... ~it ' ~l ~, , tt ,. ROUTLEDGE " I~ INTERNATIONAL ,._~ ( jj \1;, • ~ • ·iv-u ' ' t/'· ~11 fl / '--...t._ • . i I .... ~ ~ ; · ' i " {:~ }, ~~\ ~ • \ ­ 'r,., \ f '\;-~t .ia\ ~? .o.,' 1 j '" The Routledge International Handbook of lnteractionism L-: •,-,-11-"i U,,, ,(''I L_,-.,-1' . 1,11·1 il I,, 7 ,I---, Y(l ',,",/ ( ~ : / The Routledge International Handbook of Interactionism demon­strates the promise and diversity ofthe interactionist perspective in social science today, providing students andpractitioners with an overview of the impressive developments in interactionist theory, methods and research. Thematically organized, it ex­plores the history of interactionism and the contemporary state ofthe field, consideringthe ways in which scholars approachtop­ics that are central to interactionism. As such, it presents discus­sions ofself, identity, gender and sexuality, race, emotions, social organization, media and the Internet and social problems. With attention to new developments in methods and methodologies, including digital ethnography, visual methods and research ethics, the authors also engage with new areas of investigation that have emerged in light ofcurrent societal developments, such as policing and police violence, interactionism beyond binaries and social media. Providing a comprehensive overview of the current state and possible future of interactionist research, it will appeal to interactionist scholars, as well as to established sociolo­gists and students of sociology who have an interest in the latest developments in interactionism. THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF INTERACTIONISM Edited by Dirk vom Lehn, Natalia Ruiz-Junco and Will Gibson I~ ~i;i!!!~~;.p LONDON ANO NlW YORK First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, .Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxen OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business CONTENTS List ofcontributors PARTl Introduction 1 Introduction Dirk vom Lehn, Natalia Ruiz-Junco and Will Gibson PART2 Varieties ofinteractionism 2 Pragmatismandinteraction FrithjofNungesser 3 Herbert Blumer, symbolic interactionism, and 21st-century sociology Thomas]. Morrione 4 Straussiannegotiatedordertheory c. 1960-present Adele E. Clarke 5 Recent develo12ments inthe new IowaSchool ofS)mlbolic interactionism Michael Katovich and Shing-Ling S. Chen 6 Dramaturgical frameworks andinteractionism GregSmith 7 EthnomethodologY-andconversation analY-sis: theother interactionism Jason Turowetz andAnne Warfield Rawls PART3 Self, identity: and emotions 8 Click, validate, and repJY.: three paradoxes ofthe terminal self Simon Gottschalk 9 Animal selfhood Leslie Irvine 10 The selfand the supernatural Rachael Ironside 11 The(un).healthy body: and the self Lisajean Moore and Sumayra Khan 12 Identity: and racialization Matthew W: Hughey and Michael L. Rosi no 1l...._SY-mbolic interactionbeyondbinaries J.E. Sumerau E. Doyle McCarthy 14 Culture andemotion: interactionistperspectives PART4 Social organisation 15 Organizations and institutions Patrick].W. McGinty ~bolicinteractionism, social structure, andsocial chang~ historical debates andconteml2Q!filY-challenges Stacey Hannem 1 7 Mental healthand SY-mbolic interactionism: untapped Qpportunities Baptiste Brossard 18 Handling videoof[police] violence: theoretical versus practi­cal analY-ses Patrick G. Watson andAlbert]. Meehan .12........S.pace, mobility, andinteraction Robin James Smith 20 Nature and the environment in interaction Antony Puddephatt 21 The socialorganizationoftime Michael G. Flaherty 22 Collectivememory Lisa-Jo K. van den Scott PARTS Interactionism, media and the Internet 2 3 Media logi~, fear, and the construction ofterrorism David L. Altheide 24 Public fear and the media Joel Best 25 Policingand social media Christopher]. Schneider 26 Interactionism andonline identity:: how has interactionism contributedto understandings ofonline identity? Hannah Ditchfield 2 7 Physical co-P-resence anddistinctive features ofonline interactions Xiaoli Tian and Yui Fung Yip 28 HaP-P-Y-birthday, Michael Jackson: deadcelebrity: andonline interaction Kerry 0. Ferris 29 MultiP-lay:er online gaming David Kirschner PART6 New develoP-ments in methods 30 Situationalanalysis as critical P-ragmatist interactionism Carrie Friese, Adele E. Clarke and Rachel Washburn 31 Video ininteractionist research Rene Tuma 32 Digital naturalism: ethnogi::ap..!:zy: in networked worlds Michael Dellwing 3 3 Ethics in symbolic interactionistresearch Deborah K. van den Hoonaard and Will C. van den Hoonaard PART7 Reimagining interactionism 34 Towardan exP-anded definitionofsymbolic interactionism Linda Liska Belgrave, Kapriskie "Kikie" Seide and Kathy Charmaz 35 Some antinornies ofinteractionism Martyn Hammersley 36 Interactionistresearch: extendingmethods, extendingfields Emilie Morwenna Whitaker and PaulAtkinson 3 7 The new horizons ofSY-IDbolic interactionism Kent Sandstrom, Lisa-Jo K. van den Scott and Gary Alan Fine 1 INTRODUCTION Dirk vom Lehn, Natalia Ruiz-Junco and Will Gibson As scholarly perspectives and methods mature, the need is often felt to take stock and assess where they are and where they are going. Some of this reflective work is undertaken at conferences where academics meet to discuss their research and its relation­ship to existing and emerging scholarship. Handbooks are an­other place where such reflection takes place. They are less ephemeral than conference presentations, providing researchers with retrospective debate, discussions of the 'state-of-the-field' and, usually, an attempt to project possible futures. Thus, hand­books act as a resource to orient new and established practition­ers to a novel and changing field, and once published, they be­come a historical marker ofthe discipline. This handbook follows in the footsteps of eminent scholars who, in the 1960s, 1970s and in the early 2000s, produced im­portant summative accounts of interactionism.1 Of particular note is Larry T. Reynolds and Nancy J. Herman-Kinney's (2003) Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism, which is the most recent work of this type. Produced nearly two decades ago, the book serves as a thorough and detailed background on theories, meth­ods, concepts and several subfields ofinteractionist studies. It is a landmark publication that brought together established and emerging scholars at the time ofthe book's production, and it re­mains a key text for interactionist students and scholars. Their expansive collection was comprised of important chapters that contextualized interactionist theory in relation to early philo­sophical sources, traced the more recent intellectual influences shaping classic interactionism and expanded upon the contribu­tions of such foundational figures as Charles H. Cooley, W.l. Thomas and G.H. Mead. Further, the collection reflected the wide scope ofinteractionist approaches, including studies by scholars who align themselves with the Chicago School, the Iowa School, the dramaturgical approach, and ethnomethodology and conver­sation analysis. Contributors to the volume discussedmethods of symbolic interactionism and a diverse range of concepts, from mind, self, and society to role and social organization. Acore part of the handbook is made up of studies of institutions, such as eco­nomic, military, educational and religious institutions, as well as the mass media andexplored conceptual issues such as deviance, collective behavior, race and ethnic relations, as well as occupa­tions and professions, and community and urban life. Finally, Reynolds and Herman-Kinney's handbook ended with an explo­ration of several areas of focus for interactionists: social prob­lems, cultural studies, semiotics, pragmatism and narratives, as well as an assessment of future developments in the field. All in all, the book remains one ofthe most important collected texts in interactionist scholarship. Why a new handbook? Given the expansive reach and the substantial successes of this earlier handbook, one may reasonably ask why another is neces­sary. There are two main answers to this question. Thefirst has to do with the instrumental purpose of handbooks -as a toolkit to make sense ofa specific area ofknowledge at a particular point in time. The present text is the result of an interrogation of the rapidly changing contemporary field of interactionism. Kent Sandstrom, Lisa-Jo K. van den Scott and Gary Alan Fine in this volume point to three trends that define the current state of in­teractionism: a diversity ofperspectives, increasingfragmentation regarding the theoretical nucleus of interactionism, and interna­tionalization. In this introduction we address these trends with a slightly different focus: theoretical diversity and expansion, an in­creasingly globalized field and broad dissemination ofinteractionist thought within the social sciences. First, there is a continuing tendency to embrace theoretical di­versity, which has been a noticeable trend since before the publi­cation ofthe last handbook. Since the last decade ofthe 20th cen­tury, scholars have merged or expanded interactionist insights with other frameworks, such as cultural studies (Becker and McCall, 1993; Denzin, 1992), feminism (Kleinman and Cabaniss, 2019) and performance studies (Denzin, 2003) and have created novel ways of doing research, including those inspired by theo­retical critiques of positivist scientific writing, such as au­toethnography (Adams et al. 2014; Ellis, 2003; Richardson, 2016). In the first two decades ofthis century this trend towards theoretical diversity has continued. However, rather than pour­ing their ideas and research efforts into separate "silos" of intel­lectual activity, interactionists increasingly accept the diversity and interconnectedness of their perspectives, pushing further the theorization of new areas of research and new positions of critique. An example of such developments is Leslie Irvine's chapter in this volume, which expands interactionist canon by exploring the connections between humans, nonhumans and the natural environment. Her chapter refutes what she characterizes as the anthropocentric framework of Meadian theory, which, she sug­gests, led interactionists to assume the centrality of human self­hood and to reject or ignore the self-experiences of non-human animals. A further illustration of theoretical innovation can be found in theorizations of the body: Lisa Jean Moore and Sumayra Khan's chapter shows the synergies between interactionism and several critique perspectives -such as Fatness Studies, Disability/Accessibility Studies, and Transgender Studies -in ac­counting for the embodied experiences ofhealth and illness. As a final example, J.E. Sumerau's chapter on non-binary sex, gender and sexualities points out that interactionism has beenone of the sociological perspectives that has supported the construction ofa binary social world. She, however, notes that the interactionist tradition can correct this by exploring the social construction of sex, gender and sexuality at a much deeper level, questioning the binaries that appear in both social life and in social research practice. The second trend in the field is towards the globalization of in­teractionism. In a special issue published the same year as the previous handbook, Philip Manning and David Maines (2003: 497) pointed out that "the future of symbolic interactionism is global, although its origins are thoroughly American." This cer­tainly has come to be true, as interactionism is no longer an American affair (see, e.g., Plummer, 2010; Plummer and Turner, 2000; Vannini, 2008), with conferences focusing on interaction being held around the world and with an increase in topics of in­vestigation that are of global significance (see, e.g., Knorr Cetina, 2009) being studied in areas of the globe beyond the United States (see, e.g., Millier, 2015; To, 2013). In the recent past, inter­actionism has attracted enormous talent outside the territorial borders of North America. Scholars based in Europe now have an institutional anchor for their scholarship -the European Society for the Study ofSymbolic Interaction -and have transformed in­teractionism by incorporating approaches embedded in their unique social contexts (see Engdahl and Muller, 2015; Muller, 2015; Salvini et al., 2012a, 2012b). The current volume reflects this diversity with a third of the contributions coming from Europe and beyond. The third trend is towards the increasing acceptance and influ­ence of interactionist theories, concepts and methods within the social sciences. Again, this is not new, as Gary Alan Fine (1993), and, later, David Maines (2001) argued, interactionist theory and method has become a mainstay ofmuch sociological work to the extent that, inAtkinson and Housley's (2001) words, within soci­ology "we are all interactionists now". Indeed, interactionist treatment of concepts such as mind, self, society, time, deviance and stigma have become central to debates not only in sociology, but across the social sciences. For example, as Baptiste Brossard demonstrates in this volume, interactionism has been a key ap­proach to the study of mental health, with landmark studies in­cluding Erving Goffman'sAsylums (1961) and Stigma (1963), and Tom Scheff's (1999/ 1966) Being Mentally Ill. Interactionism has also greatly contributedto the study ofemotion: while they were initially hindered by a focus on the cognitive aspects ofthe selfin Meadian theory, contemporary interactionists have done much to break away from the limits of this framework (Collins, 2004; Ruiz-Junco, 2017; Turner and Stets, 2005). As Doyle McCarthy's chapter shows, the intersections of interactionism with cultural studies has given rise to diverse concepts for understanding emo­tions as normatively organized, interactionally situated, cultural (and semiotic) practices. In summary, then, these three trends -theoretical diversity and expansion, an increasingly globalized field and broad dis­semination ofinteractionist thought within the social sciences ­warrant a text that can 'take stock', bringing together scholarly work that reflects the remarkable advances and diversity within our community. We think the fascinating collection of chapters that the authors have generously contributed to this volume do exactly that. However, a further and critically important reason why we need a new handbook is because of the social and cultural changes that we have experienced over the past 1 7 years through rapid technological innovation. New technologies have thor­oughly altered the nature of social interaction, and the types of resources available (both individually and institutionally) to make meaning about ourselves, our contexts and society at large (Couch, 2017). People's experiences are frequently mediated or even constituted by technology, with new ways of speaking, new forms of activity, and with individuals and institutions using an ever-changing and expanding range of resources that alter how we do our work, socialize, access and process information and, ultimately, how we make sense of ourselves and the others around us. New communication technologies and their impact on human interaction, or the increasing use ofthe 'terminal' as a form of transforming self-understandings (see Simon Gottschalk's chapter in this volume on the terminal self) are now important foci of attention for interactionist researchers. These and other related changes also present new challenges for us as scholars altering the nature of the ethnographer's gaze, our un­derstanding of our engagement with social worlds as sensory spaces, and the practices that researchers use to represent knowl­edge (see Emilie Morwenna Whitaker and Paul Atkinson's chapter). Given this, one of the key aims of this handbook is to survey the major frameworks within contemporary interactionist schol­arship; to show how they are being used to shed light on current experiences/practices of self, identity negotiation and interac­tion; to reflect onthe conceptual and methodological innovations made by scholars and the challenges we face as an interdiscipli­nary field. We see this as a continuation ofthe work undertaken in the previous handbook and in the other collections referenced earlier. A second aim of this collection is to provide an interpretation of the field of interactionism. This is an implicit function of all handbooks as their selection ofcontent necessarily results in the construction of an interpretation and framing. Readers should not treat this (or any) handbook as representing the totality ofa field, as collected works are always biased statements to some ex­tent. Perhaps the most important feature of our own framing is the way we label the field and our definition of its boundaries. Readers will note that, in contrast to Reynolds and Herman­Kinney's (2003) text, we do not call this a handbook of'symbolic interactionism', but ofinteractionism. This broader term is much more inclusive and enables us to include critically important ar­eas of work, such as ethnomethodology and conversation analy­sis that sit uneasily in the more specific symbolic interactionism framing. This is not a new move within interactionism, as major statements on interactionism such as Reynolds (1993) and Atkinson and Housley's (2003) articulations (the latter published in the Reynolds and Herman-Kinney handbook) chose to discard the term 'symbolic', seeking an expansive lens from which to re­imagine the field. In our case, the choice is as an attempt to em­brace a plurality ofperspectives in an increasingly global and in­terdisciplinary landscape. As we discuss later, we see interaction­ism as a family of perspectives that, while diverse, have a key common concern with people's meaning making practices in so­cial life (cf. Dingwall et al., 2012). In spite of this, readers will encounter variation in the termi­nology used by the authors in these chapters, with some refer­ring specially to 'symbolic interactionism' and others opting for the more generic term 'interactionism'. Similarly, there is varia­tion in the ways that authors refer to people, using terminology such as 'actors' and 'members', which can carry quite specific conceptual implications. The label 'actor' is more strongly associ­ated with symbolic interactionist theories that draw attention to notions of'role taking' and the relation between social selves and society. In contrast, 'member' comes from Harold Garfinkel's work and its emphasis on people's own practices/methods of meaning-making of the contexts in which they find themselves. In this introduction, we use the more common term 'people' to avoid the implications that the specific terms carry. However, we have decided not to impose this