something, in such a way that the research observer is aware of the intent" (p. 41). They distinguish it from behavioral contagion (a term first used by F. Redl, 1949) which is defined as "An event in which a person's behavior is changed to resemble that of another person. This change occurs in a social interaction situation in which the person acting as the 'initiator' has not communicated intent to evoke such a change in the other" (p. 41).

We will enumerate some of the main cases of *p* inducing *o*'s action which result from the general scheme of the conditions of trying:

1. It is possible that *p* changes a proper valence for *o*. Something that was unattractive to *o* suddenly seems attractive because of *p*'s action; *o* wants to do it, and he is induced to think that *x* is good for him. It is possible for *p* to produce this change in the proper valence for *o* if he can manipulate the different conditions for the establishment of a positive valence by praising *x*, by persuading *o* that *x* is good, or by demonstratively enjoying *x*. In the mind of *o*, *p* only shows what is good; he is not the source of the valence but only the cause of *o*'s realizing the valence. The real source of the valence is in the properties of *x*; it is intrinsically good, and *p* helped *o* to become aware of it.

2. *p* shows *o* the consequences of *x*. That is done very often in persuasion. No new valences are created; *x* merely attains a new derived valence for *o*. By showing that *x* has a positive *y* as its effect, *p* creates a derived positive valence of *x* for *o*.

3. *p* can also use derived valences in another way in order to control *o*'s actions. Not only can he call the attention of *o* to consequences that are given, he can also create consequences for *o* by promising reward or punishment. The power of *p* to produce actions of *o* is then derived from his power to cause events that are positive or negative for *o*. He does not create proper valences for *o*, he does not change the agreeableness or disagreeableness of activities for *o*. He only creates derived valences by setting up if-so connections when he promises rewards or threatens punishments. He does not have to be stronger than *o* in general; he can coerce *o* if he has only the power of causing a particular positive or negative event for *o*, for instance, using blackmail, or a child controlling his parent by bed-wetting. Also,

the experiment the main cause of the resistance was that the subject defined the situation as a personal clash of wills; eating the crackers meant a defeat for the subject.

The defeat character of eating . . . is further emphasized by the tendency for S's who do not resist to find a reason for eating of their own free will, to avoid the implication that they are eating under compulsion. One S said he liked the crackers and was hungry. . . . One S implied that by eating he showed himself to be E's superior in courtesy. . . . (Frank, 1944, p. 39.)

In these cases, the situation is structured in such a way that the autonomy of the person is preserved. That is, *o* performs the requested act because he wants to do it and not because he cannot resist the pressure that *p* puts on him. The source of doing *x* is put into the person and not into the environment. This is analogous to the sour grapes fable. The fox says, "I don't do *x* because I don't want to, not because I am unable to do it." In this case again the reason for not doing is put into the person; to put it into the environment would be a sign of weakness.

To comply, in these cases, is taken normally as implying a negative value of the self (weakness). In order to preserve the self value, either the request is refused, or, if *o* complies, he does it in such a way that the implication of negative self value is reduced. He may do what he is asked to do because of the consequences his compliance implies. For instance, he may think that if he complies, *p* will like him; people will say he is a good person; people, and especially *p*, will benefit him in return. He may also fear the consequences of not complying.

A more involved example from *Tom Jones* shows the relation between complying and creating an obligation:

With reflections of this nature she usually, as has been hinted, accompanied every act of compliance with her brother's inclinations; and surely nothing could more contribute to heighten the merit of this compliance than a declaration that she knew, at the same time, the folly and unreasonableness of those inclinations to which she submitted. Tacit obedience implies no force upon the will, and consequently may be easily, and without any pains, preserved; but when a wife, a child, a relation, or a friend, performs what we desire, with grumbling and reluctance, with expressions of dislike and dissatisfaction, the manifest difficulty they undergo must greatly enhance the obligation. (Fielding, 1749, Vol. I, p. 11.)