restriction on the contributors, and we regard the variation in the conceptual language across the chapters as a reflection of exactly the diversity that we are concerned to represent. Structure ofthe handbook The handbook is organized around six themes: varieties of inter­actionism (which encompasses an analysis of key theoretical ideas in the field); self, identity and emotions; social organization; media and the Internet; research methods and reimagining interac­tionism. As we discuss in more detail later, we see these themes as major areas of work over the last two decades. In selecting the content for these sections, we have avoided reproducing content that wascomprehensivelycovered in the 2003 volume. So, for ex­ample, we have not included a focused discussion on the Chicago School, which has been the subject of much scholarly attention (see Bulmer, 1984; Chapoulie, 2020; Fine, 1995; Musolf, 2003). Similarly, we have not included a chapter on the antecedents of symbolic interactionism that were covered in detail by Prus' and Reynolds' chapters in 2003. We do not include statements solely focused on G.H. Mead's (2002/ 1932, 1967/1934, 1967/ 1938) theory or the Chicago School because we aim to avoid reducing the pragmatist strand of interactionism to G.H. Mead's thought: as Frithjof Nungesser's chapter in this volume argues, the study of social interaction must include a full array of interdisciplinary research and pragmatist ideas (beyond Mead's) in its understand­ing ofhowpeople adapt to theirchanging environments. Given our interests in articulating an inclusive field, we have intentionally avoided prioritizing one particular strand of inter­actionism over others. Indeed, as we will explain, we are critical of narrow conceptions of interaction that privilege particular strands ofthought over others. Instead, we have explicitly sought chapters that show how the field has advanced over the past 1 7 years and that reflect on new developments in the history of in­teractionism. Our intention has been to include representative perspectives that explore the contemporary significance and the potentials ofinteractionist arguments that resonate with current debates about sex and gender, the body, race and racialization, the natural environment and animals, time and space, the Internet and social media, as well as institutions such as the me­dia and the police. Suffice it to say that, while we have tried to be as inclusive as possible in our selection oftopics, the obvious lim­itations of space mean that neither the theoretical/conceptual approaches nor the empirical areas that we cover here exhaust what interactionism has tooffer. Varieties ofinteractionism Interactionism can be thought of as a family of perspectives and methods within the social sciences and humanities that are ap­pliedto the studyofa wide range ofdiverse topics (cf. Dingwallet al., 2012). As we have said, the common assumption that interac­tionism canbe equatedwith symbolic interactionism is problem­atic, as theinteractionist family is muchlarger than that. There are several key features that these diverse areas have in common. First, the notion that human interaction is the context for the emergence ofrole-taking and is the basis of the social self has dominated the landscape of interactionist thinking since its early pragmatist roots (see Nungesser in this volume). Further, interactionists examine how people orient to the world around them according to the meaning it has for them; they consider that meaning arises from interaction, and they view interpreta­tion as a process that is ongoing in interaction as people build and modify meaning in concrete situations (Blumer, 1969; Garfinkel, 2006/1948). From these general premises, interaction­ist research explores how relationships between people arise and how people maintain, experience, develop andchange their sense of self in social relationships. It investigates society and the 'so­cial self' by analyzing how social situations are organized through peoples' actions and interpretive acts and how this orga­nization structures relationships between individuals in society. In the following paragraphs, we wish to show in more detail how these themes intersect, as well as the ways they have been devel­opedas distinct approaches. Probably the most widely known interactionist perspective outside of sociology is symbolic interactionism. The term was coined by Herbert Blumer (1900-1987), who provided a land­mark statement on the conceptual character of the perspective, which drew substantially on the work of G.H. Mead (1863-1931) (Blumer, 1969). Blumer's account of symbolic interactionism gave rise to an extremely successful research program and, as Thomas J. Morrione aptly discusses in his chapter, provided a clear agenda for sociologists, offering invaluable tools for the study of the human condition in terms of peoples' perspectives, identities, and actions as emergent developments rather than as inflexibly determined by outside forces. In Morrione's view, Blumer's approach is not just a 'micro' perspective but is, rather, a holistic endeavor that also encompasses macro-aspects of soci­ety. Symbolic interactionism grew in the United States at a mo­ment of innovation for the discipline of sociology, and at a time when American society was subject to tremendous social changes, Blumer opened a theoretical space for the conceptual and empirical study of diverse and changing social settings and practices in a way that had been missed by the dominant frame­work of the time, structural functionalism (Low and Bowden, 2020). The founder of structural functionalism, Talcott Parsons, was the doctoral advisor of another 'founder' of interactionism, Harold Garfinkel (1917-2011). Garfinkel began his PhD at Harvard at the time that Blumer was developing symbolic inter­actionism in Chicago and Berkeley. As Jason Turowetz and Anne Warfield Rawls note in this volume, Garfinkel took from Parsons an interest in the classic tradition of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. However, Garfinkel (2006/ 1948) rejectedthe social-scien­tific perspective underlying Parsons' approach and began to de­velop his own sociological attitude that would eventually be for­mulated as the perspective ofethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1996, 2002). Ethnomethodology has a strong affiliation to phe­nomenology and in particular to the social phenomenology de­veloped by Alfred Schutz (1967) (see Rawls, 2002, 2006; vom Lehn, 2014). Like symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology is closely related to the pragmatist philosophy as developed by Peirce, James, Dewey, Addams and Mead (Emirbayer and Maynard, 2011). As Nungesser's chapter brilliantly illustrates, classic interactionists -specifically Dewey and Mead -under­stood interaction from the standpoint ofan organism that relates and adapts to a specific environment. Relatedly, Garfinkel (2002) argued that sociology should prioritize the point ofview of soci­etal members and that it should aim to reveal the organization of concrete everyday social practices. In his 'tutorial exercises' (Garfinkel, 1967, 2002), which in textbooks are often called 'breaching experiments' (Giddens, 2009), Garfinkel explored and demonstrated that people approach social situations with expec­tations about how they should be conducted. Through its 'prog­eny' discipline of conversation analysis (CA), ethnomethodolo­gists have discovered the detailed practices and methods through which people orientate to the problem ofcreating mutual under­standing in concrete situations. By examining audio recordings through detailed transcriptions, conversation analysts reveal the organization of talk and demonstrate the social and collaborative accomplishment of people's problem-solving efforts. An underly­ing principle of ethnomethodology is that the coordination of so­cial actions is possible because people mutually render their ori­entation toward shared practice witnessable to others. The theo­retical focus on the possibility of coordinated action stems from ethnomethodology's concern with the study of society from the perspective of "the social fact tradition," to which the classic European theorists that influenced Garfinkel belonged (see Turowetz and Rawls in this volume). With the development of CA, ethnomethodologists demon­strate their interest in practice by providing an understanding of 'language in use' thatbears affinities to Mead's (196711934) theo­retical discussion of 'communication' and of the production of 'meaning' through a 'conversation of gestures'. Further, Garfinkel's (1967, 2002) analysis of tutorial exercises show how people deploy 'situated creativity' to deal with problems they en­counter in the everyday, an argument that is cognate to Joas's (1996) analysis of 'creative action'. More recent ethnomethod­ological research using video recordings as principal data for the analysis ofeveryday interaction in work and public places adds to those discussions by highlighting the interplay of vocal, visual and bodily action with the environment (Heath and Luff, 2000; Heath et al., 2010). This analysis relates to Mead's pursuits in the 'Philosophy ofthe Act' (1967/ 1938) as well as to research under­taken by Carl Couch (1925-1994) and colleagues at the New Iowa School of Symbolic Interactionism (Couch and Hintz, 1975). While less widely influential than ethnomethodology, the New Iowa School was founded by Carl Couch as a response to the origi­nal Iowa School ofSymbolic Interactionism, led by Manford Kuhn (1911-1963). Kuhn's approach shifted the methodological em­phasis of symbolic interactionism away from the more interpre­tive, ethnographic current associated with Blumer's approach. As Michael Katovich and Shing-Ling S. Chen point out in their chap­ter, Couch developed an alternative approach to Kuhn's, aimed at systematically pursuing symbolic interactionism's interest in the dynamic nature of social selves through video and audio record­ings of behavior in laboratory settings. The New Iowa School of symbolic interactionism is further illustration ofthe diversity of ways in which the general commitment to studying meaning­making as a social process has been pursued. Two further theorists that are important to mention are Anselm Strauss (1916-1996) and his student Erving Goffman (1922-1982): two giants of interactionism whose work is dis­cussed here by Adele E. Clarke and Greg Smith, respectively. Although Strauss is perhaps best known for his introduction of grounded theory in contemporary qualitative research, Clarke's chapter in this volume showcases a richer Straussian toolkit for the students of interactionism, focusedon the concept of negoti­atedorder (Strauss et al., 1963) and its subsequent developments. Clarke distinguishes two periods of theoretical elaboration by Anselm Strauss and collaborators such as Susan Leigh Star (1956-2010): the first period spannedthe 1960s to 1990, and the second from 1990 until 2020. The foundational idea ofthis per­spective is the concept of negotiated orders, which Clarke defines as 'sets oftemporary processual arrangements among various so­cial actors that must be actively sustained or renegotiated' (p. 47). Working to dissolve dualistic thinking, Clarke contends, Strauss moved from the basic processual idea of negotiated or­ders to the theorizing ofstructural concepts, such as social worlds and arenas. Providing interactionist researchers with an under­standing ofstructure,social worlds constitute groups with a com­mon standpoint that grounds their shared identities andjoint ac­tions, while arenas bring together several social worlds with the implication of complex collective action. In the last part of her chapter, Clarke covers the extension ofthe Straussian perspective into three conceptualframeworks emerging in the secondperiod: boundary objects; infrastructures, classifications and standards and situational analysis. This work represents not only a theoretical achievement but a methodological one, as Carrie Friese, Rachel Washburn and Adele E. Clarke's chapter in Part 6 of this volume attests. Like Strauss, Goffman also provided a powerful framework for interactionists. From his dramaturgical principles to his elabora­tion of frame analysis, Goffman gave interactionists not only ethnographically based concepts to nurture or expand through their research but, more importantly, an original and fascinating mode of doing research. In particular, Greg Smith's chapter dis­cusses the three conceptual pillars of the dramaturgical ap­proach: dramaturgy, impression management and presentation of self. As Smith convincingly argues, Goffman's dramaturgical principles, fully outlined in his classic The Presentation ofSelf in Everyday Life (Goffman, 1959), would later remain important sources for Goffman's intellectual work in subsequent years. Smith views dramaturgy not as a phase in Goffman's work but, rather, as a perspective that Goffman used throughout his career and thus as an integralpart ofGoffman's overall theoretical strat­egy. Goffman's oeuvre remains a rich resource for contemporary researchers of interaction in the social sciences and the humani­ties, and, as the chapters by Hannah Ditchfield and Xiaoli Tian and Yui Fung Yip show, is central to the analysis of technologi­cally mediatedinteraction. As the previous discussion shows, as well as strong similarities, there are also substantial differences that exist between the per­spectives of interactionism, and we by no means intended to di­minish these critically important variations. Rather, in giving emphasis to the interconnectedness betweenthem and their sub­stantial points ofoverlap, ourintention is to create inter-perspec­tival dialogue that can, we hope, advance interactionism and strengthen its influence. Self, identity and emotions Interactionists have arguably paid much more attention to the topics ofself, identity and emotions than to any other topic. The previous handbook provided excellent chapters focused on the elaboration ofthese ideas, acknowledging their centrality within the evolution of interactionism. This focus is understandable given the central role that Mead's social psychological ideas have played in interactionist theorizing, particularly his premise that the self develops in interaction with others. In Mead's theory, the self (and related experiences/enactments of emotion and iden­tity) must be understood as being constructed through commu­nication and through participation in society -an idea that is also found in another interactionist founder, Charles Cooley (see Ruiz-Junco and Brossard, 2020). This social construction occurs in a wide array of communicative patterns, which, through Mead's influence, have been traditionally characterized in terms ofthe process of'role taking' -that is, taking the role ofothers in interaction to build an understanding ofthe context and the im­plications of certain actions for oneselfand for others. However, as Kent Sandstrom, Lisa-Jo K. van den Scott and Gary Alan Fine remark in this volume, interactionists have not reached consen­sus over the meanings of self and identity. Instead of trying to settle this by offering definitive definitions ourselves, our objec­tive has been to include chapters that discuss crucial changes in interactionist conceptualization of these ideas from new frame­works -see, for example, Lisa Jean Moore and Sumayra Khan in this volume, who expand theoretical conceptions ofselfby draw­ing on critical body studies and affect studies -and through their application to new topic areas, such as Rachael Ironside's chapter on the supernatural. The chapters in this volume help to highlight three areas of change or development in the theorization of self, identity and emotion. The first development addresses transformations in contemporary self-experiences due to the rise ofcommunication technologies. Today, the interaction order is no longer simply de­fined by the face-to-face communication patterns that so inter­ested Cooley, Mead and, more recently, Goffman. Simon Gott schalk explores how our use of digital technologies (cell phones, computers, tablets, etc.) has ushered in the "terminal self." This term refers to the self/body adjustments that people make as a result of interacting with other humans via terminals and with terminals. Terminal selfhood entails deep changes in self-experience, involving bodily and emotional attitudes based on the constant use of digital technologies. More importantly, it alters the nature ofour connection to the people with whom we interact and our capacities to understand others and to be under­stood. Gottschalk offers interactionists a critical angle from which to analyze these hypermodern online/face-to-face interac­tions, dominated by the presence ofterminals, and where people increasingly find their need for what Axel Honneth theorized as recognition, problematically transformed. The second development affects the contours and concept of selfhood. Traditionally in interactionism, conceptions of the self were dominated by anthropocentric, linguistic and cognitive un­derstandings. As we have previously mentioned, Leslie Irvine's chapter extends interactionist theory of the self, breaking free from the highly engrained assumption that meaning-making only happens in humans. As Irvine shows, this logo-centric as­sumption has led researchers to ignore four fundamental charac­teristics of selfhood among nonhuman animals: agency, coher­ence, affectivity and self-continuity. Working against the Meadian beliefthat mastery ofhuman language is necessary for the selfto emerge, and drawing on research on human infants, Irvine shows that nonhuman animals demonstrate the four interre­lated features of selfhood: for instance, when they signal they want to play; when they indicate their understanding of their embodied presence or absence in relation to others; when they emote, whether engaging in 'categorical' emotional behavior (e.g., feeling fear), or by expressing 'vitality affects', denoting the degree of feeling (e.g., high excitement at the prospect of play) and when theyevince remembrances ofexperiences by actingac­ cordingly (e.g., avoidance behavior when close to the animal clinic). Rachael Ironside adds to these debates by exploring how sub­jective experiences -such as feelings, the sense ofa presence, out­of-body experiences or paranormal dreams -feature in interac­tion between people. Because supernatural phenomena often are not visible or audible, it canbe challengingfor people to sharethe experience of the supernatural with others. In her chapter, Ironside introduces the qualities of supernatural and subjective experiencesby examining a typical event from her data corpus of video recordings of Ouija Board sessions. During this event, the participants in the session discuss the presence or absence of a ghost. Ironside inspects the talk and bodily actions ofthe partici­pants to reveal how they communicate and share their experi­ences with each other and thus uncovers the role ofthe self in su­pernatural encounters. In their chapter, LisaJean Moore and Sumayra Khan turn to ex­amine how people socially construct shared social facts about 'healthy' and 'sick' bodies. Their chapter begins with a review of key terminology in critical body studies, medical sociology and interactionism to then explore the proliferation of 'contested ill­nesses', like ADHD, obesity and body dysmorphia. The authors re­veal that processes ofmedicalization ofdeviance and the stigma­tization of illness sustain the cultural supremacy of a normative order, namely, the normativity ofa 'healthy body', definedin lim­ited and unattainable terms. In their analysis, Moore and Khan discuss how inequalities basedon race, class, gender, sexual iden­tity and ability are reproduced and sustained in our construe­tions and management ofhealth andillness. In her chapter, Doyle McCarthy turns to 'emotional culture' to discuss selfhood in emotional terms. McCarthy defines emotions as 'cultural objects ofhuman action', implying that they are mech­anisms of reflexive understanding and expression and of self­control. McCarthy's chapter sheds light on contemporary emo­tionalculture and how it manifests itselfin all spheres of society. In the United States, she argues, this culture involves treating one's emotions as the legitimate grounds for deeper self-under­standing and identity verification. Markedly influenced by Romanticism, this culture valorizes intense, spontaneous andau­thentic experiences. As an illustration, McCarthy discusses how emotional intensity operates as an ideal, motivating people to en­hance their sense of closeness and intimacy with others, and to reproduce this logic in a wide range of areas of social life, from personal relationships to politics and the economy. The final development we wish to highlight involves the study of identity as a site of power and resistance. Interactionists in­creasingly scrutinize how systems ofsocial categorization andla­beling -particularly those of race, class, gender and sexuality ­function as structures of oppression. This volume stresses sev­eral areas in which this critique has been developed. In their chapter on racial identity, Matthew W. Hughey and Michael L. Rosino reject a limited and de-politicized view ofidentity as a di­mension of a person's sense of self. Combining interactionist ideas with other sociological literature, the authors view racial identity operating as part of racialization: a complex process of boundary-making involving multiple levels of sociological analy­sis -from the micro to the macro. In their view, racialization pro­cesses are ideological, institutional, interest-based and interac­tional. The authors note the racialized interaction order repre­sents a sphere where people at the same time act on their experi­ence of others' racial identity and the related understanding of (un)belonging, (de)humanization, and prestige or stigma. Their chapter stresses how interactionism contributes analytic tools to explain and critique racial oppression. Relatedly, Sumerau's chap­ter shows that interactionism's critical take on identity construc­tion can be fruitfully mobilized against sex/sexuality/gender op­pression. As Sumerau argues, interactionism's commitment to re­vealing the constructed nature of identity provides a compelling resource to critique binary reifications of identity based on sex, gender and sexuality. Drawing on interactionist literature on 'identity work,' Sumerau suggests researchers may expand their current frameworks by questioning binaries, such as the con­struction of non-binary gender identities, including how others (e.g., transgender and cisgender people) view non-binary gender identities, and the marginalization of non-binary sexualities and sexual fluidity. Social organization Interactionists have arguably always had a deep interest in organ­isations and institutions, but, as Patrick McGinty's chapter high­lights, they have approached their study in varying ways, with a divergence between approaches that study them as either the context for action or as objects of study -that is, as larger struc­tures where action takes place, or as the result of processes of action/interaction. McGinty (2014) finds that the majority ofin­teractionist (inspired) research is focused on organizations and organizational culture while only a minority of studies looks at institutions as interactionally constituted. McGinty promotes this latter approach, pointing to the incredible value of research that focuses on how people organize the social world in interac­tion with each other. In this way, McGinty draws attention to work that treats organizational/institutional phenomena as a "going concern" (Hughes, 1984: 37) and encourages investiga­tions that exploit the strength of the interactionist approach to uncoverthe processes that bring about organizations andinstitu­tions. McGinty, argues for studies of the organizing practices and processes through which organizations are created and continu­ally renewed (cf. Dingwall and Strong, 1985). Implicit in McGinty's chapter is a rebuke ofthose who criticize interactionism for having an 'astructural bias', that is, for ignor­ing power relationships and other structural influences on social relationships (see also contributions in Musolf, 2016). Unfortunately, 'these presumed interactionist biases actually served to promote an emergent interactionist perspective with little or no interest in institutional, structural, or organizational concerns' (McGinty in this volume, p. 183). This argument has been taken up by Stacey Hannem, whose chapter tackles these is­sues head-on by showing how interactionist concepts can be used to reveal and analyze power and structure. Using the exam­ple of the #MeToo movement, Hannem's analysis demonstrates that power and structure are embedded within symbolic interac­tionist concepts and research topics and that they are central to One area where structure and power have been of particular concern to interactionists is in the study of health and medical contexts, which have been key topics of study at least since the publication of Goffman's (1961) Asylums. Baptiste Brossard adds to this important body of research by discussing interactionists' investigations ofmental health, distinguishing four areas ofcon­t ribution: (1) generating non-judgmental accounts ofthe experi­ences of mental health problems; (2) theorizing the role of diag­nostic labels in the production ofmental health issues; (3) study­ing how mental disorders make sense, exist and are embedded only within specific interaction settings and institutions and (4) understanding the mechanisms ofsocial control weighing on our mental functioning. Through his detailed discussion of these four areas, Brossard shows possible avenues for the development ofinteractionist researchon mental health. In addition to health care, the police are another institution where power and structure are of key concern. For years, the Black Lives Matter movement has responded to the killing of Black people by the police, denouncing implicit and explicit racism within the police and calling for radical societal changes to end racial oppression. This reminds us that these issues are not just theoretical but of real practical consequence and of the most serious kind. Over the years, interactionist studies have made an important contribution to discussions about policing and police reform by investigating the day-to-day work of police officers (Bittner, 1967; Meehan, 1993) and the language and 'so­cial organization of policing' (Manning and van Maanen, 1978). Recent work has shown how the police have increasingly used computer technology and other technologies for the profiling of suspects and the creation ofcrime statistics (Meehan and Ponder, 2002), and it has explored how such technologies have been em­bedded within the existing organization oftheir work (Manning, 2008). Watson and Meehan (in this volume) consider the use of video recordings ofpolice work, and how these are used to make judgments about cases of police violence against civilians. Through an ethnomethodological lens, they examine an arrest video-recorded by a security camera and a transcript of a subse­quent civil legal action against the arresting officer. The analysis explores 'the viewing frameworks' and the endogenous reason­ing within the settings under investigation, showingthe situated practices of making sense of the recorded scenes as a course of adjudicative work, which, in Watson and Meehan's view, is 'the objective of a truly interactionist sociology'. With their chapter, Meehan and Watson exhibit the strengths ofethnomethodologi­cal research in unpacking the social organization of action through which participants interpret and assess the actions of others, and they show the important consequences that partici­pants' meaning-making processes have for their and others' lives. In addition to institutions, interactionists have also had a long­standing interest in the ways that social life is produced as an or­ganizational structure, and several ofthe chapters in this section take onthis topic. Robin James Smith's chapter addresses the con­cept of space from an interactionist perspective, emphasizing that space is never just a 'container' or context for actionbut is it­selfcon.figured by dynamic social relationships. In the past, inter­actionists have often focused on the relationships between peo­ple in urban environments by describing them as an 'ecology' (Park and Burgess, 1967) and by examining how people structure and use urban spaces, particularly in the light of population growth and changing political circumstances (Burgess, 1967; Rodner et al., 2019). Smith discusses the notion of space through the history of interactionist scholarship, from early Chicago School ethnographies to contemporary work that explores people's engagement with landscapes (Vannini, 2012). Through his detailed discussion ofpast and recent research, Smith power­fully shows that space and mobility are not just topics to which interactionists occasionally turn, but they are central to all inter­actionist endeavors. Smith's chapter hints at the importance ofthe natural environ­ment as a topic for interactionist research, a topic that is the main concern of Anthony Puddephatt's chapter. Puddephatt re­bukes scholars who criticize interactionism for neglecting nature and the environment in their research and, through a detailed ex­amination of interactionist writings from classic scholars on­wards, Puddephatt brilliantly shows that nature and the environ­ment have always featured in interactionist research. He uses his analysis to explain how a more materialist form of interaction­ism based on G.H. Mead's theory can open up a wide range of re­search trajectory for contemporary interactionist scholars. Another major area of concern in considering organizational processes is the construction of temporality. For the past three decades or so, Michael G. Flaherty has been at the forefront of the development of interactionist study of time and has explored how human interaction and social relationships are underpinned in different ways by time as a means to socially organize actions (Flaherty, 2011 ). In hischapter, Flahertycarefully discusses these contributions in relation to interactionist theory and research, highlighting the complex ways in which social interaction is in­terwoven with and organized by an orientation to time andis in­terlinked with larger forms ofsocial organization. The final chapter in this part of the handbook continues the discussion of time by looking at how studies of collective mem­ory can contribute to our understandings of the operation of so­cial worlds. Lisa-Jo K. van den Scott argues that memories are ne­gotiated, constructed and reshaped in interaction. Memories are the result of interaction processes that van den Scott likens to 'generic processes' (Prus, 1987), that is, 'processes of generating, maintaining, and manipulating collective memory [that) can be studied across groups'. However, as van den Scott explains with reference to Milligan's (2007) study ofthe preservationist move­ment, the content and form of collective memories is constantly shaped and reshaped in interaction. For example, the buildings that people select for preservation change considering the cir­cumstances in which the selection takes place. When collective memory has been created, people use it to interpret the present and imagine the future. In her chapter, van den Scott not only demonstrates that interaction processes are critical for the pro­duction of collective memory but also shows the importance of interactionist approaches to understanding the social processes through which collective memory is created, (re-)shaped and sustained. Interaction, media and the Internet One ofthe most dominant themes in the political landscape ofre­cent years has concerned the consumption of information and the construction of 'truth' and 'facts'. We have seen the conse­quences of the ways that private companies, political interest groups, nation states and others manipulate information to con­struct and mobilize specific sentiments for their own interests (and often for nefarious purposes). The manipulation of elec­tions; the incitement ofhate crimes; the trivializing or rejection of scientific and other specialist opinion and knowledge -these are all real and increasingly common practices of contemporary social life. The mass media have become a fault-line for these debates, with print and broadcast journalism regularly being challenged over their objectivity and partiality. David L. Altheide's fascinat­ing chapter looks at how media content is used and made mean­ingful through the institutionalization and internalization of 'media logic'. This logic enables the creation of specific cultural meanings that are in turn used as mechanism of power to shape social agendas. Altheide's chapter helps to reflect on the relation­ship between corporate (and other) interests and processes of media consumption and use. Joel Best's chapter takes these ideas forward by reflecting on the ways that interactionists can con­ceptualize the relationship between audience experience and me­dia content. Drawing on the notion of 'fear' in the context of moral panics and other media scares, Best warns against the sim­plified analysis commonly found in the broaderdiscipline ofsoci­ology, which presumes specific emotional reactions on the parts of diversified audiences. Instead, Best points to the necessity of following interactionist ideals of studying meaning as a localized construction. Together, these chapters show the importance ofa continuedengagement with the topic ofmedia consumption and production. Ofcourse, traditional media's social role and practices have rad­ically changed through the introduction of social media, and in­teractionist research has played and continues to play a hugely important role in this area. All kinds ofinstitutions use media in the course of their work. One example ofthis is police work that is examined by ChristopherJ. Schneider's chapter in this volume. Schneider examines how the police use social media and how it has altered the practices ofpolice work. Essentially, social media works as a mechanism ofsocial control, enabling the police to un­derstand things about people and crime that they may have pre­viously found hard to explore. Further, as with individual users, the police use social media as a tool for self-promotion and for constructing an image and a relationship with the communities they 'serve'. These issues are of particular concern considering the previously discussed demonstrations against institutional­ized racism in police forces. Schneider's chapter shows the im­mense contributionthat interactionists can make to understand­ing the practices and systems of meaning that are embedded within these institutions, an areaofstudy that must surely play a substantial part inany meaningful debate about the police. Another area of practice that has been radically re-shaped through social media and internet technologies is computer game play. David Kirschner's chapter looks in detail at self-per­formance and meaning-making in these sociocultural domains and how the real and virtual worlds intersect in complex ways. Kirschner shows the wide influence that interactionists have had in this field in terms of the study of the meaning-making pro­cesses within game play and in game communities and the im­portance of interactionist concepts for understanding the com­plexityofgaming. Digital interaction through social media is a core area of inter­actionists' work. As we have seen, Simon Gottschalk in this vol­ume uses the conceptofthe 'terminal self' todescribe the process and consequences of using technology as a medium of interac­tion, drawing attention to the physical/perceptual skills ofusing such technologies. There is also uncertainty about the audience(s) of online interaction (what Tian and Fung Yip de­scribe in their chapter as the 'n-adic' dilemma), where one's digi­tal traces may be picked up, reacted to and used by all manner of unknown others. Certain institutions or cultural groups may pressure or even require people to have an active public presence on social media and websites, and a substantial body of research is concerned withthe impact ofthis onpractices ofself-presenta­tion (see Tian and Fung Yip's chapter for a comprehensive review). As Tian and Fung Yip's chapter makes clear, Goffman's work continues to be a key resource for researchers of online interac­tion, particularly in terms ofunderstanding practices of self-pre­sentation. One of the many areas where this influence can be seen is in the study of 'celebrity', which is integral to the dis­courses of participation in You Tube, Twitter and the like (Blank, 2006; Marwick and boyd, 2011; Schneider, 2016). The uses ofso­cial media by celebrities as a feature ofbrand building have been well documented, such as how they use it to construct a sense of intimacy with fans by revealing aspects of their 'backstage' be­havior and by using forms of speech that display 'informality' and 'closeness' with their interlocutors (Marwick and boyd, 2011). Kerry 0. Ferris's chapter shows that social media is used for interaction with celebrities even after theirdeaths. Taking the example of fans' interactions with Michael