An obligation of *p* toward *o* is an ought force in the direction for *o*, caused by a previous act *x* of *o* for *p*. The strength of an obligation is a function of the negative value of *x* for *o*, and the positive value of *x* for *p*. The greater the negative value of *x* for *o*, the more will *p* be

obligated to *o*. In the example from Fielding, the negative value of *x* for *o* is demonstrated by *o* to *p* by "grumbling and reluctance." The grumbling is a means of making *p* feel obligated, and to gain a certain measure of ascendancy over *p*.

To put it briefly, *o*'s force toward or away from complying with *p*'s request will depend on: (1) the value of *x* for *p* and for *o*; (2) what *p* and *o* can cause; (3) *o*'s sentiment for *p*; (4) the power relation between *p* and *o*, and (5) the consequences of the act.

Command

A few words may be added in regard to actions that are induced by command. In these cases the power relation is more important than the sentiments. When *o* does what *p* commands him to do, he does not "grant" the command, as he can grant a request; he obeys the command. If *o* obeys, he is considered the source of the act much less than when he grants a request. Of course, he may also try to give the impression of acting autonomously. In a power hierarchy (e.g., manager, foreman, worker) it can happen that *q* commands *p* to command *o* to do a disagreeable task. If *p* does not want to appear as if he is being pushed by *q* and is weak, he may rather take upon himself the bad repute of being a domineering person himself than admit that *q* made him do it. On the other hand, if the sentiments are more important to him than the power relations, he may blame his superiors for having to give the command to *o*.

Summary

In this chapter, how one person *p* gets another person *o* to do something was discussed. Underlying *p*'s attempts to influence *o*'s actions is the general action scheme (Chapter 4), that is, in order to make *o* act, *p* produces what he sees as the conditions of *o*'s actions. Different cases were distinguished on the basis of which condition *p* uses as means.

Induced actions are sometimes attributed to the immediate agent, sometimes to the person who made the agent execute it. In this attribution a number of factors play a role, and the way in which the event is placed in the surrounding causal structure is taken account of.

In exploring the character of requests, their relation to power, ought forces, sentiments, and self-esteem was treated. A few remarks on the role of commands were added.

Benefit and harm

BENEFITING AND HARMING apply in a general way to a wide and colorful range of human interaction. Praising, helping, teaching, protecting and encouraging, for example, are considered actions generally benefiting a person unless special circumstances are taken into account. Usually for instance, helping is considered as a worthwhile and benefiting action, though if the one who is helped needs to learn through his own efforts, the help may be rejected as harmful. More typical instances of harming are seen in insulting, hindering, hurting, condemning, and breaking a promise.

A Basic Definition

We may begin by noting the almost platitudinous statement that when *o* benefits *p*, he causes something, *x*, that is positive for *p*, and that when *o* harms *p*, he causes a negative *x*. Very quickly, however, it becomes apparent that this statement requires further specification in order to clarify its ambiguities. Yet it is a fruitful starting definition, for in the process of clarification some psychologically meaningful principles emerge.

The definition includes a causal factor, namely that *o* causes *x*, and an evaluative factor, whether *x* is positive or negative for *p*. Let us consider some of the variations that may be represented by "*o* causes *x*." For example, *o* causes *x* but does not mean to do so; *o* causes *x* but *p* does not realize it; *o* causes *x* accidentally, and *p* thinks he did so

intentionally; and even *o* did not cause *x* but *p* thinks he did. With regard to the evaluation of *x*, decisive differences may again be specified: *o* may have intended a positive *x* but the resulting action resulted in something negative; *p* and *o* may or may not misjudge the way the other evaluates *x*; *p* and *o* may agree or disagree as to the evaluation of *x*; though *p* and *o* may agree, the evaluation of *x* may differ from that determined by another person, *q*, or the standards of law and ethics; *x* may be negative in its immediate effects and positive from a long-term point of view, or vice versa.