Jackson on Twitter, Ferris illustrates that cultural icons and the meaning around them are managed and negotiatedby fans and the cultural indus­tries more broadly. Ferris shows how the organizations that rep­resent dead celebrities (often for substantial profit) continue to use and build the brand and that through such organizations, fans engage with the celebrity as an 'agentic' actor, and in doing so, they continue to construct their legitimacy as celebrities and icons. Another use of Goffman's work is shown by Ditchfield's chap­ter, which demonstrates how Goffmanian concepts, such as face­work and presentation of self, can be usefully combined with CA and with discursive approaches to look at the ways people man­age the self in real-world conversations. Ditchfield's fascinating analysis explores how part icipants in Facebook message chats composed and edited their messages in real time and how their editing decisions help us understand their practices of'facework' as a lived communicative practice. New developments in methods Since its earliest origins, interactionism has had a sustained im­pact on methodological debates and practices in the social sci­ences. From the 'urban ethnographies' of the Chicago School to CA attention to the 'micro' features ofspoken talk, interactionists have shaped the landscape of qualitative research practice. Herman-Kinney and Verschaeve's chapter in the previous hand­book gave a clear overview of the methods in symbolic interac­tionism, showing their emergence and variety and giving em­phasis to the importance of careful empirical and conceptually grounded theory. Given that this history is well told, rather than provide an overview of methods within interactionist scholar­ship, our aim in this handbook is to include chapters that ad­vance the discussion about the study ofinteraction in contempo­rary society. It would be extremely remiss ofus not to begin our discussion of methods without recognizing the groundbreaking work of Kathy Charmaz, one ofinteractionism's central figures in the last few decades who, sadly, passed away in 2020. Kathy had done more than anyone to advance the practices and uses ofgrounded theory (GT), helping to continue the sustained influence of the method across the social sciences (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007), including areas as diverse as marketing (Goulding, 2002), man­agement and organization studies (Gioia et al., 2013), nursing (Schreiber and Noerager Stern, 2001) and information systems research (Wiesche et al., 2017). Originating in the collaborations of Glaser and Strauss's ethnographies of caring for the dying (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), grounded theory has since been devel­oped substantially by these and other authors (Glaser, 1998 Charmaz, 2006; Holton and Walsh, 2017; Strauss and Corbin, 1997; Konecki, 2011; Redman-MacLaren and Mills, 2015). But it was Kathy who saw the importance of rescuing the approach from its realist implications -its implicit obsession with bias and objectified knowledge and method -and with developing an ap­proach that takes account ofcontemporary social theory, such as feminism and postmodernism. We are delighted that Kathy has been able to contribute to this handbook in one ofthe closingchapters, which we will discuss in more detail later. But her work is also shown in Carrie Friese, Rachel Washburn and Adele E. Clarke's chapter, which explores the development of GT in situational analysis. Continuing on from Kathy's work, situational analysis also intersects with criti­cal perspectives, such as feminism and post-colonial theory, and continues to develop the pragmatist (critical) roots of symbolic interactionism. Friese, Washburn and Clarke's chapter gives a practical guide through the mapping techniques of this method, showing how they can be used to explore difference in perspec­tive, examine power andcreate collaborative and useful research. Aside from GT, interactionists have been a driving force in ad­vancing the understanding, popularity and influence of ethno­graphic methods in the social sciences. The urban ethnographies ofthe Chicago School and the phenomenological studies ofpraxis in ethnomethodology continue to be central methods for learn­ing about diverse worlds, shedding light on life and work that re­mains hidden from public view and from traditional sociological analysis (Goffman, 2015; Desmond, 2017; Duck, 2012; Stuart, 2018, 2020). Rene Tuma's chapter looks at the intersection ofin­terpretive ethnographic inquiry with video methods developed from EMCA. Tuma outlines the emergence of video methods in interactionist research before showing the particular compo­nents ofvideography, where ethnographic knowledge and careful methodical analysis of interaction inform each other. Video­based studies ofinteractionhave been important since the 1960s and have become extremely influential in the analysis of work and organization through sub-disciplines such as workplace studies (Heath and Luff, 2000; Heath et al., 2010; Knoblauch et al., 2014; Szymanski and Whalen, 2010). Tuma's chapter contin­ues debates in these areas by giving an example of how ethnogra­phy and video work come together in the analysis of a specific work setting. Through this, Tuma helps us to think about the connection between 'micro' data and broader ethnographic con­texts ofinquiry, which is a key topic at a time when video and au­dio dataare increasinglyeasy to capture. The subject of ethnography is also taken up by Michael Dellwing, whose chapter looks at practices of online ethnogra­phy, pointing to the huge diversity in methods and approaches that can be found in this area. Using the example of researching online games, Dellwing shows the importance offlexibility in on­line ethnography, being able to engage with online participants in the range of communication forms they themselves use. His discussion shows that naturalistic research online brings up dis­tinctive issues, such as the question of whether 'lurking' online is equivalent to unobtrusive non-participant observation inface-to­face contexts. This final point helps to foreground a set of issues that are of increasing importance for contemporary researchers, which is how to negotiate the shifting political terrain ofresearch ethics while maintaining flexible and meaningful research strategies that enable us to understand the world from peoples' own points ofview. The fi­nal chapter in this section, from Deborah K. and Will C. van den Hoonaard, addresses this, proposing an approach to ethics that draw on interactionist principles by narrowing the gap between researcher and researched; recognizing the culturalcomplexity of participants' lives; having flexibility in the research process and the methods used(rather than rigidly sticking to pre-determined plans); and maintaining a keyinterest in protecting and fostering the dignity ofresearch participants. The chapter offers an impor­tant contribution to the ongoing interdisciplinary conversation around ethics, on which interactionism must continue to have a substantial influence. Reimagining interactionism The chapters in this handbook illustrate that interactionism re­mains a vibrant research tradition comprising an abundance of creative scholarship that continues to advance theories, methods and substantive areas ofstudy. The final section ofthe handbook examines the possible futures of the field, with the contributors providing powerful and thought-provoking commentaries on interactionism's relevance. Emilie Morwenna Whitaker and Paul Atkinson's chapter ex­plores advancements in the collection and analysis ofdata for in­teractionist work. Drawing on the claim that interactionism's most substantial contributions have been empirical, Whitaker and Atkinson look at how the ethnographic gaze -so central to our discipline -can be extended by paying attention to the mate­riality of embodied sensory interaction to the ways that social media (and other technologies) extend interaction over time and across spaces. The chapter makes the strong case that methods are there to pursue disciplinary questions and topics -that methodis onlya means to an end, and that our overall aim should be to use advancements in methods to extend our sociological understanding. Martyn Hammersley's chapter addresses what he characterizes as the antinomies within interactionist thinking: the tensions be­tween focusing on process versus structure and between epis­temic versus pragmatic conceptions of meaning. Hammersley's fascinating discussion reflects on how interactionism may come to grips with these tensions, but it also asks whether these ten­sions are simply areas we must learn to accept, whether they are productive for the advancement of our discipline or are actually impediments to advancement. Kent Sandstrom, Lisa-Jo K. van den Scott, and Gary Alan Fine recognize interactionism's internal divisions. For these authors, interactionism finds itself in the midst of an "identity crisis," which cannot be overcome until interactionists drop what they characterize as the attitude ofa 'resistance movement' and desist from fighting over dominance to define the 'central mission' of interactionism. Instead, they suggest that interactionism should embrace a commitment to 'a pragmatic and richly interpretive approach to social life -highlighting meanings, symbol creation, and interaction' (p. 444). Finally, Linda Liska Belgrave, Kapriskie "Kikie" Seide and Kathy Charmaz argue a different point. Their chapter endorses a revised pragmatism -based on a critical gaze to address the limitations of its founders -particularly in terms of their [at best] 'color blindness' -and proposes the application of constructivist grounded theory and situational analysis to advance social jus­tice goals. The authors propose two forms for this advancement: systematically questioning taken-for-granted meanings that re­produce systems ofoppression (particularly in relation to neolib­eralism) and making the perspectives ofmarginalized communi­ties a central focus by combining interactionist methodologies with other methodologies. In sum, the final section of this handbook points to three dis­tinct paths to reimagine interactionism: working to resolve its antinomies or epistemological (and political) tensions; preserv­ing its essence while letting go of the struggle for theoretical dominance and purity and reviewing and renewing its agenda and its methodological frameworks on the basis ofthe pursuit of social justice. The coming years will tell which of these paths are followed and how we develop and change as a discipline along the way. Note 1 Examples for such accounts ofinteractionism are Human Behavior and Social Processes: An lnteractionist Approach, edited by Arnold Rose in 1971/1962 and the collection Symbolic lnteractionism: Genesis, Varieties Critics, edited by Bernard N. Meltzer et al. in 1975. References Adams, Tony E., Holman Jones, Stacy, & Ellis, Carolyn (2014). Autoethnography. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Atkinson, Paul, & Housley, William (2003). Interactionism (1st ed.). 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PART2 Varieties ofinteractionism 2 PRAGMATISM AND INTERACTION FrithjofN ungesser Introduction Pragmatism is a constitutively interactionist theoretical perspec­tive. If we investigate the writings ofthe founders ofpragmatism -Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842­1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), and George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) -it becomes obvious that the key characteristics of this intellectual movement are rooted in reflections on the inter­action between organisms and their environments. This holds true for the pragmatist reconceptualisationofperception, knowl­edge, and truth, just as for the pragmatist concepts ofhabit, per­spective-taking, and the social self, and for the pragmatist belief in scientific fallibilism, progressive education, anddemocratic re­construction. As these examples already suggest, interaction is not only one of pragmatism's key concepts but also has a rather extensive meaning. From a pragmatist perspective, 'interaction' is not limited to social interaction, nor is it limited to the interac­tion of humans. Instead, all organisms act within -and, hence, interact with-their specific non-social and socialenvironments. Against this background, several key questions, which can be divided into four segments, arise with respect to the pragmatist perspective on interaction: 1) How do the interactions between different organisms and their environments differ, and what is specific about the interactions humans have with their environ­ment? 2) What are the differences betweenhuman socialinterac­tion and that ofother organisms? How are these differences con­nected to the emergence of perspective-taking and the self? 3) How does the development ofperspective-taking and the self oc­cur during socialisation? How is the refinement of perspective­taking connected to the understanding of normativity? 4) What are the broader implications ofthe pragmatist account of interac­tion for our conceptualisation of society? How were the insights of pragmatist social theory taken up by the interactionist tradi­tionin sociology? The chapter is structured according to these questions. Each of the following sections will first outline the answers the classical pragmatists gave to the respective question; then, I will illustrate how the pragmatist arguments influenced later theoretical devel­opments and in which respects their answers need to be revised in light ofcurrent research. Because of the scope ofthe pragma­tist conceptualisation ofinteraction, the discussion will touch on developments in various fields of study, ranging from primatol­ogy and the cognitive sciences to developmental psychology and sociology. Modes oforganism-environment interaction Pragmatism conceptualises the activities of organisms in a rela­tional way, that is, as interaction between the organism and its environment. The most elaborate account of this interactive process can be found in the work of John Dewey (esp. 1925/29/ 1958, ch. VII, 1938/ 1986, ch. II). This is why, in this section, I will summarize Dewey's view on interaction before I outline how his insights relate to current developments in biol­ogy, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and the theoryofaction. In contrast to inanimate things, Dewey argues, all living beings show an organised pattern of activities to satisfy their needs and maintain their integrity. Living beings thus strive to maintain a stable relationship with their environment or -in the case of ten­sion -seek to restore it. This is the basic idea of the pragmatist concept of organism-environment interaction. It applies to all or­ganisms from protozoa and plants to animals and humans.1 However, one can identify vastly different 'modes ofenvironing­organical interactions' (Dewey, 1938/ 1986: 36). Dewey differen­tiates between these modes by looking at some oftheir elemental physical and perceptual features. Offundamental importance are the organism's mobility and its modalities ofperception. The sim­plest forms of life are thus sedentary organisms without distal senses. In their case, an activation ofthe contact sense is followed directly by the 'consummatory act' (Dewey, 1938/ 1986: 36). In contrast, with the emergence ofdistal senses -especially seeing and hearing-'activities ofsearch' (Dewey, 1938/1986: 36) inter­vene between these poles of activity. The subordination of the contact senses to the distal senses leads to a strong increase in the organisms' behavioural inhibition and control because a stimulus perceived from a distance must be kept stable and tracked over longer periods oftime andgreater distances. As a re­sult, these organisms act in a spatially and temporally 'spread­out environment' and are 'liberated' from the immediate impact of the environing objects (Dewey, 1925/1929/1958: 270, 279). This change, according to Dewey, is the starting point for an in­creased flexibility and reflexivity ofbehaviour, which has reached an unprecedented level in the natural history of the human species. To differentiate between modes of organism-environment in­teraction, Dewey also considers the varying degrees ofchangeabil­ity. While the life of simple organisms resembles a repetition of almost identical activities, the interactions of more complex or­ganisms undergo greater change. Towards the outside, thedegree of changeability can be perceived by the extent to which the envi­ronment is manipulated by the organism to solve problems or avoid their emergence. Such 'adaptations' (Dewey, 1911/2008: 360) would include the construction ofburrows, dams, or nests; the spinning of webs; or the construction of roads. The use of tools, according to Dewey, is a method of adaptation that is spe­cific to humans. Using tools becomes possible, he argues, because human activity is regularly and strongly inhibited. Instead of be­ing urged to behave in a certain way, humans can take a step back from the situation and identify the connections between various objects and effects they have on each other (Dewey, 1925/ 1929/1958: 128-129). Thereby, the environment fills with objects that refer to others, and objects turn into signs. At this point, there is a correspondence to language, which Dewey also regards as a human monopoly. He not only emphasises that the transmission of tool use is often accompanied by language, he also characterises language as the 'tool of tools' (Dewey, 1925/ 1929/1958: 168, 186). Different modes oforganism-environment interaction also cor­relate with different degrees of experiential change. While the ex­periences ofsimple organisms remain relatively stable over time, the experiences of more complex organisms are modified through interaction with the environment. This is what Dewey (1911/2008: 360) calls 'accommodation'. The inhibition of activ­ity in problematic situations often leads to the perception of pre­viously unknown behavioural possibilities. Hence, the increased flexibility of activity goes hand in hand with the possibility and necessity of learning and habitualisation. In this context, lan­guage, again, has a 'peculiarly significant function' (Dewey, 1938/1986: 51). Onthe one hand, language itselfis the result ofa historical development of learning and, thus, can be regarded as one cultural artefact among many; on the other hand, however, it is an essential driving force for the cultural restructuring ofcog­nitive processes as well as for the transmission and development of cultural knowledge. In other words, Dewey understands lan­guage as a product of cultural history that, after its emergence, becomes a constitutional medium of thought. Language contin­ues the 'liberation' of experience because it allows us to intellec­tually recombine potential actions and meanings and thus to carry out 'rehearsals', that is, imaginations offuture interactions with the environment (Dewey, 1938/ 1986: 63). Dewey's conceptualisation of organism-environment interac­tion is ofcrucial importance for pragmatism in general because it synthesises some of its key insights of earlier pragmatism, such as the functionality and situatedness of reflection (e.g. James, 1890/1950: 138-144; Peirce, 1868/1992) and the importance of learning and habitualisation for human action (esp. Dewey, 1922/2002; James, 1890/ 1950, ch. 4; Peirce, 1878/1992, 1877 / 1992). Also, Dewey's arguments were later refined byother pragmatists. In the work of George Herbert Mead (esp. 1907, 1938/1964) we find important arguments on the embodied and practical character ofthe perception and meaning ofobjects that take up Dewey's arguments. Just as pragmatism in general, its conceptualisation of organ­ism-environment interaction has become the subject of renewed interest. This rediscovery started in the 1990s (e.g. Joas, 1992/ 1996: l 26ff.; Lakoffand Johnson, 1999: 97) and'[t)oday, or­ganism-environment talk is more common than ever before' (Pearce, 2014: 28). As current research shows, some ofthe origi­nal arguments must be revised. Nevertheless, recent discussions demonstrate that pragmatism still possesses substantial poten­tial for theoretical innovation in different disciplines. I will shortly touch on three aspects: 1 One aspect that is clearly problematic in the classical prag­matist account of organism-environment interaction is the characterisation ofanimal activity. As will also become clear in the next section, there is a recurring tension in the pragmatist interpretation of animal behaviour (Nungesser, 2017: 357­361). On the one hand, the pragmatists not only follow Charles Darwin's gradualism, they also advance conceptual means that would allow for a fine-grained analysis of animal behaviour. Yet, when referring to concrete behavioural pat­terns of animals, they usually fall back on traditional di­chotomies, such as the one between animal instinct and hu­man learning. Recent ethological studies demonstrate that such dichotomies fail to do justice to animals -also with re­gard to their object manipulation (e.g. Tomasello and Call, 1997, ch. 3.1.) and use of tools (e.g. Sanz et al., 2013). The challenge, therefore, arises to analyse these complex forms of animal activity by means of pragmatist concepts, such as adaptation and accommodation, manipulation and environ­mental spreading, andsituated reflection and habitualisation. 2 Convergences between pragmatism and various innovative developments in psychology, the cognitive sciences, and neu­rophysiology prove its lasting theoretical relevance. These in­novations confirm that cognitive processes need to be inter­preted asfunctional and embodied phases within environmental interaction. Experimentalresearch on 'inattentional blindness' and 'change blindness', for instance, proves that we perceive only a very limited part of our environment (e.g. Mack, 2003; Simons, 2000). This selectivity of perception can only be un­derstood if we follow the pragmatists in dismissing the copy theory (Mead, 1936, 344,) of perception and knowledge, which held sway over philosophy and psychology for cen­turies (Noe, 2006, ch. 2). Instead ofcopying our environment, we perceive what is relevant for our current activity. Furthermore, several scientific developments corroborate the pragmatist claim that our access to the environment is struc­tured according to our bodily actions. Here the pragmatists anticipated insights which are often discussedin thecognitive sciences with reference to J.J. Gibson's theory of affordances (Shapiro, 201 1, ch. 2). These arguments can also be combined with important findings in cognitive neuroscience (Nungesser, 2017: 354-357). 3 In different disciplines, pragmatism became an essential ref­erence point for the development of a non-cognitivist, non-ra­tionalistic, and non-deterministic theory of action. In philoso­phy and the cognitive sciences, pragmatist arguments are in­voked to criticise what Susan Hurley (1998, ch. 10) calls the sandwich model ofcognition. According to this model, cogni­tion starts with the passive reception of sense data and ends with the bodily action (the two slices ofbread), while the cog­nitive centre (the filling) processes the sense data and com­mands the body. Contrary to such a linear conception, embod­ied and situated accounts of action understand perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes as circularly connected and mutually constitutive (e.g. Gallagher, 2009; Johnson, 2010; Shalin, 2017). Similarly, in social theory, authors such as Hans Joas (1992/1996) and Anselm Strauss (1993/2014) draw on pragmatism to oppose both rationalist and deterministic the­ories of action. From their perspective, rationalist theories falsely assume that individuals permanently experience their situation consciously and conceptualise it in means-ends rela­tionships, while deterministic theories assume that con­sciousness is ineffective, and action is instead regulated by drives or habits alone. From a pragmatist perspective, belief and doubt -or, as Joas would put it, habits andcreative recon­struction -mutually constitute each other. Which of these phases of activity is dominant cannot be decided a priori but rather depends on the challenges the concrete situation holds in store. Social interaction and the emergence ofthe self through perspective-taking The differences between modes of organism-environment inter­action just described are also relevant for the pragmatistperspec­tive on the emergence of the self. Classical pragmatist arguments regarding this issue vary in complexity. The writings of James and Dewey suggest that the emergence of the selfcan be under­stood as a result of the inhibited and flexible character ofhuman activity, which gives rise to self-reflexivity and self-awareness as aneffective way tocope with a contingent environment. Mead re­fines this argument by claiming that the genesis of the self can only be understood ifthis pragmatist account of human activity is connected with an analvsis ofthe soecifics ofsocial interaction. Self-awareness, according to Mead, is rooted in the ability to look at oneselfthrough the eyes ofothers, that is, in the ability ofper­spective-taking. Mead studies this connection of social interac­tion, perspective-taking, and the emergence ofthe self on an evo­lutionary, ontogenetic, and macrosocial level.2 In this section, I will first summarise Mead's evolutionary arguments; then I will refer to the implications of some recent findings for Mead's the­ory. His ontogenetic and macrosocial arguments will be dis­cussedinthe following sections. In his evolutionary account of the emergence ofperspective-tak­ing and the self, Mead draws on the comparative analysis of ani­mal and human interaction. The social interactions of animals, he claims, exhibit a fixed structure and are regulated by instincts. In several studies, Mead illustrates this mode ofsocial interaction with reference to a dog fight (Nungesser, 2016: 258-265). The fight, Mead argues, consists ofa series ofreciprocal instinctive re­actions that 'does not call for more than inherited physiological adjustment' (1925: 263). The reciprocal reactions take the form of a 'conversation ofgestures' (Mead, 1910: 398). A gesture, then, is an abbreviation of a social action. For example, the dogs' snarling and baring ofteeth can be interpreted as the evolution­ary remnants of the original action ofbiting. Such gestures trig­ger an instinctive response by other group members, resulting in a coordinated interactional pattern. Within such instinctive and gesture-based interaction, there is, according to Mead, neither the possibility nor the functional ne­cessity to develop a self. This is different in humans. Because they lack instincts, they 'do not know what to do'. However, as was shown inthe previous section, it is the very indeterminacy ofbe­haviour that allows humans to detect new objects to cope with the challenges oftheir environment. According to Mead, this abil­ity led to a dramatic change in social interaction in the course of human evolution. The mutually reactive character ofsocial inter­action allowed human individuals to detect a new social object that drastically influenced the behaviour of their conspecifics, namely, themselves. Ofparticular importance within this process was a specific class of communicative signs, which Mead (e.g. 1912) calls -following Wilhelm Wundt -'vocal gestures'. Because the 'sender' is affected by his or her own vocal gesture in the same way as the 'receivers', the individual can associate others' reactions to the vocal gesture with his or her self-affection (Mead, 1922: 161). This is why, for Mead, the use ofvocal gestures facili­tates the constitution ofthe selfas a socialobject inhuman social interaction.3 The emergence of perspective-taking and the self results in a new form ofsocial coordination, which is, according to Mead, hu­man-specific. Aside from perspective-taking, this newform ofso­cial coordination is also based on reciprocal anticipation, learn­ing, and habits. Perspective-taking also gives rise to symbolic communication. In contrast to gestures, significant symbols are perceived not only by the receiver but also by the sender, thus fa­cilitating the establishment of a common meaning (e.g. Mead, 1922). Symbols are necessary for the development of language, which, again, is constitutive for both reflective forms ofgroup co­ordination andcomplexforms ofthinking.4 If one confronts Mead's analysis ofanimal and human socialin­teraction with current research, the previously mentioned pat­tern reappears. Similar to Dewey, Mead develops highly innova­tive arguments that suffer from their dichotomous structure and the contemporary lack ofreliable empirical research. Hence, it is appropriate to revisit Mead's approach in light of recent ethologi­cal findings. These findings strongly suggest it is necessary to distinguish a continuous spectrum ofmodes ofsocial interaction that considers nonhuman social activity that is not exclusively based on instinctive patterns. Such non-instinctive patterns can be observed, for example, in primates. Primatological experi­ments suggest that the ability to engage in perspective-taking and to communicate in a flexible, situation-specific way can no longer be regarded as a human monopoly. However, experiments also show that these capacities are limited in important ways (Nungesser, 2016). Despite these differences, important ethologi­cal studies agree with pragmatism in that complex communica­tion and cognition depend on social cognitive capacities, such as perspective-taking, and that language in the strictest sense only took shape in the course of human cultural evolution and then became a seminal medium of human thought (Nungesser, 2012: 187-196;Tomasello, 1999). The refinement ofperspective-taking in the course ofsocialisation While Mead's comparative analysis focusses on the phylogenetic conditions for the emergence of perspective-taking and the self, his discussion of human socialisation reconstructs how perspec­tive-taking and the self become more complex over time through social interaction. Again, I will outline Mead's arguments before discussing theirrelevance for current debates. In his well-known reconstruction of ontogeny, Mead (1925, 1934/2015, ch. 20) distinguishes between two stages of perspec­tive-taking by looking into the development ofchildren's play be­haviour: The first stage, which Mead calls 'play', consists of sim­ple role plays. In such a play, children adopt the perspective of specific and typical social roles. Thus, in this stage 'the child is continually acting as a parent, a teacher, a preacher, a grocery man, a policeman, a pirate, or an Indian' (Mead, 1925: 269). In the second stage, which Mead calls 'game', children begin to take part in competitive and rule-based games, such as team sports. To participate in such games, children need to engage in a more complex, qualitatively new form of perspective-taking that pro­vides a situational overview. For example, when playing football, children need to consider the perspective oftheir teammates and opponents, but they also must follow the rules of the game as well as tactical guidelines. To do this, children need to adopt a kind of social bird's-eye view that Mead (1925: 268, 1934/2015: 154) calls the 'generalized other'. Through the adoption ofgener­alised perspectives, the relations between different roles and gen­eral expectations ofthese roles -that is, norms, rules, and plans ­become understandable. What is more, according to Mead (e.g. 1925: 272-273), all general concepts that imply an evaluation that is perceived of as independent of individual persons -such as objectivity, justice, validity, or truth -presuppose the adoption of such generalised perspectives. Mead's interpretation ofchildren's play behaviour and perspec­tive-taking is connected to his distinction between the 'I' and the 'me' as two aspects ofthe self(Mead, 1934/2015, ch. 22, 25, 27). In the beginning, Mead argues, children are purely impulsive be­ings. So, they have an 'I' but not yet a 'me'. Through the develop­ment ofperspective-taking, children learn to judge their own im­pulses and creative flashes based on the perspectives of others. This is how they acquire a 'me'. Only after the constitution ofthe 'me' can they understand that others perceive and judge them and that they expect certain actions from them. Importantly, through the internalisation of the interplay of 'I' and 'me', chil­dren can anticipate the reactions ofothers to a certain action be­fore itis actually performed-a crucial step in the development of reflexive and normative agency. Also, during socialisation, the 'me' multiplies because the individual encounters various groups and institutions which often possess diverging standards and norms. Although it comes under stronger social control in the course of socialisation, the 'I', however, remains a source ofspon­taneity and creativity. Although there was hardly any systematic psychological re­search on human ontogeny in Mead's time, ifwe look into recent studies in developmental psychology, we can notice important similarities to his account. Michael Tomasello and Hannes Rakoczy (2003: 139), for example, agree with Mead in that 'the child is going from guiding its actions via an internalized "signifi­cant other" to guiding its actions via an internalized "generalized other"'. The first step can be observedintwo-year-olds who show an understanding ofthe intentions ofothers but do not yet grasp how cultural institutions work. This changes in four-and five­year-olds, who gain access to 'collective realities' and general nor­mative expectations. This also explains why in 'virtually all cul­tures in which there is formal education, where children learn about such things as cultural institutions and their workings, 5 to 6 years of age is the canonical starting point'. While they con­firm Mead's description of the generalisation of perspective-tak­ing in the course of socialisation, studies in developmental psy­chology can give us a more comprehensive and experimentally based chronology ofontogenetic development. Also, the connec­tions between the development of social cognition and other, es­pecially linguistic, competences are studied in much more detail (e.g. Tomasello, 1999, ch. 3-§., 2019). Pragmatist social theory and the interactionist tra­dition in sociology The relevance ofthe pragmatist account ofinteraction is not lim­ited to the analysis ofdifferent modes oforganism-environment interaction or the development ofhuman agency in the course of anthropogenesis and socialisation. Rather, it has also wide-rang­ing implications for the understanding of society. I will now il­lustrate some of the key implications by pointing to four social mechanisms that are not onlv core comoonents of ora011atist so­cial thought but also paved the way to crucial contributions to the interactionist tradition in sociology. Experience, social objects, and meaningasproducts of interaction From a pragmatist perspective, experience is socially constituted through a myriad of interactions. As Dewey (1916/2008: 71) states, experience is 'reconstructed' or 'reorganized' by living in a social group. This is the very process he calls 'education'. Crucially, for Dewey, education is not a process in which certain contents are transferred directly from one individual to another. Instead, only when the individual participates in conjoint activi­ties with more experienced individuals will he or she learnwhich aspects of the environment are of importance, what they mean, andhow they are used(Dewey, 1916/2008: 25). The idea that the behaviour of individuals is based neither on objective meanings inherent in the surrounding objects nor on subjective meanings emerging from the individual mind but on socially and interactively produced meanings became the start­ing point of important sociological contributions. It was espe­cially Herbert Blumer (1969/1998) who took up this pragmatist insight and transformed it into a sociological research pro­gramme he named 'symbolic interactionism'.5 According to Blumer, this insight has far-reaching methodological conse­quences (for more details, see the chapter on Blumer in this volume).6 Social phenomena cannot be explained just by looking at social structures or individual dispositions. Things do not speak for themselves but gain meaning and relevance only through interaction and interpretation. For example, as espe­cially Howard S. Becker (1973) argues, social problems or deviant behaviour are not simply 'there'. Instead, they are 'social objects' that result from the interactive formulation and enforcement of social rules that define a certain situation, behaviour, or person as problematic or deviant. Similarly, as Becker (1973, ch. 3) showedusing the example ofmarijuana consumption, the physi­ological change caused by a drug does only lead to a pleasant ex­perience when it is framed in interaction with more experienced users as a positive result ofthe practice ofdrug use. The social constitution and transformations ofthe self One ofthe crucial contributions of Mead's pragmatist social the­ory is the insight that the emergence of the self can be under­stood as a result ofthe capacity for perspective-taking. By looking at themselves through the eyes ofothers, individuals internalise the cultural