Common-sense psychology leaves no doubt that there are important differences in these cases of causal attribution and evaluative judgment. The differences are recognized by such ordinary comments as: he tried to help me but he didn't know how; he did it because he had to; I refused his gift; he didn't mean to hurt me; his kind words are insincere; it is a blessing in disguise; his present is really a bribe.

p's Life Space as Perspective

If all the possible variations of benefit and harm subsumed by *o* caused *x* and by the evaluation of *x*, were listed, the result would be unwieldy. From the theoretical point of view, we shall not do violence to this variety if we restrict the cases by adopting the point of view of *p* with respect to the harm or benefit of *o*. That is to say, we shall share *p*'s life space and interpret the event *x* in terms of his perception of its causal and evaluative connotations. If, for example, *p* feels that *o* wanted to harm him, it will not matter for our purposes whether *o* would concur in this belief or not. Of course, as the social relations between *p* and *o* progress, *p*'s understanding of the event *x* may well become affected by *o*'s real intentions, but our analysis would then proceed from *p*'s now altered life space. In the interest of ease of presentation, however, the event *p* perceives as caused and intended by *o* will be assumed to be so, unless otherwise indicated, and the evaluation of *x* will be assumed to be objective as well as the same for *p* and *o*.

Local and Total Relevance

As we have seen, the cases of benefit and harm revolve around variations in the implications that may be conveyed by *o* caused *x* and by *x* itself. These wider implications constitute what may be designated as the total relevance of an event, and *p*'s interpretation and reaction to the situation usually rest on this. In contrast, the local relevance of an event is restricted to the immediate nature of *x* and the simple fact that *o* has caused it.

For example, though it is true that benefit can be defined only by

of tension which acts as a disturbance of the existing state of affairs; the person mobilizes himself to meet the disturbance through a discharge of the tension in diffuse aggression. In the expression theory of revenge, the homeostatic process may be linked with the fact that the emotional character of the revengeful act is in harmony with certain essential features of the instigating event.

The several points of view describing or deriving retribution are not necessarily contradictory. They merely emphasize different features that are considered invariant, or at least important. It is likely that each of the features plays a role inasmuch as retribution exists on different levels and takes part in different functions.

Summary

In this chapter we considered the actions of benefiting and harming another person with emphasis on the person's reactions. If p is benefited or harmed, his response will depend mainly on the way he interprets these events; therefore, we had to deal once more with attribution. The ideas of local and total relevance were discussed in this connection. For instance, an experience can be painful as such, that is, its local relevance is negative; but since it implies agreeable consequences its total relevance is positive. The relations of benefit and harm to sentiments, power, and ought forces were treated, as well as the way these relations influence our interpretation and expectation of actions by other people.

In the second part of the chapter the phenomenon of retribution was explored as an especially important kind of reaction to experienced benefit or harm. Different theories of retribution and factors influencing the tendency to retribution were considered: the derivation of retribution from the tendency toward harmony with sentiments; revenge as an attempt to influence the cognitive structure of o ; revenge as undirected aggression; revenge seen as an expression of retributive emotion; the relation of ought forces and power to retribution; and retribution as homeostatic tendency.

Reaction to the lot of the other person

EVENTS THAT HAVE THEIR SOURCE in the environment and that affect p in some way have been referred to throughout the book, and their general characteristics were examined in Chapter 6. These environmental effects make up the "lot of p ." That environmental changes are positive or negative for the other person can also affect p . It is in this sense that the lot of o becomes a lot of p . However, there may be a real difference between the subjective state of o and what is generally considered the affective connotations of his lot. For instance, o may be very happy in spite of the fact that a misfortune has befallen him.

Formal Statement of Reactions

If we take into account only the value dimension of an experience, i.e., its positive or negative character, four types of reaction to the lot of the other person may be schematically distinguished: (1) That o has a positive experience is positive for p . (2) That o has a negative experience is negative for p . (3) That o has a positive experience is negative for p . (4) That o has a negative experience is positive for p . In the first two types, the relation between p and o is syntonic or concordant. It presupposes a sympathetic "identification"; the first may be called sympathetic enjoyment, the second simply sympathy or compassion. The last two types show a discordance or antagonism

receive emotional support or other help from *o*, to prevent *o* from engaging in certain activities, to make *o* feel guilty, etc. Or, he may try to prevent *o* from sympathizing or pitying him by pretending that everything is fine and by avoiding discussion of his troubles. He will do so when he does not want *o*'s sympathy, or, if *o* is his enemy, in order to avoid an occasion where *o* might openly or secretly gloat over his misfortune.

Summary

Four types of reaction to the lot of another person were listed, of which two are concordant, and two discordant.