narratives and normative standards of their group(s), evaluate their actions accordingly, and, thereby, build up complex identities which remain dependent on their social environment andthe recognitionofothers. This conceptualisation of a constitutively social self found its way into some of the seminal contributions to social theory. Jurgen Habermas draws heavily on Mead to argue for a 'paradigm shift' 'from purposive action to communicative action' (1981/2005, pt. V) and praises him for being the 'first to have thought through this intersubjective model of the socially pro­duced ego' (1992: 170). In an extension of his earlier study on Mead, Hans Joas (1992/ 1996, ch. 3.3) develops the claim that many theories ofaction fail to do justice to the 'primary sociality' ofhuman agency. Insteadofsimply assuming the existence ofin­dividual agency, Joas argues, every theory of action needs to con­sider the question ofhow agency develops in the course ofsocial­isation and how it remains dependent on social interaction after­wards. The idea of a constitutively social and continuously changeable self also became the starting point of interactionist studies of biographical transformations. The interactionist con­cept of 'the career' connects the theorem ofthe social selfto the study ofinstitutional and organisational contexts (esp. Goffman, 1961b; Strauss, 1959/1997). Over the courseofone's life, one will pass through various positions in social structure; each of these positions brings with it specific perspectives from which one can view, evaluate, and regulate one's behaviour. Importantly, the term 'career' is neither exclusively associated with professional careers nor with personal success but also involves nonprofes­sional as well as downward and horizontal dynamics. Hence, there are not only careers of bankers and university professors but also the careers ofmental patients (Goffman, 1961a), violent repeat offenders (Sutterliity, 2007), and radical protestors (Pettenkofer, 2017). Also, as especially Anselm Strauss (1993/2014: 53) stresses, careers are 'not entirely manageable' but follow 'trajectories'. We are, thus, not always in the driver's seat ofour own lives (for more details, see the chapter on Strauss in this volume). By integrating elements of planning with ele­ments of contingency, failure, and suffering, interactionist soci­ology, again, follows pragmatists like Dewey (1925/1929/ 1958: 23), who emphasises that interaction always has to be conceptu­alised as a process of'action-undergoing'. Perspective-taking, emotions, and social order Mead's arguments on perspective-taking can be complemented by Charles Horton Cooley's concept of the 'looking-glass self'. According to Cooley (1902/ 1922/2009: 183-184), the looking­glass self emerges through a three-step process. In contact with others, an individual first imagines how he or she appears to the other person; then, the other's 'judgement ofthat appearance' fi­nally results in 'some sort of self-feeling'. If the imagined judge­ment is positive, the individual usually experiences a pleasant self-feeling, such as pride; ifit is negative, an unpleasant feeling, such as shame, follows. Like Mead, Cooley indicates the imagined other can be a specific person or a group. Also, the other does not have to be present. Even ifindividuals are alone, others 'look over their shoulder'. Cooley's concept of the looking-glass helps us understand how genuinely social emotions, such as shame, embarrassment, and pride, are connected to normative expectations and social order. Important interactionist studies can be interpreted as a continu­ation of this insight. This holds especially true for the work of Goffman (Scheff, 2005). Not only does Goffman (1959) analyse the strategies individuals use to produce a positive image of themselves, he also describes in great detail the measures they take to protect the interaction order and the persons involved in it from embarrassing situations (Goffman, 1967; for more de­tails, see the chapter on Goffman in this volume). By analysing how companies enforce the manipulation of feelings in interac­tion, Arlie Hochschild (1983/2007) elucidates the connection of emotions, perspective-taking, and social organization from still another angle. The universalisation, hierarchies, and conflicts of perspectives By taking the perspectives of generalised others, individuals are able to understand and evaluate the viewpoints, attitudes, and actions not only ofthemselves but also of others. As Mead shows in his more macrosociological studies, generalised perspectives can lead to very different socialdynamics (Mead, 1918, 1929). On the one hand, contrasting different generalised perspectives can lead to insights into the limits and peculiarities ofone's own per­spective, which may foster dialogue and understanding between different individuals and groups. Such a dialogue can be given an institutionalised form that is of special importance in science, in the media, and in public political debate. On the other hand, the understanding ofgeneralisedperspectives also brings new incen­tives for aggression and violence: The development of gener­alised perspectives may lead to sanctions that aim at individuals who (supposedly) violate the norms of the group. Also, conflicts between generalised others may occur when different groups or political actors disagree, for example, on their political, moral, or religious truths. The conflicting consequences ofthe institutionalisationofgen­eralised perspectives are echoed in later scholarship that draws on pragmatist social theory. On the one hand, Habermas (1968/ 1987, 1981/2005) refers to both Peirce and Mead to de­velop his concepts of the rationality of communicative action and the ideal communication community, thereby emphasising the integrative and universalising dynamics of communication and perspective-taking. On the other hand, by connecting the concept of perspectives with concrete organisational settings, Goffman demonstrates that generalised perspectives are not neu­tral but are the result of power relations. According to Goffman (196la), in 'total institutions', such as psychiatric clinics or pris­ons, the inmates are forced to view and evaluate themselves by means of the perspectives that are valid in the organisation, which often leads to radical changes of their selves. Although Goffman develops this argument with reference to the extreme case of 'total institutions', it is clear that it contains a more gen­eral lesson, namely, that the inventory of perspectives used to build up an identity in a certain society is not only limited but also connected to social hierarchies and power relations (Athens, 2002; Pettenkofer, 2014; Thomas et al., 1972). Concluding remarks As has become clear, pragmatism is a fundamentally interaction­ist theory. Its conceptualisation ofinteraction touches on a great variety of issues: the basic bodily and perceptual dimensions of interaction; the genesis of perspective-taking, the self, and nor­mativity in human evolution and ontogeny; the social constitu­tion and transformation of experience and the self in institu­tional and organisational contexts; and the various macrosocial dynamics of generalised perspectives. Accordingly, a re-evalua­tionofthis conceptualisationofinteractionmust consider a wide variety offindings ranging from evolutionary biology and ethol­ogy to cognitive science and developmental psychology to social philosophy andsociology. From a sociological perspective, the breadth ofthe pragmatist approach to interaction may come as a surprise. Yet, I think it has several advantages: First, this approach highlights the originality of pragmatism in areas that are usually not perceived in the so­cial sciences. Second, highlighting crucial, yet often ignored, as­pects may also be of systematic relevance for social theory. For example, only if we take into account Mead's thoughts on evolu­tion, animal behaviour, and the psychology ofperception can we gain a comprehensive view ofhis radically embodied and consti­tutively social account of human agency, and only then may we see the important differences between Mead's understanding of human action and, for example, Blumer's or Habermas's (Joas, 1993; Kilpinen, 2013). Third, highlighting the scope of pragmatism's account ofinteraction can also help us see its lim­its. Despite all their innovative insights, the classical pragmatists did not develop an elaborate sociological theory (Nungesser and Pettenkofer, 2018). Instead, as revealed in the last section (and as will be shown in more detail in the following chapters), the prag­matists devised a series of highly innovative concepts that only later were transformed into full-fledged sociological research programmes. Notes 1 For the origins of the pragmatist concept of organism-environment interaction, see Pearce (2014 ). 2 However, the distinction between these analytical levels is often fuzzy in Mead's writings (e.g. Cook, 1993: 205). l I can only give a rough summary of Mead's arguments here. However, it needs to be pointed out that Mead's exact argumentation on self­constitution varies in different publications and suffers from argu­ mentative problems -particularly with respect to the 'vocal gesture' argument. For a detailed discussion, see especially Joas (1980/ 1985, ch.6) andCook (1993, ch. 6). !l Like Peirce and Cooley, Mead (1934/2015: 47-51, 141-142) under­stands thinking as the internalisation ofsymbolic dialogue. .i Although Blumer (1969/ 1998: 1, 21) mentions Dewey, his systematic argument draws almost exclusively on Mead (see Huebner, 2014, for a detailed study on how Mead became canonised as the founding figure of symbolic interactionism). Blumer's interpretation has been criti­cised repeatedly because it ignores key dimensions of Mead's pragma­tism, such as the importance of the physical environment or the em­bodied character of agency (see, e.g., Joas, 1993, ch. 1 and Striibing, 2005, ch. 2.4). §_ This is one ofthe reasons why there is a strong link between pragma­tist-inspired interactionist social theory and qualitative social re­search. For more on this, see Strilbing (2007) and the chapter on Strauss in this volume. References Athens, L. (2002). 'Domination': The Blind Spot in Mead's Analysis ofthe Social Act.Journal ofClassical Sociology, 2(1),25-42. Becker, H. S. (1973). Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press. Blumer, H. (1998). Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (Original work published 1969). Cook, G. A. (1993). George Herbert Mead: The Making of a Social Pragmatist. UrbanaandChicago, IL: University ofIllinois Press. 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Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Tomasello, M., & Rakoczy, H. (2003). What Makes Human Cognition Unique> From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality. Mind&: Language, 18(2), 121-147. 1 HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM, AND 2 lST­CENTURY SOCIOLOGY Thomas]. Morrione Herbert Blumer (1900-1987) is a pivotal figure in the develop­ment of sociology and social psychology. The central theoretical and methodological propositions ofsymbolic interactionism that he articulatedin 1937 are relevant throughout the social sciences today and are apt to remain so as long as there is interest inlearn­ing about human knowing, acting, and interacting. His insis­tence on a scientific empirically grounded examination ofhuman interaction in everyday life challenged then-prevailing sociologi­cal and psychological theories. His perspective evolved throughout his exceptionally produc­tive academic career and is informed by knowledge that he gained through personal experiences. These included serving as the public panel chair of the War Labor Board (1943-1945) and as the first chair of the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration for U.S. Steel and the Steelworkers of America (1945-1947). Within the academic world from 1940 to 1952, he edited the American Journal ofSociology and served as the president of the American Sociological Association (ASA) in 1956, the Society for the Study of Social Problems in 1954, and the Pacific Sociological Association in 1971-1972. A larger-than-life figure, over six feet tall, with a rich baritone speaking voice and the physique of a professional football player (which he was for a time), Blumer strode through life with courage, humor, and an ever-present cu­riosity about the nature ofhumanconduct. Exceptionally curious about the dynamic character and com­plexities of social life, Blumer entered academia and earned his MA from the University ofMissouri in 1922 and his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1928, where he worked with Ellsworth Faris as his thesis advisor and the philosopher G.H. Mead. Blumer's dissertation drew on C.H. Cooley's conception of "sym­pathetic introspection" to support what are now generally ac­cepted assumptions ofethnographic research (Prus, 1997, 1999). Critiquing social psychologists for relying upon physical science research methods to understand human action andgroup life, his dissertation contained the core ideas ofsymbolic interactionism. It also informed his Methodological Critique of Thomas and Znanieki's Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1939) and a great deal of his theoretical, methodological, and analytic-conceptual work. Dissertation in hand, Blumer taught at the University of Chicago from 1928 to 1952, when he was recruited to chair the sociology department at the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley. He retired from teaching there in 1967. Four years before he died, the ASA honored him with its Career of Distinguished Scholarship award, praising him for formulating the theory of symbolic interactionism and for making "substantive contribu­tions" to a "wide variety" (Blumer, 2003) of areas of study (Footnotes, 1983). These include, for example, his analyses of movies and adolescent development, drug addiction, social prob­lems (Blumer, 1971), the effects ofmass media, morale, race rela­tions and race prejudice (Blumer, 19 58), social development, pub­lic opinion polling, labor relations (Blumer, 1947), fashion (Blumer, 1969), social structure and power conflict (Blumer, 1954), collective behavior (Blumer, 1946, 1959), industrializa­tion (Blumer, 1990), research methodology(Blumer, 1939, (1969) 1986), and Mead's understanding of the nature of human con­duct (Blumer, 1966, [1969] 1986, 2003). Opening Pandora's box: paradigmatic clashes in the social sciences Influenced greatly by Chicago sociologists Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Ellsworth Faris, as well as byphilosophers Mead and John Dewey, Blumer took over teaching the social psychology course at Chicago at Mead's request in 19 31. Six years later, he put symbolic interactionism on the theory map when he distilled and articulated thecore ideas ofa group oftheorists, whom he named "symbolic interactionists" who "view social interaction as pri­marily a communicative process in which ... a person responds not to what another individual says or does, but to the meaning of what he says or does" (Blumer, 193 7: 171). His perspective stood in direct opposition to dominant stimulus-response behav­iorist theory by making "interpretation" the intervening variable between stimulus and response. It invited epistemological and ontological questions about the nature of social reality, action, social structure, change, and collective life. Blumer's scientific, empirically oriented, anti-behaviorist, anti­positivist, and anti-functionalist stance quickly drew him into controversies about sociological and social psychological theory and methods. In America, particularly from the 1920s through the 1950s, structural, functional, positivist, and neo-positivist sociological theory, as well as quantitatively oriented research methodology, enjoyed widespread acceptance among sociologists and social psychologists. Blumer's perspective contrasted sharply with these views and with psychological reductionism and be­haviorist models of human action in general. Predictably, his de­bates became more frequent as his fundamental ideas gained no­toriety and informed his critiques of dominant views (Maines, 1977, 1988; Morrione, 1988; Prus, 1996, 1997, 1999). He relished these exchanges and met them in a direct andconceptually artic­ulate fashion (Morrione, 2003: 1-11). David Maines (1988: 236-237) chronicles persistent misinter­pretations and recurring "myths" about Blumer's perspective as being a-theoretical (Huber, 1973) or anti-theoretical (Coser, 1976), as deficient for not melding Mead and Marx into a human­istic sociology attuned to the impact of structural variables (Lichtman, 1970), and as hamstrung by an a-structural view (Smelser, 1988) -a charge that has been repeatedly debunked (Lyman, 1988; Maines, 19771989; Maines and Morrione, 1990, 2001; Prus, 1996, 1997, 1999). Maines (1989: 384-387) also cites distortions offered by Hans Joas (1985: 6), J.D. Lewis and R.L. Smith (1980), L. Warshay (1975: 31, 119), andothers who paint a warped picture of Blumer not as the pragmatist he was but as a phenomenologist, "subjectivist," or nominalist/idealist. Rooted in pragmatism Clarifying his position in an April 17, 1979 letter to Irwin Deutscher, Blumer (2003: ii) said, "Mead was a pragmatist in philosophical stance andso am I.. . . (F)or pragmatism reality does not exist in consciousness, nor is the reality eternally real, inde­pendent of human experience with it." Blumer's symbolic inter­actionismrests squarely onpragmatism's assumption that reality lies at the point of contact between the empirical world and knower of that world. Reality emerges in a process in which the knower (1) is establishing the composition and character of the em­pirical world by indicating or asserting what it is and (2) is using that empirical world to test the validity of the indications and assertions. (Blumer, Letter to Peter Mills, 1982 in 2003, p. 167) He locates social reality and individual and collective acts of any size orcomplexity in a situated, continually emerging present. He rejects philosophical idealism and realism in favor ofempirically grounded understandings of everyday life composed of individ­ual andcollective acts, interactions, and social structures that are continuously defined reflectively and predicated upon the gener­ation and use of shared meanings. As processes, human actions and interactions, joint activities, and social organizations or structures are always situated. Dimitri Shalin's (1986: 13) description of what interactionists adopted from pragmatism reflects Blumer's stance, particularly in that reality is understood to