True sympathy which has as its object the sorrow or joy of another person was distinguished from emotional contagion, and it was pointed out that the difference between these two concordant reactions shows in behavior. A similar distinction can be made in regard to discordant reactions.

The sentiment toward *o* influences the reaction to his lot, and a balanced state exists when *o* and his experiences are both positive or both negative. This balanced state is closely related to requirements of justice.

The own lot of *p* is of great importance in his reaction to the lot of *o*. The evaluation of *p*'s lot and that of *o*'s lot influence each other, and the one often plays the role of a background for the assessment of the other; it is either assimilated to this background, or seen in contrast to it.

There may exist a tendency towards equalization of lots, which plays a role in envy. This tendency towards equality is influenced by sentiments, power, ought forces, and unit formations.

Some comments were added on the everyday conception of work, and on the control of *o*'s envy.

Conclusion

IN THIS BOOK some of the phenomena that play a role in interpersonal relations have been discussed. As we said in the beginning, there are doubtless others of equal importance which have been left out or treated only tangentially, like falling in love, or conversation. Also, many have been largely disregarded which cannot be treated without taking into account processes concerning larger groups, though they may also influence the behavior of one person toward one other person.

One of the convictions guiding our approach was that psychology is not yet a fully developed science; it is still in an infantile stage and one must expect it to crawl and not yet to walk like an adult (cf. Köhler, 1929, Chapter 2). It should grow gradually and organically out of the matrix of implicit theory and should not be weaned prematurely from unformulated and intuitive thinking about behavior. This does not imply a rejection of the attempts to define exacting standards for a fully developed science. One can accept those and still be tolerant toward the muddling and vague ambiguities through which a vital growth has to pass. Compliance with these standards does not guarantee value: an approach can be spelled out clearly in operational or mathematical terms and still be sterile—another can commit every possible sin against the canons and still be full of promise. In the early stages of a science it is hard to measure the value of a contribution by explicit standards, perhaps as difficult as it is to measure artistic production.

Thus, we do not claim that the present essay aspires to be a full-grown system. All it attempts is to present some thoughts which may be helpful in the transition from an intuitive level with its implicit theories to the explicitly systematic thinking of a developed science: it contains pretheoretical speculations, hunches, and suggestions. Koch (1956) used for his paper at a recent Nebraska Symposium the subtitle "Work notes toward a pre-theory of phenomena called 'motivational'"; in this sense, this book might be called "work notes towards a pretheory of interpersonal relations."

Especially in discussing interpersonal relations we should avoid losing contact with the level of common-sense thinking—we have tried to give reasons for that in the first chapter. In making use of this thinking and in theorizing about it—and these two aspects may not always have been sharply separated—we found that what Koch says is true, namely, that common sense contains much psychological theory and that "such theory constitutes a most abstract and epistemologically complex ordering of the data of experience and behavior" (p. 60).

We started out with the observation that the person is located in the complicated causal network of the environment. It is useful to distinguish two parts within this network: on the one hand the mediation, the part that is close to the skin of the organism, comprising the proximal stimuli which impinge on the organism, and the immediate influences of the person on the environment; on the other hand the distal environment, made up of the vitally relevant persons and things. The person is separated by the mediation from the contents of the distal environment, though the mediation at the same time allows the establishment of a close functional contact between person and environment, spanning, as it were, the variable manifold of mediating events. Our perceptions and actions are directed to the contents of the distal environment.

Close relations across a distance exist also between the thoughts, wishes, emotions, and sentiments of one person and those of another person. In the perception of other people we are directed towards them and their psychological processes. We try to make sense out of the manifold of proximal stimuli by ordering them in terms of the distal invariants and their relevant dispositional properties.

This ordering and classifying can often be considered a process of attribution. The main features of the environment are given in representation; we find ourselves in a certain situation, and something happens which has to be fitted into the situation—it has to be attributed to one or the other of the contents of the environment. For instance, our subjective environment contains the self and another person and a new event occurs: one of the persons will be held responsible for it.

That is, we interpret the events as being caused by particular parts of the relatively stable environment.

Of special importance for the interpretation of the social world is the separation of the factors located in persons, and those that have their source in the environment of these persons. Many examples of this implicit "factor analysis" were given, for instance, in Chapter 3, visibility of object as the environmental factor vs. perceptual ability as the personal factor; in Chapter 4, difficulty of task vs. ability; in Chapter 5, desirability of object vs. personal desire, and environmental and personal factors in enjoyment; in Chapters 6, 10 and 11, the factors that are responsible for what happens to the person; in Chapter 8, objective requirements and personal wishes; in Chapter 9, the factors making for induced action.

The basis for this analysis is often a series of observations which can give information about the events and dispositional entities and which makes possible the disentanglement of causal belonging-together in a way analogous to experimental methods, and that leads to a veridical assessment of the important features of the environment. However, in many cases the attribution is dictated by personal preferences, habits of thought, or needs, and results in distorted views.

Thus, the proximal event is always interpreted in terms of the relatively invariant contents of the world around us. These contents must be consistent with each other, and that means that we have definite ideas about fittingness, about consonance and dissonance. We assume implications between the parts of the environment, whether in regard to the structure of space, the logic of illumination, or the perceived psychological phenomena in other persons. Thus, the interpretation does not consist merely of arbitrarily connecting meanings to data; that feature which is characteristic of science—namely, that a network of concepts that are systematically defined is fitted to the empirical manifold, and lends the terms in which this manifold is encoded—is already present in naive perception and judgment. One might say we are much more implicit Newtonians than implicit Baconians. As example of these formal connections underlying our naive thinking we can refer to the relations between can, try, and success (Chapter 4): The statement that somebody who can do something and tries to do it will succeed in doing it, is analytic and does not have to be proven by experiment. The relation between desire and enjoyment (Chapter 5) is also of this character. It is likely that the interdependence of belonging and sentiment (Chapter 7) is based on analytic statements.

The general features of the causal network are thus in some way internalized and mastered. They form the content of the cognitive matrix that underlies our interpretations of other people's behavior and

our attempts to influence it. We have specific ideas about the possible conditions and effects of the different vitally relevant changes and entities. Our implicit knowledge of the conditions allows us to influence the distal parts of the world in purposeful action; and our knowledge of the effects makes cognition and expectation possible. These considerations were applied to the analysis of our cognitions and actions in regard to the perceptions of another person (Chapter 3), to his success in action (Chapter 4), to his wishes and affects (Chapter 5), to his sentiments (Chapter 7), etc.

We arrived thus at a description of the implicit theoretical models of perception, action, motivation, sentiments, and norms. An explication of these thought models may not only be helpful in understanding interpersonal relations, but also in getting a clearer idea of the pre-theories out of which some of the concepts of "scientific" psychology grew.

However, one has to be aware that the picture that evolves in this way shows only a part of what is going on between people, that part which, let us say, inclines toward the side of "intellectualism." To complete the picture one would have to add other facets, for instance, one would have to give an account of the genetic sources of interpersonal behavior.

A notation for representing interpersonal relations

MANY OF THE EXAMPLES discussed in this book were first analyzed with the help of a notation partly fashioned after that of symbolic logic, though its basic concepts are by no means connected by systematic definitions. Such a notation forces one to explicate the conglomerate terms of everyday language and to restrict oneself to the use of a few concepts. A translation from the vernacular into this notation is an excellent exercise in explication. However, one should keep in mind that it is not completely worked out and is only meant to offer suggestions as to what one can do with a tool of this kind.

The own person, i.e., the person whose life space is being considered, is, as has been done throughout the book, symbolized by *p*, other persons by *o* and *q*; *r* stands for an undetermined person (somebody). If material is analyzed in which the persons have proper names, abbreviations for these names can be used. The letters *x*, *y*, and *z* designate impersonal entities, things, situations, or changes, etc.

Actions, attitudes, etc., can be represented as relational propositions. In agreement with the usage of symbolic logic the terms related will be symbolized by small letters and the relations by capitals. Thus, aRb means that a relation *R* holds between *a* and *b*. The first term of the relation will often be a person; the second term can be a personal or impersonal entity, or another relation. If the second term is itself a relational proposition, a colon will be inserted between the symbol for the first relation and the expression for the second relation. Thus,