possess an emergent or "indeter­minate" quality and to exist as a "pluralistic universe continually produced by the collective effort of individuals." More directly, Blumer's symbolic interactionism builds upon the cardinal prag­matist tenet (Mead, 1932, 1938: 215) that all aspects of reality and our thoughts about it exist as continual processes of becom­ing. Whatever it is, includingsociallife, it exists as a situationon­goingly reconstituted and always marked by our relation to it. Social reality in all contexts and forms, from the mundane to the extraordinary, from a person putting on his or her shoes to a community dealing with a mass shooting or a nation facing a balance oftrade crisis or a pandemic, is experienced as situations are indicated anddefined -wittingly or not -given meaning, and "handled" in some way or another -effectively or not. It is con­tinuously formed and reformed as situations that are themselves emergent processes with outcomes not written in stone. This is the empirical reality-in-process that Blumer exhorts symbolic in­teractionists and ethnographers engaging his view to describe and to understand. Premises, "root images," and central conceptions Although symbolic interactionists' scholarly interests vary con­siderably, there has emerged among them an acceptance of Blumer's ((1969) 1986: 2) three perspective-defining key tenets: (1) people's actions are based upon the meanings they ascribe to things they point out to themselves (objects); (2) meanings ofob­jects (any physical, social, or abstract thing indicated) are not in­herent to them but are developed through interactions with one­self and others; and (3) meanings are not unchangeable -people define and may reinterpret meanings ofobjects as they use them to construct acts when dealing with situations they face. Accordingly, individual and collective acts are accomplishments enabled bythe human ability to create and share meanings of ob­jects, define situations, and act upon those definitions. Blumer's portrayal of acts ofany scale, duration, or complexity as constructed moment to moment (with the contents and pro­cesses always subject to unpredictable effects) in ongoing situa­tions respects the emergent creative nature of human behavior. Indication, interpretation, and situational definition, thus, take on causal significance in establishing the nature and careers of individual or collective acts, including those of macro propor­tions. As developing processes, acts are not determined by ab­stract forces, such as strains toward equilibrium, or by "vari­ables," such as roles, norms, statuses, or reference groups (Blumer (1969) 1986: 53). What people do and the forms that social life takes depend upon the human ability to point out and define one's own indications as well as others' acts and utterances and to engage in symbolic interaction with oneself. Blumer ((1969) 1986: 6) develops this point further in his basic understandings, or "root images," ofthe nature ofgroups and so­cieties, interaction, objects, actors, and action, as well as the "fit­ting together" of ongoing acts to form collective or "joint" acts. He employs the latter termto build an empirically groundedcon­ceptual bridge to large-scale structured social phenomena (Blumer (1969) 1986: 58). Describing phenomena that are gener­ated, maintained, and changed through symbolic interaction, his basic conceptualizations further one's understanding of people's immediate life-worlds, inform his macro-sociological approach (Lyman, 1988; Prus, 1997; Maines, 1988; Morrione, 1988, 2003), and undergird his often path-breaking contributions to substan­tive areas such as fashion, collective behavior, social change, race prejudice, and powerrelations. As importantly, Blumer's "four central conceptions" of sym­bolic interactionism reveal his pragmatist-born commitment to viewing all forms and aspects of individual and collective acts and community life in terms ofprocesses that create, sustain, and change them. Essentially, he (Blumer ((1969) 1986: SO) observes that (1) action relies on constructing objects' meanings through the process of self-indication, (2) interactions among people are enabled through interpretations of what each indicates to the other(s), (3) acts are built up in situations as people point things out and interpret the relevance of whatever it is they confront, and, on a macro level, (4) "the complex inter-linkages of acts that comprise organization, institutions, division of labor, and net­works of interdependency are moving and not static affairs." These conceptualizations reflect his understanding of the ubiq­uity, complexity, and multi-layered operation and interaction of processes in social life; they frame his view of reality and direct his scholarly research agenda. Indeed, his contributions in areas such as collective behavior, labor and race relations, and industri­alization often involve drawing attention to the operation ofpro­cesses withinprocesses. Processes within processes Blumer's focus on process is especially evident, for example, in his formulation of the origin and career of social problems, wherein he observes that symbolic interaction-enabled collective definition, not so-called objective structural conditions, promotes the emergence and charts the careers of social problems. Accordingly, he offers a guide for the close empirical examination of five stages through which social problems are constructed; these cover its "emergence, ... legitimation, ... mobilization, ... formationofan official plan ofaction, and ... implementation" of that plan(Blumer, 1971: 301). Broadly speaking, a social problem is a form ofmacro-social or­ganization or structure, the career of which reflects the develop­ment ofeach ofthese five empirically observable arenas ofaction, interaction, or joint action. Each process contributes to socially constructed realities supporting individual and/or collective acts. And Blumer's discussions of such substantive areas routinely of­fer road maps to discovering emergent processes deserving em­pirical scrutiny. Thus, by uncovering the details ofthe process of collective definition, creating collective protest and change be­comes a focus of investigation. As people consider things, social unrest may entail the production ofdelegitimizing collective def­initions of social arrangements, which challenge the status quo (Blumer, 1978: 9); here, for example, Blumer would have us seek answers to questions such as, "Whose definitions?" "How are theycommunicated?" Robert Prus's work on generic social processes (GSPs), defined as empirically identifiable "transsituational elements of interac­tion" ( 198 7: 2 51), brings the abstract notionofprocess into sharp empirical focus, creating the basis for his formulation of a pragmatist's rationale for ethnographic research methodology and choice of sociological subject matter (Prus, 1997). He draws on Blumer's perspective to formulate his concept because of its inherent emphasis on the ubiquity of indication, interpretation, and definition occurring in human association and group life. This ubiquity lends symbolic interactionism a "generic" charac­ter, one that underscores its relevance, ifnot its indispensability, for analysis of "transsituational" forms of social life (Prus, 1999: 123). Additionally, in a Blumer process-oriented fashion, each GSP points to constitutive empirical processes within it. Thus, for example, while the generic process of socialization is germane to analysis of what occurs during military boot camp or a first­grade class, in each case, activities pertaining to "acquiring per­spectives," "achieving identity," involvement, "doing things," and "experiencing" relationships (Prus, 1987: 274-281) invite exami­nation as generic processes developing within processes, none of which have certainends given in advance. Emergence Blumer, as might anyone, observed that individual and collective acts and interactions take unpredictable twists and turns. For ex­ample, international trade negotiations, advocate groups' con­frontations, impeachment proceedings, community power group conflicts, marriages, industrial relations, and social problems have unpredictable careers and may be studied empirically as emergent processes. Constituted through processes intrinsic to symbolic interaction (indication, definition, interpretation, and situation-related self-reflexivity) and open to the play of obdu­rate factors outside developing lines ofaction, individual and col­lective acts and interactions are not entirely predictable in ad­vance. As G.H. Mead student and philosopher David Miller (19 73: 42) observes, "The emergent, being unpredictable in principle, does not follow logically from the world that is there, from the conditions necessary for its emergence, from what is tradition­ally calledits cause." In fact, "emergence, uniqueness, and the un­predictable are all parts ofreality that cannot be adequately sub­sumed in a scientific cause and effect logic" (Puddephatt and Prus, 2007: 276). Stressing this point with an eye toward "broadening" limited views of the relevance of Blumer's symbolic interactionism be­yond meaning creation and micro interaction, Snow (2001) sug­gests using emergence as an "orienting principle" to frame in­quiry into processes that produce novelty or changes in existing forms of social organization, what people normally do, how they define particular situations, or how they see things in general. While Blumer would probably be sympathetic to Snow's project, he would emphasize that emergence goes on continuously and is not restricted to what appears to actors as "novel." He found problematic the assumption that emergence is associated exclu­sively with change because it implies logically, but misleadingly, that something is there in a.fixed fashion that is changed. Blumer (Blumer-Morrione conversation, December 9, 1985) said of Mead's (1934, 193 8) treatment ofemergence: If there's anything that's true in Mead's thought, it's the realization that it's a process going on all the time, which contains within it as a process, the ingredients of a shifting scene.... He's conceiving ofthis process as a continuous ongoing affair, as it actually is because what happens this moment is not the same thing as what happened a mo­ment ago or what will happen a moment ahead. You've got inher­ently, not accidentally, but inherently, a flux taking place and I think that thought is something that has escaped scholars by and large, even though they may talk about emergence. Thus, as Blumer sees it, (1) specific instances of social reality, and social reality in general, are ongoing emergent processes re­siding in streams and networks of situations met by acting units (individuals, groups, large-scale organizations, societies, etc.). (2) The existence ofemergence as a ubiquitous adjusting process is a necessary feature of reality. As Miller (1973: 41) notes, "A world without adjustments would be a world without emergents and without process, passage, time, and history." (3) Emergence oper­ates at all levels of scale of social phenomena and characterizes the physical as well as psychological realms of reality (Mead, 1934). (4) In so far as interpretation and situational definition in­volve the ongoing selection of past and future elements when shaping individual and collective acts, and social structures com­prised of them, such selection is an emergent process at the root ofhuman creativity, a source ofnovelty that is "incurably unpre­dictable" (Miller, 1973: 29). (5) While definitions ofsituations are emergents that guide acts, Blumer (1972, (1969) 1986) cautions that social reality has an "obdurate" character that also impacts them and that situations have qualities independent ofhowever they may be defined by an "acting unit" -individual, group, orga­nization, community, society, etc. For example, however much I may believe that I can convert another's political opinion to my own, that other may remain opposed to my position. And, ( 6) the ubiquity of emergence does not mean that there are no patterns ofindividual and collective human activity (Blumer (1969] 1986: 86) or that within repetitious acts emergent symbolic interac­tional processes are not occurring. In terms of emergence manifested on a larger scale, consider unpredictable paths of organizational mergers and acquisitions, marriages, union/management bargaining, congressional de­bates, political primaries, or military conflicts, all of which are neverentirely predictable. As acting units meet and handle situa­tions, their acts, identities, and situational definitions are built up through selectively carving out, in ways that are not fully deter­minable, recollected and immediate experiences as well as imag­ined aspects of projected situations (Morrione, 1985). How, which, or when such indications enter the construction of thought and situated action is not entirely determinable. As emergents, an acting unit's selections from a recollectedpast and from future projections are folded into ongoing situational defi­nitions, acts, interactions, and developing joint acts. Emergence is an elemental aspect of Blumer's view of social causality per­taining to the construction and career of acts, interactions, and forms ofsmall andlarge-scale social organization. Social causation, macro social phenomena: industri­ alization and race prejudice Blumer (19 56) rejects the determinism implicit in variable analy­sis and the associated common assumption that factors external to individuals act upon them as passive agents to determine par­ticular outcomes. Such an assumption is, for example, evident in faulty causal logic revealed in prevalent interpretations of industrialization's role in producing social change (Blumer, 1990: 103-126, 145-150). In that Blumer ([1969] 1986: 70-75, 2003: 25-26, 95-102) con­siders macro (a term he found conceptually problematic and never used) social structures, large-scale complex social organiza­tions, systems of stratification, and institutions to be forms of joint action, he finds symbolic interactionismquite capable ofan­alyzing them at least as effectively as mainstream sociology does (Maines, 1977, 1988: 47, 1989). Contrary to a view of macro social entities that reifies them, conceptualizing them as somehow self-directing, Blumer ([1969] 1986: 58) believed they shouldbe viewed empirically, as continu­ally constituted, shaped, and directed by people in interaction with one another, weaving their acts together. Always situated, macro social phenomena are formed in an emerging present in which existing ongoing structures (as forms of joint action), meanings of acts, and definitions of situations play into them as they are constructed. In his process-oriented view of social orga­nization, the meanings of individual and joint acts are elements ofhistories constructed and recalledby groups, organizations, in­stitutions, and societies (Blumer (1969] 1986: 20); but these his­tories do not fully determine their paths ofdevelopment. Blumer's (1990) Industrialization as an Agent ofSocial Change illustrates his empirically orientedposition concerning macro so­cial phenomena and social causation. Defining industrialization as an economic system possessing "a nucleus of mechanical pro­duction, an attached network ofprocurement and ofdistribution, and an attendant service structure" (Blumer, 1990: 32), he argues that "To be realistic and workable in scholarly use, the conceptu­alization ofindustrialization as an agent ofsocial change must be cast in terms of items or features that can be identified and traced at work in the collective life of the group" (Blumer, 1990: 42). Individual and collective situational definitions figure among the most significant of such features, especially since his counter-intuitive thesis is that industrialization plays a neutral role in determining social change. His view elevates the causal significance of such definitions and supports an emergent process model of social structure and societal organization. In so far as social life is human action and interaction, change neces­sarily involves actors' self-enabled ability to create objects and to act based upon their meanings when dealing with situations in­volved. This ability enables people and groups to address and handle routine or novel situations as they emerge, including, in this case, those accompanying the introduction of industrializa­tion into a variety of spheres ofestablished everyday community life. As industrialization touches community activity at various "points of entry" (Blumer, 1990), individuals and groups define its manifestations in ways that make sense to them and not in some predetermined way or according, for example, to abstract system requisites. Their interpretations of industrialization's manifestations and the subsequent definitions ofsituations they construct identify potential areas of social adaptation, accep­tance, accommodation, or resistance. Such interpretations pro­vide rationale for adjustments relating, for example, to the community's established patterns of social interaction, occupa­tional, class, status, or power structures (Blumer, 1990: 42-49). So, change (or a lack ofit) that occurs in the structure ofthe exist­ing social order depends on the meanings that people create in interaction and on the situational definitions they formulate as they confront their new experiences. Consequently, society usu­ally exhibits among the different points of entry a mix of collec­tive responses to industrialization's appearance (Blumer, 1990: 101). Blumer's point, supported by empirical studies, is that industrialization's impact varies greatly depending upon how its actual or imagined consequences are defined in areas where it contacts individual and community life. Such outcomes are emergent and, ultimately, indeterminable. In terms ofcausation, he also notes the desirability ofattempting to understand indus­trialization as an agent of social change by contextualizing it within larger intra-and extra-societal processes, including, for example, cultural traditions, internal political machinations, or the state of the global economy (Blumer, 1990: 150). Such factors as these mayexert influences despite individual or collective defi­nitions of situations and subsequent acts, hindering or facilitat­ing ongoing industrializing processes. As does his analysis of industrialization as an agent of social change, Blumer's (1958) seminal work on race prejudice as a function of group position illustrates the importance of his per­spective and his structure-as-process macro-sociology. It poses a serious challenge to psychological theories of prejudice (Adorno et al., 19 50; Allport, 1966) that locate its source in individuals' psychologically generated negative feelings about perceived dif­ference (Lyman, 1984). Blumer (1958: 3) asserts that prejudice develops as the result of a process of collectively defining and sharing an identity and a "sense of group position" and is not a function of personality. It emerges as superordinate groups per­ceiving threats to their position ofcontrol attempt to diminish or eliminate the impact of such threats. Central to this argument, his observation that super-and sub-ordinate group images or identities are formed not in primary interactions but in leader­influenced and media-shaped public contexts seems particularly relevant to understanding the character of today's media-satu­ratedsocial world. Perry's (2007) ethnographic exploration ofthe notion of a "universal white identity" supports Blumer's insight into how perceived threats to group positions play into collective identity. Minescue and Poppe (2011) lend further support to Blumer's group positional model and generalize it beyond its ap­plicability to understanding the origins and dynamics of race prejudice when they explore contesting groups' relative sizes as related to intergroup conflicts among national minorities in Russia. And, Bobo's (1999) and Bobo and Hutchings' (1996) ex­aminations of the dynamics of prejudice build upon Blumer's thesis by stressing the need for studies of group identity forma­tion, threat perception, public leadership, the role of interest groups and the media in shaping images of oppression and stereotypes, and the cultural framing ofracial identities. Here, as is typically the case, Blumer's substantively oriented work ex­pands research horizons relating to social action and community life. Conclusion The foregoingcomments on Blumer's view of industrialization as a macro social phenomenon and on the social origin ofrace prej­udice offer just two of countless examples of how scholars striv­ing to extend the relevance of symbolic interactionism and Blumer's work continue to see them as critically important sources with the potential to further our understanding of the nature and complexity of human association and group life. As Fine (1993) pointed out some time ago, Blumer's core theoretical ideas now inform a wide range ofviews, including feminist, phe­nomenological, postmodernist, and semiotic perspectives, and they have been linked to major theorists other than Park and Mead, among whom are Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Karl Marx, and Jurgen Habermas. Scholars continue to plumb the depths ofBlumer's theoretical insights today. Still, for those who attend more closely and directly to Blumer's symbolic interactionism, there is immensely more to be gleaned from his theoretical, methodological, analytic-conceptual, and substantive work. Thus, for instance, Prus (1996, 1997, 1999) and Prus and Grills (2019) draw extensively on Blumer in ad­dressing and articulating generic features of social life as they pertain to a wide range of human knowing, acting, and interacting. Those who gain greater familiarity with Blumer's work are apt to discover within it an extensive array of theoretical insights. Such familiarity provides access to an exceptionally potent methodology and to a conceptual guide to producing empirically informed ethnographic research. His perspective directly chal­lenges conventional models ofsocial causation that disregard the actualities ofhuman group life. Blumer also provides a macro so­ciology that respects the character of social life and all its emer­gent complexities as ongoing streams of situations and inter­changes. He champions a social science that examines commu­nity life as experienced by symbolically enabled humans, who, through their acts and interactions with self and others, create, sustain, and change the social worlds in which we live. References Adorno, T. W., Frankel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and Row. Allport, G. W. (1966). Prejudice and the Individual. In J. P. Davis (Ed.), The American Negro Reference Book (pp. 706-713). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 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Perinbanayagam (Eds.), Foundations of Interpretive Sociology: Original Essays in Symbolic Interaction (pp. 161-192). Greenwich, CT: JAi Press. Morrione, T. ]. (1988). Herbert G. Blumer (1900-1987): A Legacy of Concepts, Criticisms, and Contributions. Symbolic Interaction, 11(1), 1­12. Morrione, T.]. (2003). Preface and Editor's Introduction. In T.]. Morrione (Ed.), George Herbert Mead and Human Conduct (pp. ix-xvii, 1-11). WalnutCreek, CA: AltaMira Press. Perry, P. (2007). White Universal Identity as a 'Sense ofGroup Position'. Symbolic Interaction, 30(3), 375-393. Prus, R. (1987). Generic Social Process: Maximizing Conceptual Development in Ethnographic Research. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 16(3), 250-293. Prus, R. (1996). Symbolic Interaction and Ethnographic Research: Intersubjectivity and the Study of Human Lived Experience. New York: SUNY Press. Prus, R. (1997). Subcultural Mosaics and Intersubjective Realities: An Ethnographic Research Agenda for Pragmatizing Social Sciences. Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press. Prus, R. (1999). Beyond the Power Mystique. Albany, NY: State University ofNew York PTess. Prus, R., & Grills, S. (2019). Management Motifs: An Interactionist Approach for the Study of Organizational Interchange. Basel, Switzerland: Springer International. Puddephatt, A. J., & Prus, R. (2007). Causality, Agency, and Reality: Plato and Aristotle Meet George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer. Sociological Focus, 40(3), 265-286. Shalin, D. N. (1986). Pragmatism and Social lnteractionism. American Sociological Review, 51(1), 9-29. Smelser, N. (1988). Social Structure. In N. Smelser (Ed.), Handbook of Sociology (pp. 103-129). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Snow, D. A. (2001). Extending and Broadening Blumer's Conceptualization of Symbolic lnteractionism. Symbolic Interaction, 24(3), 367-377. Warshay, L. (1975). The Current State ofSociological Theory. New York: D. McKay. 4 STRAUSSIAN NEGOTIATED ORDER THEORYC. 1960-PRESENT Adele E. Clarke To understand social science is to understand the metaphors that social scientists use. Gary Alan Fine ( 1984: 239) One fundamental metaphor in the social sciences is 'negotia­tions.' Negotiated order, developed by Anselm Strauss (1916­1996), is an enduring 'generic (widely applicable) social process' (Schwalbe et al., 2000), providing useful analytic entree into a vast array oftopics.1 Now incirculationfor over 60 years, the in­fluence of this perspective has been substantial, with Google Scholar listing approximately 9,400 entries with 'negotiated or­der' in the title and/or text as of2 7 June 2020. Strauss specialized in discerning such generic social processes and, through intensively empirical research, t ransforming them into what Leigh Star (1989a) called 'theory/methods packages.' These packages were Strauss's frameworks of practice through which theorizing informs research, which in turn informs theo­rizing and so on, abductively enriching, strengthening and inte­gratinginteractionist scholarship. At the core ofStrauss's work from the 1950s on were his sus­tained anti-dualistic efforts to clarify relations among social structures and social processes (e.g. Charmaz and Clarke, 2020; Stri.ibing, 2019). Initially, his empirical and theoretical negoti­ated order work centred on social processes (e.g. Strauss et al., 1964; Strauss, 1978a). For example, in early fieldwork, Strauss (1978a: 4-5) found negotiations pervasive, noting that 'Everyone seemed to be negotiating about something.' Strauss (1978a: 1, original emphasis) also introduced his book Negotiations with a processual definition: Negotiation goes by many names, is referred to by many synonyms: bargaining, wheeling and dealing, compromising, making deals, reach­ing agreements after disagreement, making arrangements, getting tacit understandings, mediating, power-brokering, trading off, exchanging, and engaging in collusion ... . (N]egotiations appear in many forms, ... in every and all areas oflife. Negotiated orders are sets oftemporary processual arrangements among various social actors that must be actively sustained or renegotiated. But Strauss's anti-dualism soon provoked him. Glaser and Strauss (1967: 239-242) had asserted that sociologically: '[S]tructure and process are related more complexly (and more interestingly) than is commonly conceived.' It was time to re­turn to more structural concerns. Strauss (e.g., 1978b, 1982b, 1984, 1993) then developed social worlds/arenas theory. With roots in Mead's work (Cefai, 2016), this theorycanbe viewed as a more structural 'flip side' ofnegotiatedorder theory. 2 Briefly, social worlds are groups of varying sizes that generate a life oftheir own with shared perspectives that form the basis of both individual and collective identities and action. As groups with shared commitments to certain activities, they generate shared ideologies about how to go about their affairs and share resources to facilitate their actions. Larger arenas ofconcern are constituted by multiple social worlds that are focused onpartic­ular shared interests and that are prepared to act collectively in some way. 'In arenas, various issues are debated, negotiated, fought out, forced, and manipulated by representatives of the various worlds and subworlds' (Strauss, 1978b: 124; see also Clarke et al., 2018: 61-77). Significantly, social worlds and arenas can serve as structural units ofanalysis for the study ofprocessual negotiated orders, including conflict and negotiations. Here, I first frame Strauss's and his colleagues' collaborative versions of negotiated order from their earliest publication in 1963 to the last in 1993. I then ask pragmatist questions: How and why did the negotiated order perspective come to be? What has it been useful for? How has it beentaken up and extended as an analytic tool? My review covers the first 30 years (c. 1960­1990) as 'early' negotiated order work, including Strauss's and others' development ofsocial worlds/arenas theory. The second period (1990-2020) constitutes 'later' work. Here my focus is largely on the wide-ranging applications of the perspective and little on the minutia ofdebates within it. Last, I engage three contemporary 'conceptual reincarnations' through which negotiated order and social worlds/arenas per­spectives are sustained in contemporary scholarship: 1) bound­ary objects; 2) infrastructures, classifications and standards; and 3) situational analysis. All three incarnations have deep roots in pragmatism and emphasize different facets, aiding and abet­ting anarray offreshapplications ofthe perspectives. Straussian negotiated order and social worlds/arenas theories The realm of rules could ... be usefully pictured as a tiny island of structured stability around which swirled and beat a vast ocean of negotiation. But we could push the metaphor further and assert ... that there is only vast ocean. (Strauss et al., 1964: 313, original emphasis) Like many other interactionist concepts, 'negotiation' as a key social process is now part ofthe accepted American sociological canon, its pragmatist interactionist origins largely obscured (e.g. Becker, 1999; Fine, 1993; Maines, 2001). To wit, my web searches found recent papers using the term 'negotiated order' lacking any citation. The concept of'negotiations' emerged in the late 1950s in the scholarlyliteratures on organizations and organizational behav­iour in discussions of bargaining. Usually part ofthe literature on economics/industrial relations, the nascent labour organiza­tional bargaining literature included work by sociologists Herbert Blumer (e.g. 1978) and Alvin Gouldner (e.g. 1954a, 1954b).3 During the Cold War, interest in bargaining also reached into the study of international relations (e.g. Morse, 1976). Strauss's more sociological concepts of negotiations, social Strauss's more sociological concepts of negotiations, social worlds, and arenas had their empirical roots in his collaborative research group's study ofwork in hospitals: In the late 19 50s, quite by accident, my coresearchers and I stum­bled on that very notion of arena, of flexibly acted-out organisa­tional scripts without firm rules, and on the crucial importance of negotiation to social order... .The problem forced itselfonouratten­tion, as we observed personnel and patients in two psychiatric hos­pitals, for everyone seemed to be negotiating about something. So central did this negotiation seem to the events being studied that when writing up the conclusions we made negotiation a key con­cept ... and coined the term negotiated order. (Strauss, 1978a: 4-5, original emphasis) Strauss and colleagues' (Leonard Schatzman, Danuta Erlich, Rue Bucher and Melvin Sabshin) classic article appeared in 1963, and their empirical and theoretical negotiated order book, Psychiatric Ideologies and Institutions, in 1964. Bucher and Strauss (1961) also initiated work on 'Professions in Process,' Schatzman and Bucher (1964) on negotiating the division of labour, and Bucher (1962) on 'segments' of a profession as po­tential reformist social movements. All ofthese inspired ongo­ing threads ofnegotiations research. Process (rather than structure) was then very hot in sociology; related interactionist works included Goffman's (1961) Asylums, Glaser and Strauss's (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Blumer's (1958) work on negotiating the colour line and Symbolic Interactionism (1969), Thomas Scheff's (1968) 'Negotiating Reality,' and more. Indeed, the dominance of this and related work led Herbert Gans to remark around1975 that, 'in many ways America has become a negotiating society' (quotedin Strauss, 1978a: 2). Strauss (1978a) viewed negotiatedorder as what we now term a 'generic social process' (Prus, 1996; Schwalbe et al., 2000). He posited the following key assumptions of his negotiated order theory: 1 Social order is negotiated order ... . There can be no organisa­tional relationships without accompanying negotiations. (emphasis added) 2 Specific negotiations are contingent on specific structural conditions ... patterned, not accidental. They can be studied in terms oftheir conditions, character and consequences for persons andorganisations. 3 The products ofnegotiation (contracts, understandings, ...) all have temporallimits, for eventuallythey will be reviewed, reevaluated, revised, revoked, and/or renewed. 4 Negotiated order has to be worked at [and) ... is continually reconstituted.... (emphasis added) 5 The negotiated order on anygiven day canbe conceivedofas the sum total of the organisation's rules and policies, along with whatever agreements, understandings, pacts, contracts, and other working arrangements currently obtained ... at ev­erylevelofthe organisation.... (emphasis added) 6 Any changes impinging on the negotiated order ... such as the introduction of a new technological element ... calls for renegotiationor reappraisal....(Strauss, 1978a: 5-6). Ultimately for Strauss (1978a: 6), the empirical question was 'How do negotiation and appraisal play into each other and into the rules, policies and other "more stable" elements of social order?' John Scanzoni's (1979: 529) review ofStrauss's Negotiations in Contemporary Sociology noted that his examples were mostly at the group or organization level, refuting the critique of SI as solely focused on micro phenomena. In Symbolic Interaction, Harvey Farberman (1979: 153-159) raved: 'Strauss opens up the possibility of developing an empirically grounded general theory ofsocial order.' With a classic grump, Carl J. Couch (1979: 159­ 163) wrote: 'What a sad effort... [yet]There is nothing better.' In Strauss's final engagement with this topic in 1993 in his capstone book, Continual Permutations ofAction (1993: 254), he suggests replacing 'negotiated order' with 'processual ordering': 'My use ofa verb -ordering-instead ofthe usual noun is meant to emphasize the creative or constructive aspect of interaction, the "working at" and "working out of" ordering in the face ofin­evitable contingencies.' Echoing Everett Hughes's (1971: 52-64) 'going concerns,' our obligation is to analyze the goingness, in­cluding conditions which facilitate and hinder it. Processual or­dering captured the range ofnegotiations from easy agreement to coercion and 'the lack of fixity of social order, its temporal, mobile, and unstable character' (Strauss, 1993: 255), the very flexibility that renders it ageneric social process. In 1978, Strauss (1978b) also published the first of several ar­ticles explicating his more structural social worlds and arenas theory, centred largely on negotiations within and among struc­tural entities he now called social worlds and arenas (described earlier). Strauss (1982b, 1984) later elucidated legitimation and segmentation processes ofsocial worlds and arenas -negotiated phenomenaindeed!(See also Becker I19 8 2].) Strauss continued to publish on both negotiations and social worlds/arenas for the rest of his career (Strauss, 1982a, 1982b, 1991, 1993; Stri.ibing, 2019), and his research and theorizing continued to reconcile the conventional binarism of structure and process. Early negotiated order research (c. 1960-1990) ... not everything is either equally negotiable or ... negotiable at all. One of the researcher's main tasks, as it is that of the negotiating parties themselves, is to discoverjustwhatis negotiable atany given time. (Strauss, 1978a:252) Thanks to its empirical potency, the negotiated order perspec­tive quickly became a resounding academic success, initially es­pecially in sociology. For the first 30 years, there were about 800 Google Scholar listings. Key early empirical interactionist works on negotiatedorder appeared in a special issue ofUrban Life (11, 3).4 David Maines' (1982b) introduction, 'In Search of Mesostructure,' strongly promoted the perspective. Larry Busch's (1982) paper in that special issue revealed the historical processes through which negotiations produce structural condi­tions, noting that once produced, they then shape subsequent ne1 Sociology ofHealth&: Illness, 19(4), 498-520. Allen, D., & Hughes, D. (201 7). 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Buy the Kindle edition to continue reading the lull book, or return to the store to purchase the Hardcover edition. 55295 Kindle Edition: ..,-, The Routledge International Buy now with 1-Click Handbook of lnteractionism ... By clicking "Buy naw wrth 1-Click". you agree to Amazon's Kindle Store Terms of U:e. Sold byAmazon.com Services LLC 1111 ~cc mn rc h11vinn nntinnc:.